In this subsection, we are going to examine two ways by which the ascriber can designate the meaningpossessed by the subject of report. There are at least two ways by which an ascriber can designate the customarymeaningpossessed by the subject: 1. by referring to her usage of the name 2. by using a definite description of themeaningpossessed by the subject. We explain both of these ways in this subsection.
When a language user uses a name, she does not explicitly state themeaning of that name grasped by her. For instance, assume that a language user is justified in knowing Plato as “the pupil of Socrates” and refers to Plato via this justified description. She does not explicitly express this description, namely “the pupil of Socrates”, each time that she uses the name “Plato”. Therefore, the hearer may not know by exactly which justified description the speaker is referring. However, it is possible to designate themeaning grasped by her by designating her usage. Without the meaning of a name, the language user cannot competently use that name. Hence, each correct usage of a name is associated with themeaningof that name grasped by that user.
The primary way for an ascriber to designate the customary meaning of a name possessed by the subject is by being exposed to the subject’s usage of that name. Each usage of a name is associated by the justified description(s) of the reference of that name which is known by the user of the name. Hence, the meaningof a name possessed by a language user can be referred to by referring to her usage of that name.
For instance, consider Amy who just spoke with Peter about Paderewski as a musician and does not know anything about Peter’s other set of descriptions of Paderewski. By referring to Peter’s usage of “Paderewski”, Amy can designate
19It is possible to compare the role of customary meaning in the biphasic mechanism
with the role of definite description in causal-historical theory of reference. In Kripke’s theory definite description may play a role in fixing the reference in the baptizing ceremony. However,
the baptizer can also baptize the object by pointing to it. Therefore, in Kripke’s theory
descriptions can also play a role in the mechanism of reference but knowing them is neither sufficient nor necessary for the causal-historical mechanism to function.
98 CHAPTER 6. PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES
one of themeanings of Paderewski possessed by Peter. She does not need to know the othermeaningby which Peter refers to Paderewski.20 The following
ascription as stated by her will be about Paderewski-the-musician and not the other one.
(5) Peter believes that Paderewski has musical talent.
Now assume that an ascriber has been exposed to the subject’s usage of the name. The question is what the ascriber needs to know in order to refer to that usage. Our suggestion is that the ascriber can refer to that usage in the way that we refer to objects in the world: by knowing a justified description of that usage. For instance, we can refer to themeaningof Plato as possessed by Aristotle since we can provide a justified description of his usages, e.g. we can quote his usage of the name in his bookMetaphysics.
Hence, the A-meaning of the name can be a justified description of the usage of the subject. Thus, the ascriber will be able to refer to the meaning associated with a particular usage by referring to that usage. In this case,the ascriber does not need to have any explicit information about the very justified description used by the subject of the report. This is the way by which Arthur is able to designate the customarymeaningof Tolstoy possessed by the scholar of Russian literature in the case of two Tolstoys. In the conversation, he is exposed to the scholar’s usage of name and therefore he can have a justified description about his usage of the name and therefore he can designate the meaning of Tolstoy as grasped by him.
However, there is also a second way to designate the meaning possessed by the subject. We are also able to ascribe a belief to subjects, without being exposed to their usages of names. For instance, we might talk about the beliefs of Aristotle concerning Zoroaster:
(6) Aristotle believed that Zoroaster was Persian.
As far as I know, there is no text in which Aristotle talked about Zoroaster. Assume that Aristotle actually possessed ameaningof Zoroaster. We can not refer to thatmeaningvia designating Aristotle’s usage of the term “Zoroaster” since his usage is not available for us. However, we can also designate Aristotle’s customary meaning, by which he refers to Zoroaster, by the aid ofa definite description of that meaning. For instance, “the meaning by which Aristotle refers to Zoroaster” denotes the set of justified descriptions that Aristotle associ- ated with the a linguitic a linguistic expression whose reference was Zoroaster.21 In this case the A-meaning of the name is that definite description. For the ascriber to use this kind of descriptions, he needs to be able to competently use the name “Zoroaster”. Nevertheless, if an ascriber is confused about Zoroaster, he will not be able to designate the meaning by which Aristotle referred to Zoroaster by using this description. The reason is that she uses the very name
20If Amy is exposed to both of the usages (Paderewski-the-politician and Paderewski-the
-musician), she needs to realize that the term “Paderewski”is usedwith the intention to
refer to two different persons. Otherwise, she will be confused about themeaningspossessed
by Peter in the way that Emma was confused about two John Smiths.
21We do not need to know the linguistic expression used by Aristotle as the name of
6.3. THE SEMANTIC CONTENT OF PNS 99