Sensor de humedad

After Aelian’s and Arrian’s respective works no specific military treatises were written in Greek prior to the sixth century.310 A handful of works were produced in

308_{I think that Richardot’s (2005: 352) statement is a little unfair: “Il n’a pas le goût du détail}

militaire d’un Ammien Marcellin.” The fact is, Jordanes had different objectives from Ammianus (and a different educational background); besides, Ammianus is not as

straightforward as Richardot suggests. If Richardot had been referring to the text at large, then I would agree, but not on the basis of this battle narrative alone. On Ammianus see Sabbah (1978), Matthews (1989), Barnes (1998), Drijvers and Hunt (1999), and Kelly (2008).

309_{For an excellent overview of late Roman military manuals see Rance (2007a: 343-348). I}

omit Julius Africanus, on which see Dain (1967: 335-336), and the comments pertaining to military matters in the anonymous On Political Science.

310_{Two notable Latin handbooks were written: the anonymous De rebus bellicis, a short}

treatise, which dates to the fourth century that is concerned with issues such as equipment and defence; and the Epitoma rei militaris of Vegetius, an important work, with some antiquarian characteristics, that may date to the fourth century, though more likely the fifth. On the former see the papers in Hassall and Ireland (1979), and Liebeschuetz (1994); on the latter see Goffart (1977), Barnes (1979), Zuckerman (1994), and now Charles (2007).

the century, including the Epitedeuma, and the Tacticon of Urbicius;311 _{the Peri}

Strategias, the Rhetorica Militaris, and the Naumachia of Syrianus;312 _{and the}

Strategikon of Maurice.313 _{The Tacticon of Urbicius is little more than a summary of} Arrian’s Tactica.314 _{The Rhetorica Militaris is somewhat unique, being a}

compendium of military speeches; Rance, following Zuckerman, says that it probably drew upon earlier rhetorical handbooks.315 _{Urbicius’ Epitedeuma, much like the} earlier De rebus bellicis, offers an invention to help the reigning emperor in battle, in this case, Anastasius. The Epitedeuma stresses both tactics and morale, for the author claims that it would be especially useful for infantry when up against

cavalry,316 _{while also noting the defences of an encampment would help morale.}317 Yet, his invention has more to do with technology, or better, equipment, than tactics, with some sort of fencing and mounted ballistae defence-system described.318 Syrianus’ Peri Strategias, or what we have of it, discusses a host of issues, ranging from strategy (στρατηγικῆς), forts (φρουφίων), and how one must prepare

311_{The works of Urbicius date to the reign of Anastasius, while the Strategikon dates to the}

590s. The dates of the works of Syrianus, however, are more problematic, with dates between the sixth century and the late tenth century offered. An edition, translation, and commentary of Urbicius’ brief Epitedeuma is provided by Greatrex, Elton, and Burgess (2005). For the Tacticon see Förster (1877).

312_{The works attributed to Syrianus have attracted some attention. The unity of the texts, and}

their attribution to the single author Syrianus seems assured, though earlier Dain (1967: 343- 344), for example, had treated the Rhetorica Militaris as the work of some other author. Some of the more recent works include Baldwin (1988), Zuckerman (1990), Lee and Shepard (1991), Cosentino (2000), and Rance (2007b). The comments of Dennis (1984: 1-7) in his edition, and translation, of the Peri Strategias, are also of value.

313_{As regards Maurice, see Dennis (1984: vii-xxiii) in his translation of the treatise, Whitby}

(1988: 130-132), as well as the comments of Rance in handful of articles (2000: 230-236; 2004a: 266-269; 2004b: 105-106; 2005: 429-431;2007a: 347-348), all of which build upon his work in his dissertation (1993). Whately (2008: 251-254) discusses the relationship between generalship and discipline the Peri Strategias and the Strategikon. For the impact of earlier Greek military manuals, whether ancient or late antique, on medieval Byzantine treatises, see Sullivan (1997: 181-195). Overviews of Byzantine tactical manuals are provided by Dain (1967), and Hunger (1978: II, 323-340).

314_{Greatrex, Elton, and Burgess 2005: 42-43.} 315_{Zuckerman 1990: 219-223; Rance 2007a: 346.} 316_{Urbicius 2.19-20.}

317_{Urbicius 12.67-70.}

themselves against siege machines (πῶς
δεῖ
παρασκευάζεσθαι
πρὸς
τὰς
μηχανὰς
 τῶν
πολιορκούντων), to armament (ὁπλίσεως), how one must guard against sudden attacks from the enemy (πῶς
δεῖ
φυλάττεσθαι
τὰς
αἰφνιδίους
τῶν
ἐχθρῶν
ἐπιθέσεις), and the phalanx (φάλαγγος).319 _{Syrianus, like his predecessors in the genre,}

reworks some earlier material, a tendency particularly evident in his discussion of the phalanx.320 _{On the other hand, he devotes considerable attention to the defensive} works of camps, cities, and fortifications, to surprise attacks, as well as when, or even whether, to make battle.321 _{Also of note is the role of the general, which is} stressed as soon as Syrianus turned to military matters. The only aspect missing is morale, which is not explicitly discussed in the text. Nevertheless, late Roman warfare – and Byzantine for that matter – was very much about taking advantage of whatever opportunities were presented, rather than the earlier imperial practice of taking battle to the enemy at all costs. This is reflected in the works of Urbicius and Syrianus; significantly, the charge of this task is very much assigned by these writers to the general, which takes us to the last text to discuss.

Maurice’s Strategikon, a practical work, which manages to describe late Roman warfare while still adhering to many of the practices of the genre, is a text of considerable importance with an obvious slant towards tactics. Its focus is didactic, and it is aimed at the would-be general, though it is meant to supplement training in

319_{Strategy: Syrianus Magister, Peri strat. 4-5; forts: ibid. 9; siege machines: ibid. 13;}

armament: ibid. 16; surprise attacks: ibid. 20; and the phalanx: ibid. 15, 17-18, 21-23, 34, 36. One of the most contentious issues surrounding the works of Syrianus are their date of composition; although many date them to the sixth century, significant challenges have been raised, notably by Baldwin (1988), Lee and Sheppard (1991), Cosentino (2000), and Rance (2007b). This bears on my usage of the text in this thesis. As it stands, I find the arguments of Baldwin, Lee and Sheppard, and Consentino unpersuasive, though the points raised by Rance bear some consideration. Thus, though there are grounds for excluding the works of Syrianus from discussions of sixth century warfare, the absence of conclusive evidence precludes this.

320_{Rance 2007a: 346.}

the field rather than to replace it.322 _{Onasander’s treatise was certainly a major} influence, though it is more likely to have provided the impetus for Maurice, rather than the explicit framework and material for the work.323 _{Cavalry manoeuvres make} up a considerable portion of the work, in part a reflection of the sort of warfare that the army was engaged in, in part because the section on infantry seems to have been added later as a supplement.324 _{Like its sixth century predecessors, the}

Strategikon betrays a real interest in stratagems, and opportunism on the field of battle; besides the sections scattered throughout devoted to ambushes, the subject warrants an entire chapter.325 _{There is also a chapter devoted to surprise attacks.}326 One of the most innovative features of the Strategikon is the inclusion of a chapter devoted to the types of enemy that the army is likely to face, something which has no literary precedent in the genre of Greek military writing.327 As noted, there is

considerable emphasis on tactics and formation. Significantly, however, Maurice is concerned not only with the formations themselves, but with how they are created, how they operate, and the human efforts behind their employment. Communication, discipline, morale, and training are all rightly regarded as essential to a unit’s ability to carry out any of the tactical manoeuvres described, or any of the other actions for that matter. This conflation of the two strands of tactics and morale marks out the

Strategikon as unusual among military manuals, though not histories. Indeed, as Rance notes, “It also reveals an acute understanding of the realities of combat and

322_{See Maurice Strat. pr. 21-27.} 323_{Cf. Rance 1993: 99ff.}

324_{In other words, this work was first conceived of as a treatise on cavalry warfare, and only}

later was the infantry component added. Chapter 12, the later addition, is something of a mixed bag lacking the unity of chapters 1 through 11, including, as it does, points which, in the earlier parts of the work, had been covered under separate chapters, such as the types of formation (12.A.1-7), armament (12.B.4-5), and the crossing of various types of terrain (12.B.18-21). Thus, it does not provide evidence for the inferiority of late sixth century infantry, on which see Rance (2004a, 2005: 427-443, 2007a: 348-359).

325_{Maurice Strat. 2.5, 3.16, 4.1-5 (the chapter devoted to ambushes - Περὶ
Ἐνέδρας).} 326_{Maurice Strat. 9.1-5. cf. Maurice Strat. 7.A.12.}

an insight into the psychological preoccupation of both generals and troops.”328 _In many ways, and as we might expect given the text’s practical purpose, as evidenced, in part, by its deliberately simple language, it marks a fitting final text since it

incorporates the two strands of military thought referred to in this survey of Greek military theory, order and morale, as well as the equally important issues of generalship and the use of stratagems.

Chapter Overview

I opened this chapter by looking at three different, though often

complementary, approaches to battle in antiquity. The rhetoricians and historians put great stock on the arrangement of the narrative itself, its truthfulness, its clarity, and its vividness. All three devoted some attention to battle deployment, tactics, and the importance of formation in battle. Morale, however, was also sometimes

attributed an important place in battle. Homer, unsurprisingly, cast a large shadow over the three groups, though they often took quite different things from his texts, the

Iliad and the Odyssey. Procopius’ contemporary historians tended to include a hodge-podge of features from the three theoretical strands as regards what traits to include, how to arrange the text, and which conception of combat (tactics/morale) to focus on. In regard to the latter, both Malalas and Maurice stress tactics and morale. Jordanes, on the other hand, plays with the arrangement of his material a great deal, while Evagrius includes a reasonable number of rhetorical elements in his Battle of Melitene. It is now time to turn to the Wars to uncover Procopius’ grammar of battle.

Chapter 3: The Persian Wars

Now that I have looked at Procopius’ personal and cultural background, it is time to turn to the Wars itself, beginning with the Persian Wars. Of the four sections of the text, it is the first two books, which make up the Persian Wars, which have attracted the most attention. Significant work has been done on the wars themselves, Romano-Persian relations, and Procopius’ depiction of Sasanid Persia.1 Nevertheless, an historiographical analysis of his descriptions of battle has not yet been undertaken. In the previous chapter we saw that there were a number of features that Greek writers felt were important for writing a description of battle; moreover, an historian had to be selective, and careful, when arranging his material. There are six factors that I want to examine in this chapter on the

Persian Wars: the programmatic battle and siege, which have a bearing on not only Procopius’ discussion of the Persian Wars, but also the Wars as a whole; how Procopius arranges his descriptions of the many varied pitched battles, skirmishes and sieges in the Persian Wars; the excitement of battle, or how Procopius makes his descriptions more engaging to his audience; Greek military theory and Procopius with regard to tactics and morale; Procopius’

characterization of Belisarius and Khusro, which is tied to the prominent role that generalship plays in Greek battle descriptions; and finally a summary look at the importance of context in understanding Procopius’ narratives of battle in the

Persian Wars.2

1_{Whitby 1986a, 1988, 1994;Blockley 1992;Howard-Johnston 1995;Shahîd 1995, 2002;}

Greatrex 1998; Greatrex and Lieu 2002; Haarer 2006; Börm 2007; Dignas and Winter 2007; Lewin and Pellegrini 2007.

2_{In my discussion of these issues I will not be going over every battle and siege in detail;}

space precludes such an approach and many of the issues raised about some battles and sieges are relevant to others. Historical treatments of individual battles can be found in the works of Rubin (1957), Greatrex (1998), Haldon (2001), Syvänne (2004), Lenski (2007), and Lillington-Martin (2007), among others.