SEMEJANZAS Y DIFERENCIAS ENTRE LOS RELATOS DE MARCOS 8,22-26 Y JUAN 9,1-7.35-38

Question 1. To connect this chapter with what has gone before, St.

Thomas⁹⁶ says that in it Aristotle is showing that truth is found in act rather than in potency: about which we read almost nothing in the text.

Therefore, it is probable that Aristotle is digressing here and returning to say something about being as true. For, in this whole work, he principally uses three distinctions regarding being: namely, of being per se (omitting being per accidens) divided into ten categories, of being in act or being in potency, and of being as true and non–being as false. Therefore, since he has spoken of the first two [distinctions] in these three books, 7, 8, and 9, although he has excluded being as true, along with being per accidens, from the consideration of this science, nevertheless, in this Chapter he briefly returns to that, particularly to explain how truth is found in the knowledge of simple things; for this was completely set aside in Book 6.

And first of all, he repeats what he said in Book 6, namely, that truth and falsity are found in the judgment (compositio). About this opinion, many doubts can be raised, doubts which have been treated in Disputation 8, Sections 1 to 6.⁹⁷

Question 2. But further it is asked: is the truth of a judgment (compositio) taken from a composition of things, as Aristotle indicates? But the answer is clear: for the sense is not that to the mind’s composition, in order that it be true, there must correspond a composition in reality, but rather a union or conjunction of extremes, which is signified by the mind’s com-position. For although our mind enunciates being or not being only by really composing its own simple concepts, it does not however attribute to the thing conceived that mode of composition; but it understands a

thing which is in itself simple by way of what is composite. Therefore, the truth of the mind’s composition is based upon the union or the identity, which the extremes of the composition have in reality, whether that be an absolute and simple identity, or a union with some composition—unless perhaps in the very composition of the mind there is expressed a mode of identity or union, for instance, if you say: “The goodness of God is his wisdom,” or something of that sort. For then it is necessary that such a mode of identity correspond in reality between the extremes as is signified through the copula.

Question 3. Could the same proposition be true and false? Not indeed at the same time—for it is certain that in this way absolute truth, when it is present, excludes all falsity; which was treated in Disputation 9, Section 1⁹⁸—but successively. Aristotle, indeed, here affirms that, but there is some difficulty. However, we have defended the view of Aristotle in Disputation 8, Section 2.⁹⁹

Question 4. Whether there is some truth in the understanding of simple things has been discussed in Disputation 8, Section 2;¹⁰⁰ and above at the end of Book 6, some things have been noted for the explanation of this chapter.

Question 5. Whether in the understanding of simple things there may be some proper falsity, and how it happens by accident: Disputation 9, Section 1.¹⁰¹

Question 6. Whether the human intellect can know the quiddities of immaterial substances? For Aristotle says we have ignorance of them, not as a negation, but as a privation, indicating that the human intellect has the power to achieve that knowledge. In line with this, St. Thomas notes here¹⁰² that Aristotle in this passage has decided for the affirmative side of this question, which he had left undecided in De Anima, Book 3, Text 36.¹⁰³ But if one considers it correctly, Aristotle in Book 3 of the De Anima is speaking about “the conjoined intellect.”¹⁰⁴ But in order that the opinion in this passage be true, that the ignorance which we now have of the es-sence of immaterial substances is in the manner of a privation, it is enough that in our intellect as such (secundum se) there be a natural capacity for that knowledge, even though, because of the impediment of the senses, [those substances] cannot be fully understood in this life. Therefore, from this present opinion we do not have a complete resolution of the question which was proposed in De Anima, Book 3. Hence, St. Thomas affirms in that place¹⁰⁵ that the question has nowhere been decided by Aristotle. But about this we speak at length in Disputation 35, Section 1.¹⁰⁶

Metaphysics Book IX 181 Question 7. Incidentally, also here it can be asked: whether from Aristotle’s opinion all immaterial substances are necessarily beings in act, and whether he would rightly conclude that if they are in potency, they are generable and corruptible? For in this [place] /p. LIV/ Aristotle seems to say that he does not know any other way of production and [seems] to indicate that all incorruptible beings are necessarily beings in act. But about this subject we debate at length in Disputation 20, Section 1,¹⁰⁷ Disputation 30, Section 2 [sic],¹⁰⁸ and Disputation 35, Section 3.¹⁰⁹

Notes

1 Tightly bound to the preceding two books, Book 9 is devoted to the study of potency and act, their different species, and their mutual relations. In this book, Aristotle finishes his inquiries about the various ways in which to take being, of which he has spoken in Chapter 1, of Book 6. For this, cf. Tricot, Aristote…, p. xxviii.

2 Cf. Metaphysics 5.7.1017a35–b9; ibid. 6.2.1028b1–2.

3 Cf. DM 31, s. 3, vol. 26, pp. 233–5, where Suárez asks: “How and in what do being in potency and being in act differ in creatures, or essence in potency and in act?”

4 See especially, DM 13, s. 4, vol. 25, pp. 409–14, where the question is: “Whether prime matter has some actual ungenerable and incorruptible entity?” and ibid., s. 5, pp. 414–21, which asks: “Whether matter is pure potency, and in what sense is that to be taken?”

5 Cf. DM 15, s. 9, vol. 25, pp. 532–6, which asks: “Whether the dependence of matter on form is so great that one cannot be conserved without the other, even by Divine power?”

6 Cf. DM 42, vol. 26, pp. 605–33: “Generally about quality and its species.”

7 Cf. 1019a15–1020a6.

8 Cf. Metaphysics 9.1.1046a9–13. On this, see St. Thomas, In lib. Metaphys. IX, c. 1, l. 1, Cathala no. 1777: “Haec autem potentia reducitur ad primam potentiam activam, quia passio ab agente causatur.” (“But this potency is reduced to a first active potency, because passion is caused by an agent.)

9 That is to say, in a way which is common to all the categories.

10 That is, as restricted to one category.

11 Cf. e.g. Metaphysics 6.1.1025b22; ibid. 7.8.1033b8

12 Metaphysics 9.1.1046a21–22.

13 Cf. DM 44, 1, n. 10, vol. 26, p. 666.

14 Cf. “  ,    ’ …” Metaphysics 9.1.1046a27–28.

15 Cf. Aristotle: “ ” (“insofar as it is united by nature”). Hence, Moerbeke’s translation “inquantum simul natum est” (“insofar as it has naturally come to be al-together”).

16 My conjecture is that Suárez is here thinking of how, say, an individual might be moved by the innate tendencies of its specific nature.

17 Cf. DM 18, s. 7, vol. 25, pp. 631–50, which asks: “Whether in order that it be able to act, an efficient cause must be really distinct from the recipient [of its action]?”

18 Cf. Metaphysics 9.2.1046a36–37.

19 Cf. Metaphysics 9.2.1046b1–2.

20 That is, “De Anima”—or “psychology.”

21 Cf. Nichomachean Ethics 1.13.1103a2–3.

22 Cf. Nichomachean Ethics 1.13.1102b13–14.

23 That is, a potency to something outside itself.

24 Cf. De Anima 3, cc. 9–11, 432a16–34a21.

25 Cf. De Anima, 3.9 432a24–b7.

26 Cf. ibid. 10.433a32–b30.

27 Cf. Nichomachean Ethics 1.13.110213–15.

28 Cf. Metaphysics 9.1.1046b6.

29 For this, see S. Thomae Aquinatis, In Aristotelis librum de Anima commentarium, III, c. 9, l. 14, editio tertia, cura ac studio P.F. Angeli M. Pirotta, O.P. (Taurini: Marietti, 1948), pp. 189–98, nn. 796–846.

30 Cf. Metaphysics 9.2.1046b4–7.

31 Rather, cf. DM 19, vol. 25, pp. 687–745: “About Causes which act Necessarily and [Causes which act] Freely or Contingently, where [we treat] also of Fate, Fortune, and Chance.”

32 Cf. DM 26, s. 6, vol. 25, pp. 944–9, where Suárez asks the question: “Whether the same thing can be the cause of several effects, especially of contrary effects?”

33 Cf. Metaphysics 9.3.1046b29–33. Aristotle attributes this view to the Megarics. It seems to be first associated with Euclides of Megara (ca. 450–380 B.C.) and then, more famously, with Diodoros Cronos (d. 307 B.C.). On this, cf. Hans Seidl, Aristoteles’ Metaphysik, IX, Kommentar (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1978), vol. 2, pp. 464–5.

34 Cf. “   ,         

,   .” Metaphysics 9.3.1047a24–26. Note that while the sense is the same, the text here is not exactly congruent with the axiom derived from it.

35 Cf. Metaphysics 9.4.1047b3–6.

36 In lib. Metaphys. IX, c. 5, text. 8–9, vol. 8, fols. 232v–233v.

37 Cf. John of Jandun, Quaestiones in duodecim libros Metaphysicae, IX, q. 5 (Venetiis, 1554), fols. 114vK–115vO.

38 Cf. Chrysostomi Iavelli Canapicii, In omnibus Metaphysicae libris quaesita testualia metaphysicali modo determinata: in quibus clarissime resolvuntur dubia Aristotelis et Commentatoris, eaque ut plurimum decisa habentur iuxta Thomisticum dogma ..., IX, q. 10 (Venetiis, 1576), fols. 259r–261r. Javellus’ opening remark (259r) is of interest:

“In this question, in which I intend to speak only in a metaphysical way, and not as a theologian, I find two opinions, of which the first takes the negative side and the second the affirmative. The first is that of the Commentator [i.e. Averroes], which [opinion]

Jandun, [in his fifth] question on Book 9 of the Metaphysics, tries to defend. The second [opinion] is that of Blessed Thomas.” (“In hac quaestione, in qua intendo loqui mere metaphysic. et non ut theologus, invenio duas opiniones, quarum una tenet partem negativam, alia affirmativam. Prima est Comment. quam conatur defensare Iand. in lib.

9. metaphys. q. [quinta] secunda est B. Th.” Again, from Javellus’ text in this question, I think he is the source for Suárez’s understanding of Jandun.

39 Cf. In 12 lib. Metaphys., IX, c. 4, l. 3; Cathala nos. 1808–1809.

40 Cf. “       .” De Generatione et cor-ruptione 2.11.337b7.

41 Cf. DM 19, s. 2, vol. 25, pp. 693–700, where the question is: “Whether among efficient causes there are some which operate without necessity and with freedom?”

42 Ibid., s. 3, pp. 700–706, which asks: “Among efficient causes, if the first cause acts with necessity, can there be any one that acts freely? And, in general, does the freedom of an action require freedom in all the causes which influence it, or is freedom in one of them enough?”

43 Such would be a thing which would entail its own self–contradiction.

44 Cf. Metaphysics 9.4.1047b14–30.

45 See In 12 lib. Metaphys., IX, c. 4, l. 3, Cathala no. 1812.

Metaphysics Book IX 183

46 That is by repeated acts.

47 Cf. Metaphysics 9.8.1049b5.

48 DM 19, vol. 25, pp. 687–745: “About Causes which act Necessarily and [Causes which act] Freely or Contingently, where [we treat] also of Fate, Fortune, and Chance.”

49 That is, Disputation 19.

56 With this, cf. Metaphysics 9.5.1048a10–15.

57 See Pauli Soncinatis, O.P., Quaestiones metaphysicales acutissimae, IX, q. 14 (Venetiis:

Apud haeredem Hieronymi Scoti, 1583; Reprint: Frankfurt: Minerva G.M.B.H., 1967), p. 245.

58 Ibid., 245b.

59 Cf. DM 19, s. 6, vol. 25, pp. 719–24, where Suárez asks the question: “In what way is a free cause determined by a rational judgment?”

60 Ibid., s. 4, pp. 706–11, which asks: “In what way is there freedom or contingency in the action of a second cause, notwithstanding the concurrence of the first cause? And, consequently, in what sense is it true that a cause is free which, positing all that is required for acting, can act or not act?”

61 Rather, see: DM 22, s. 2, vol 25, pp. 809–26, which asks: Whether the concurrence of the First Cause with a second cause is something in the manner of a principle or of an action?”; ibid., s. 3, pp. 826–9, where the question is: “In what way is God’s concur-rence related to the action of a second cause and to the subject of that action?”; and s.

4, pp. 829–38: “In what way does God concur with second causes?”

62 In this Chapter Suárez gives no indication that he knows of a discrepancy between the text of Fonseca and those of others, including William of Moerbeke and Cardinal Bessarion with regard to lines 1048b18–35. On this cf. Fonseca, In Metaphy. Arist., tomus III, p. 647, and W.D. Ross, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 2nd edition (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1966), vol. 2, 253–4.

63 Cf. DM 31, vol. 26, pp. 224–312: “About the Essence and Existence of Finite Being as such, and their Distinction.” Esp.: ibid., s. 7, pp. 250–53, which asks: “What is the existence of a creature?”

64 Cf. DM 43, vol. 26, pp. 633–63: “About Potency and Act.” See especially: ibid, ss. 1–3, pp. 633–45, where the questions discussed are: (1) “Whether potency is sufficiently divided into active and passive, and what each of them is?”; (2) “Do active and pas-sive potency differ always in reality or sometimes only in concept?”; and (3) “What is divided in that division and how is it defined?”

65 Cf. DM 48, vol. 26, pp. 867–97: “About Action”; and DM 49, pp. 897–912: “About Passion.”

66 Cf. Metaphysics 9.7.1049a2.

67 Here I am reading (with Rábade et al.) “aeneum” and “aes” rather than the “aereum”

(airy) and “aer” (air) of the Vivès edition.

68 Here I am supplying “When” from the preceding Chapter heading, to carry on the sense of the accusative and infinitive construction from that heading to this.

69 See DM 43, s. 6, vol. 26, pp. 656–63, which asks: “Whether act is prior to potency in duration, perfection, definition, and cognition?”

70 On the topic here, cf. esp. DM 44, s. 7, vol. 26, pp. 679–81, which asks: “What acts does a habit cause?” and ibid., s. 8, pp. 681–6, whose question is: “Whether an act is an essential efficient cause of a habit?”

71 Cf. DM 43, s. 6, vol. 26, pp. 656–63, where the question is: “Whether act is prior to potency in duration, perfection, definition, and cognition?

72 Cf. Metaphysics 9.8.1050a2–3. Note that in the text Suárez was following this is now Chapter 9, whereas in the modern text of Aristotle it is Chapter 8.

73 Cf. Metaphysics 9.9.1051a4–15.

74 Cf. “     ,  ’ .” Metaphysics 9.8.1050a6–7.

75 Cf. DM 23, s. 2, vol. 25, pp. 847–51, where the question is: “How many ends are there?”

76 Cf. DM 48, s. 2, vol. 26, pp. 873–81, where Suárez asks: “Whether action as such es-sentially relates to a term, even if it is immanent action—and therefore this last is also located in this category?” it should be noted that this is the only reference I have found in which Suárez also has given a paragraph number. natural reason that there are in the universe some spiritual substances besides God?”

88 Cf. In 12 lib. Metaphys., IX, c. 8, l. 9, Cathala no. 1873. Be-ing.” The Sections cited are: 1, pp. 275–7: “Whether formal truth is in the composition and division of the intellect?”; 2, pp. 277–83: “What is the truth of cognition?”; 3, pp.

283–9: “Whether the truth of cognition exists only in composition and division or also in simple concepts?”; 4, pp. 289–92: “Whether the truth of cognition or of the intellect does not exist in it until it judges?”; 5, pp. 292–4: “Whether truth of cognition exists only in the speculative intellect or also in the practical intellect?’; and 6, pp. 294–5:

“Whether truth is in division as much as in composition?”

98 Cf. esp. DM 9, 1, n. 6, vol. 25, pp. 313–14, where Suárez excludes all falsity in relation to the Divine intellect.

99 Also see DM 9, 1, n. 22, vol. 25, p. 320.

Metaphysics Book IX 185

100 Cf. DM 2, s. 2, vol. 25, pp. 277–83, which asks: “What is the truth of cognition?”; but also cf. ibid., s. 3, pp. 283–9, where the question is: “Whether the truth of cognition exists only in composition and division or also in simple concepts?”

101 See DM 9, s. 1, vol. 25, pp. 312–21, which asks: “What and where is falsity? And is it a property of being?”

102 In 12 libros Metaphys., IX, c. 10, l. 11, Cathala no. 1916.

103 Cf. De Anima 3. 431b16–19.

104 That is, the intellect as joined to the body, which intellect then needs images (phan-tasmata) for its operation; cf. “The foundation is that [text] of Aristotle in Book 3 of the De Anima: ‘A man who is understanding must look to images.’ From this there is derived the philosophical principle that a man’s conjoined intellect cannot naturally operate unless the imagination at the same time cooperates. Hence it happens that if the imagination is damaged, the intellect cannot reason or discourse in an orderly way.”

(“Fundamentum est illud Aristot., 3 de Anim.: Necesse est intelligentem phantasmata speculari. Ex quo habetur illud philosophicum principium, intellectum hominis conjunctum naturaliter operari non posse, quin simul phantasia cooperetur; unde fit ut, si phantasia sit laesa, intellectus non possit ordinate ratiocinari et discurrere.”) Suárez, De oratione, II, c.

14, n. 3, in Opera, vol. 14, p. 187. Also, cf.: “But it must be taken into account that the intellect here is not separate from the body, inasmuch as it is a certain power of the soul, which is the act of the body.” (“Considerandum tamen est quod intellectum hic dicit non separatum a corpore, inquantum est potentia quaedam animae, quae est actus corporis.”) St. Thomas, In Aristotelis librum de Anima commentarium, III, c. 7, l. 12, editio tertia cura ac studio P.F. Angeli M. Pirotta, O.P. (Taurini: Marietti, 1948), p. 185, n. 786.

105 Cf. In Aristotelis librum de Anima, ed. Pirotta, p. 185, n. 785.

106 Rather, cf. DM 35, s. 2, vol. 26, pp. 436–9, where it is directly asked: “What can be known by natural reason about the quiddity and essence of created Intelligences?”

107 Cf. DM 20, s. 1, vol. 25, pp. 745–54, where Suárez’s question is: “Whether it can be known by natural reason that the creation of some beings is possible, or even necessary?

Or (what is the same) whether one being insofar as it is being can depend essentially on the effective causality of another?”

108 Rather, see: DM 30, s. 8, vol. 26, pp. 113–15, which asks: “Whether by natural reason God may be demonstrated to be immutable and eternal?”

109 See DM 35, 3, n. 52, vol. 26, pp. 456–7.

The Tenth Book of the Metaphysics