Fidel Castro and his communist government came to power in Cuba in 1959, much to the horror of the Eisenhower administration in the United States. Cuba was supported throughout the Cold War by the Soviet Union and became a flashpoint for Cold War tensions, notably during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when Nikita Khrushchev sparked the most dangerous Cold War confrontation by attempting to place nuclear weapons on the island. America has maintained near total sanctions on Cuba since 1959, but before 1990 they were largely offset by the support, trade, and subsidy offered by the Soviet Union. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the withdrawal of these subsidies has caused a 35% drop in Cuba’s GDP. The decreased threat of communism has led to a reevaluation of the sanctions by the United States, but so far the wounds of the twentieth century, and the electoral significance of Florida where most Cuban émigrés live, has steeled the resolve of the White House. Sanctions were, in fact, strengthened significantly in the Helms-Burton Act of 1996, although recent measures have made food and medicine a little easier to move from the United States to Cuba. In November 2003 almost 180 UN delegations voted to end the unilateral sanctions. Nevertheless, the Bush administration remained adamantly opposed to lifting the embargo and has tightened restric- tions on travel to Cuba. The administration has insisted that sanctions will remain until the Cuban government takes “meaningful steps” toward freedom, human rights, and the rule of law.
Pros
Cons
The sanctions cause real and unacceptable harm to the Cuban people. In the 1990s Cuba lost US$70 billion in trade and US$1.2 billion in international loans because of US sanctions. Cuba is too poor a country not to suffer from these losses. The dominance of America in the pharmaceuticals industry, moreover, means that Cubans are unable to gain access to many drugs. America would be the natural market for most Cuban products, and its refusal to accept goods with even the most minor Cuban components from third nations damages Cuba’s ability to trade with other countries. Other South American countries have recently relied on the types of loans that Cuba is denied to keep their economies on track.
Sanctions didn’t cause economic failure in Cuba. The communist political and economic system has been shown to lead inevitably to economic collapse with or without sanctions. Even if sanctions were lifted, lack of private ownership, foreign exchange, and tradable com- modities would hold Cuba back. The International Trade Commission found a “minimal effect on the Cuban economy” from sanctions. In fact, the US can best con- tribute to an economic recovery in Cuba by using sanc- tions to pressure that nation into economic and political reforms.
Sanctions are pointless and counterproductive. They’ve made no political difference in the last 43 years, why would they now? They result the US being blamed for all the failures of the Cuban economy, and sanctions are also used to justify repressive measures for security. Presi- dent George W. Bush claims to want to empower civil society in Cuba, but in 1998, while governor of Texas, he argued that the best way to achieve this in China was to trade and spread “American values.”
Sanctions are a proven policy tool and can be used to pres- sure an extremely repressive regime into reforms. Aggres- sive US engagement and pressure contributed to the col- lapse of the Soviet Union. Sanctions are also, according to Secretary of State Colin Powell, a “moral statement” of America’s disapproval for the Castro regime. Blam- ing America for all economic woes didn’t fool ordinary Russians, and it won’t fool Cubans. Now is exactly the time that the US should be tightening the screws so that Castro’s successor is forced to make real changes. No legitimate reason has been offered for singling out
Cuba for sanctions. Cuba has no biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons and does not sponsor terror. Cuba holds fewer prisoners of conscience than China, Viet- nam, Iran, or even Egypt. To maintain sanctions to encourage change in the form of government, as the US
Cuba is a repressive regime with one-party rule that holds political prisoners and stifles opposition and economic freedom through constant harassment. The Cuban government has refused to aid in the search for Al-Qaeda suspects and is on the US list of sponsors of terror because it provides a safe haven to many American
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claims it is doing, is totally illegitimate under interna- tional law. Cuba has offered to compensate US citizens whose property was nationalized in 1959.
fugitives. Cuba is known to have a developmental bio- logical weapons “effort” and is recorded as breaking in- ternational sanctions to export dual-use technologies to Iran. Finally, Cuba has failed to stop illegal drug ship- ments through its waters, and its government profits di- rectly from resources stolen from US citizens in 1959. Sanctions on Cuba are illegal and damage America’s
international standing. They violate the UN Charter, laws on the freedom of navigation, and repeated UN resolutions since 1992 (passed with only the US and Israel in opposition). Furthermore, some parts of the Helms-Burton Act are extraterritorial in their effects on the business of other nations and thus cause significant protest around the world. This makes a mockery of the US claim to be a guardian of international law, not only in its dealings with Cuba but also in the negotiations over the future of Iraq. America could achieve its goals internationally more easily if it were not for its own lack of respect for international law.
America is attempting to protect the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights for both its own citizens and citizens of Cuba. If the US breaks inter- national law, it is only to more fully realize the true aims of international law. The UN resolutions condemning the sanctions have never passed the Security Council and therefore lack any authority. America’s status as a guard- ian of human rights and an enemy of terror is enhanced by its moral refusal to compromise with a repressive gov- ernment just off its own shores.
The US will also benefit from the opening of trade with Cuba economically. Midwest Republicans have voted to drop the embargo because of the potential for profits in their farming states. Further, if sanctions end, Americans will be able to stop pretending that they prefer Bolivian cigars!
Cuba will never account for more than a tiny percentage of America’s trade, and it is able to source and sell all its products elsewhere. Even if Cuba were a vital market for American goods, it would be worth giving up some economic growth to maintain a commitment to the free- dom of the Cuban people. As it is, the total Cuban GDP is a drop in the ocean.
Sanctions are not the will of the American people but of a small minority of embittered Cuban Americans in Florida who are being pandered to. National opinion generally expresses no preference about or opposes the ban. In recent years the House of Representatives has voted by increasing margins to lift the ban on travel to Cuba, but the Bush administration remains opposed. This is electioneering government at its worst.
The people who care most about the Cuban question oppose dropping sanctions. The Midwest Republicans who voted to drop the travel ban are no less blinkered than the Cuban Americans who vote to keep it. Opin- ion on sanctions wavers; the separation of powers is in place specifically to allow the White House to maintain a stable policy on issues of national security.
sample motions:
This House would drop the sanctions on Cuba. This House would sanction sanctions. This House believes in Cuba Libre. This House condemns US foreign policy.
Web Links:
CubaNet. <http://www.cubanet.org> Provides latest news on Cuban domestic issues and international relations. •
Global Researcher. <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=7024>. Article written from an anti-sanction •
stance.
Washington Post. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/19/AR2007121902291.html> Argues •
Further reading:
Askari, Hossein G., John Forrer, Hildy Teegen, and Jiawen Yang. Case Studies of U.S. Economic Sanctions: The Chinese, Cuban, and
Iranian Experience. Praeger, 2003.
Haney, Patrick. Cuban Embargo: Domestic Politics of American Foreign Policy. University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005.
Osieja, Helen. Economic Sanctions as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the U.S. Embargo Against Cuba. Dissertation. com, 2006.