R.A. No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
Facts:
A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation filed complaints for alleged violation of R.A. 3019 against Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago. Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against her before the Sandiganbayan. The prosecution then filed a motion to issue an order suspending Santiago. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion and ordered the suspension of Santiago for 90 days from her position as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines and from any other government position she may be holding at present or hereafter. Hence, this petition assailing the said order of the Sandiganbayan.
Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has the authority to decree a ninety-day preventive suspension of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago.
Ruling:
YES. The order of suspension prescribed by R.A. No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the said constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member. The Court ruled that Section 16 (3), Art. VI of the Constitution deals with the power of each House of Congress inter alia to 'punish its Members for disorderly behavior,' and 'suspend or expel a Member' by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days — is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of R.A. 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives."
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded members of Congress from R.A. No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government — the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary — has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either branch. R.A. No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
ANTERO J. POBRE v. Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009, Velasco, Jr., J.
No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
Facts:
Antero Pobre filed an administrative complaint against Senator Miriam Defensor- Santiago regarding the speech she delivered on the Senate floor. In the said speech, she said the following:
"I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots."
In her comment, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not deny making the aforequoted statements. However, she invoked parliamentary immunity contending that it was delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee.
Issue:
Whether Santiago can be subject to a disciplinary action. Ruling:
NO. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, which provides: "A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof."
The Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served.
Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.
DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO, and SALVADOR M. VIARI v. RICHARD J.