Sentencia en contra de Rodrigo Pérez Alzate

Preparations for the cyclone were better planned, and at a larger scale, during Cyclone Mahasen compared to Cyclone Sidr. During Cyclone Sidr, warnings were broadcasted and preparations were undertaken immediately, by the Government at the national and local level, with the help of NGOs. Volunteers worked at the field level, urging people to take shelter and helped older people and children to reach the safe shelters. In Tentulbaria village, Faruk and his wife, as trained NGO volunteers, tried hard to disseminate the warnings, take people to safe places, and prepare the school building as the cyclone shelter. Faruk's efforts saved many villagers from Cyclone Sidr, though many inhabitants in Barguna municipality and even Tentulbaria village did not take shelter soon enough, and had to face the devastating effects of the cyclone.

During Cyclone Mahasen, plans for warning dissemination, preparation and evacuation were better planned and improved (CDMP 2014). However, gaps have still been noticed in implementing those plans at the field level. The number of evacuees among the respondents

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from the vulnerable locations and houses did not increase as expected. The following discussion explores the reasons behind this non-evacuation.

During Cyclone Mahasen, when Bangladesh Meteorological Department (BMD) forecasted the cautionary signals, Upazila Disaster Management Committees (UzDMCs) opened a control room on 14 May 2013 following the Standing Orders on Disaster (SOD) and being instructed by the District DMC (Disaster Management Committee). The UzDMCs instructed UDMCs (Union Disaster Management Committee) and CPP (Cyclone Preparedness Programme) volunteers to disseminate the early warning. The Union Parsad (UP) chairpersons called an emergency meeting with UDMC members, CPP representatives, NGOs and local elites to take the necessary preparations to face Mahasen. Getting instructions from the UDMC chairmen, all UP members began to disseminate early warning messages in local communities using megaphones, microphones, and the loudspeakers of local mosques. Though in most cases people came to the cyclone shelter by their own arrangement, in some areas, for instance in Badarkhali Union, UDMC arranged engine boats, rickshaw-vans and motorized vehicles to evacuate and help people to reach the shelters (CDMP 2014).

Besides the Government warning dissemination, some NGOs in Barguna mentioned that they have their own contingency plan and separate cell and advisors for disasters. When any signal is forecasted from the Bangladesh Meteorological Department (BMD), they open a control room and attend the emergency meetings called by the Government authority. They contact their trained caretakers of the cyclone shelters and volunteers by mobile phones.

Volunteers at the ground level are the most important part of warning disseminations and evacuations. They maintain very close coordination with UzDMCs and help local UDMCs to run the evacuation and response work successfully. There were 1,815 CPP volunteers in Barguna Sadar Upazila during Cyclone Mahasen, who were mostly local male and female inhabitants (CDMP 2014). I had an opportunity to talk with two male and female volunteers for the village in my study. They told me their stories of Cyclone Sidr and Cyclone Mahasen and the problems they faced while working as volunteers. Now the question arises, whether those preparations were enough to lead to a successful evacuation before the cyclone.

Were the cyclone warnings and awareness enough for successful evacuation before Cyclone Mahasen?

Compared to Cyclone Sidr, an increase in awareness and taking preparations can be seen among the inhabitants during Cyclone Mahasen. NGOs who worked on evacuation training

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could see the results of their work directly during Cyclone Mahasen. An NGO official mentioned in his interview, 'Our training showed its success during this Mahasen event. After receiving the signals, we could bring all the beneficiaries to the shelter with the help of the volunteers. Inhabitants could use the flags. The number of flags showed the intensity of the danger and males and females both could understand the message'. All of the training and experiences of Cyclone Sidr helped the respondents to become very aware of weather warnings, and to draw up their own preparation plans for the next cyclone. They selected the place where they would take shelter during any further cyclone attack, and they tried to store some dry foods. They became very alert. This improvement in preparation has also been mentioned in the CDMP report: 'The performance of all stakeholders at District, Upazilla and Union level related to early warning dissemination, evacuation, emergency preparedness and other necessary initiatives was found outstanding' (CDMP 2014, p1).

However, this improvement in awareness did not help to improve the number of evacuees during the warning periods. As discussed in the previous chapters, most of the urban respondents and some respondents in the rural study area did not leave their vulnerable houses during the warning period for Cyclone Mahasen. Several other factors created complex situations for the inhabitants, leaving them in confusion and facing dilemmas as to when and whether to take shelter before the cyclone attack. As Ahsan (2014) writes, ‘an individual’s risk preference is not only influenced by a single risky situation but also individual exogenous or background risks' and ‘people always face multiple risks and such background risks may influence an individual’s decision’ (Ahsan 2014, p 48). Compared to two respondents in Cyclone Sidr, only five respondents of the present study could leave their houses during the warning period of Cyclone Mahasen, though another fifteen out of the other twenty-five respondents lived in tin-made vulnerable houses (Kutcha). They planned to take shelter at the neighbour’s house rather than at the cyclone shelters. Many of them took shelter during the cyclone attack or had to stay at the vulnerable houses during Cyclone Mahasen. Compared to another Cyclone Aila in 2009, a similar situation was also revealed. In his research Mallick (2014) found that about 66% of the respondents (308 in number) were at their house or a neighbour’s house during Cyclone Aila in 2009 in the Satkhira district and only 14.1 percent took shelter at the cyclone Shelter (Mallick 2014).

The main reasons behind the non-evacuation during Cyclone Mahasen include people’s past experiences at the cyclone Shelter (Mallick 2014), the lack of a cyclone shelter, an inaccessible location (Mallick et al. 2009; Paul 2009; Islam et al. 2011; CDMP 2014), the vulnerability of the shelter structure (Paul and Dutt 2010) and its dilapidated condition (Debnath 2007 cited in

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Haider and Ahmed 2014), and lower capacity of the shelter which creates an overcrowded (Paul 2009; Alam and Collins 2010), filthy and unfriendly environment for all, especially for pregnant or sick women (Paul 2009), children, older and disabled people (CCC 2009).

Data from the interviews highlight the experiences of victims during the warning periods of Cyclone Mahasen.

Alauddin, a young man from the urban study area, described his worries about the nearest school building which is used as the cyclone shelter. After Cyclone Sidr, that school building has had one extra floor added to it without proper foundations. So, Alauddin and his family have taken risks by staying at their vulnerable house during the warning periods of Cyclone Mahasen, rather than gathering in that school building which might itself become vulnerable, being overloaded with evacuees. Alauddin explained, ‘ there is no proper cyclone shelter in the area …as one school building with one floor foundation has been converted into two stories, which becomes vulnerable being overloaded with people during disaster...we are afraid of taking shelter at that school and remain at home with high vulnerability,... depending on fate..'. (Male, age 27, urban area, U8). Alauddin's reasons for being fearful show similarity to the situation mentioned in Cash et al. (2014) article: ' Although funds were quickly mobilised to help the most vulnerable people rebuild their home, an assessment noted that the new homes were similar to those that had stood before (rather than reinforced or strengthened), and would therefore be likely to suffer the same level of damage in future storms' (Government 2008 in Cash et al. 2014, p 2098).

Again, confidence about their houses and preparations also discourage many respondents’

from evacuating during the warning time. People may feel their houses are ‘quality houses’

(Mallick 2014), strong enough for the cyclone attack, though most of the houses are made with tin and wood. Some of them were even reluctant to take shelter during the warning period of Cyclone Mahasen. Similar reluctance was also recorded among many residents of the Bolivar Peninsual in Texas, just three years after Hurricane Katrina, during the warning period of Hurricane Ike which led to the deaths of over 100 people (Berg 2009; Kunreuther et al.

2009).

Nazem, who lives in Barguna municipality, stayed with his two young children and wife in his tin shade house during Cyclone Mahasen, as he felt ‘my house is built on a higher basement, it is strong...I rented it after Sidr for this reason...'(Male, age 28, urban area, U6). Even Rima, the young woman from Tentulbaria village, victim of Cyclone Sidr, did not leave her tin shade house during Mahasen, believing that her house was strong enough to face the cyclone. 'We

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stayed at home...the home is stronger... the doors and windows are very strong ...' (Female, 28, rural area, R11). Karim, a male respondent (age 48, R2) from the rural study area believes that people who leave their houses in cyclones face more problems. So, he stays at home during the warning periods. But staying in vulnerable houses did not turn out to be a good decision for most of the respondents. Many of them had to leave their house during the cyclone attack in strong wind and storm waters, or else had to face injury and panic while staying inside their damaged house.

Therefore, many of them took the same risk again in Mahasen, as in Sidr. It could have led to a large number of injuries during Cyclone Mahasen, if it had turned into a severe cyclone. The question arises, if all respondents from vulnerable locations wanted to take safe shelter during Cyclone Mahasen, was it possible to provide them with enough shelters? There were only 70 shelters in usable condition in Barguna Sadar Upazilla with capacity for 30,000 people during Cyclone Mahasen (CDMP 2014). The total population of Barguna Sadar Upazilla is 237,618 and the rural population is 210,659 (BBS 2006). So, the capacity of the shelters is far below the amount needed. For instance, Tentulbaria village has only one cyclone shelter a with maximum capacity of 1000 people, whereas the total population of the village is 3345 (BBS 2006). This village does not have any multi-storey buildings except one or two private houses. So, insufficient number and unsuitability of the cyclone shelters make the success of the preparation and evacuation plans questionable.