In a 2012 New York Times article Clarke & Primo (2012b) asked a simple, yet unanswerable question: “HOW scientific are the social sciences?” (Emphasis in the original). Implicitly the two professors of Political Science laid emphasis on the most pending questions in Social Science: who defines the scientificity of ‘scientific’ work? How can the respective scientific nature actually be defined, measured and vindicated? What is correct and what is wrong, especially if taking into consideration that in Social Science various distinctive and exclusive assumptions and theories aim to explain the same phenomena (Eun 2011: 764). In their article and related book A
Model Discipline, respectively, the two authors scrutinised the limitations of the
rational, hypothetico-deductive model as a proposed scientific method. In simplified terms this model requires the researcher to devise a theoretical model, deduce a testable hypothesis from it and test it against a ‘real’ problem. As a result the hypothesis can either be verified or falsified. In any case this approach is deemed to be scientifically valid (Clarke & Primo 2012a, b). Based on “the guiding light of causal analysis of political science and IR” (Kurki 2006: 195) – the undoubtedly influential work of King, Keohane & Verba (1994) – most researchers in IR and European studies follow the outlined suggestions on how to conduct valid causal analysis: causality is measured by the causal effect of an explanatory/independent variable on a dependent variable (Ibid.; Hansen 2006: 8–9; Kurki 2006: 195).
Causality is key to this understanding as any research project can assumingly be conceptualised in causal epistemological terms (Hansen 2006: 8).
The broad acceptances of King, Keohane & Verba’s proposition has led to two main ‘causal’ implications for research undertaken in Social Sciences, implying an “epistemological superiority of this form of gaining knowledge”: 1) causal analysis has been advocated as the widely accepted norm and 2) other methods, such as discourse analysis or interpretivism have been side-lined as they do not fit with the “empiricist regularity-driven assumptions” (Kurki 2006: 196–197).12 “Insofar as this
book became the ur text for how to do social science, it is not surprising that simplistic hypothesis testing also became more widespread.” (Mearsheimer & Walt 2013: 446)13
However, this particular scientific method is not the answer to everything. Especially concerning questions of space and power, the postmodern pluralism of theories and approaches offers a broad and conceptually manifold basis for ‘different’ analyses. Instead of focusing on a universalistic grand theory, this pluralism provides an opportunity for a multifaceted examination of space and power and its distinct correlation (Reuber 2001: 78–79). One of the most prominent developed options is critical geopolitics. As explicitly illustrated in Chapters 2 and 3, critical geopolitics is deeply rooted in poststructuralism, which is commonly perceived as the “key theoretical proposition of critical geopolitics” (Müller 2008: 323). Poststructuralism originated during the 1980s as an opposition to structuralism, a philosophy and intellectual movement developed during the first half of the 20th century, prioritising “(determining) structures over agency and change” (Jørgensen 2010: 164). Poststructuralist authors, among others Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida or Jean Baudrillard, however, neglected the self-sufficiency of structures and rather emphasised the potential multiple meanings of, for instance, a given text, depending on the respective reader or recipient. In IR “(…) poststructuralism is a critical
12 Constructivists, although still mobilising causal concepts of testing, have argued that causality is not
a prerequisite for valid scientific research and explicitly allow “more scope for non-causal theory as part for a research agenda” (Hansen 2006: 8).
13Mearsheimer & Walt criticised the explicit focus on simplistic hypothesis testing, yet from a U.S.
attitude, approach, or ethos that calls attention to the importance of representation, the relationship of power and knowledge, and the politics of identity in an understanding of global affairs” (Campbell 2013: 225). Poststructuralism is not an IR theory but rather a critical approach, devoting particular interest to the themes of identity, power/knowledge and representation/interpretation, emphasising language and the production of meaning (Jørgensen 2010: 165). Poststructuralist approaches aim to outline the limitation (and consequently political consequences) of certain modes of knowledge production by charting the boundaries of realms of subjection and consequently highlighting ways on how to deconstruct particular discourses in order to reveal their power. Therefore, poststructuralism stresses the limitation of a particular form of rationality (Dalby 1991: 276). It is argued that ‘proper knowledge’ is not gained by a “theory’s ability to uncover causal truths as knowledge is [always] historically and politically situated” (Hansen 2006: 9).
As this dissertation shows, both space and the narration of space undoubtedly matter. Yet, if arguing from a causality point of view, the main questions would actually not be ‘does space matter’ but rather ‘how much does space matter’. Consequently, one would first have to outline the explanatory power of space and its related discourse in opposition to material explanations and second to delineate the causal effect of space on foreign policy (Ibid.: 22). For poststructuralists this is problematic in a twofold way.
First, it is perceived that materiality, such as facts, threats or events that constitute a certain foreign policy debate and related behaviour, is never ‘extra- discursive’ and accordingly never simply and only ‘there’ but needs to be explicitly articulated and narrated (by humans and discursive agency) in order to appear and finally become mobilised (Ibid.: 22). This is not to say that materiality does not exist and/or is only constructed, see Subchapter 2.2. According to Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, non-discursive features exist externally to thought. The essential issue is rather how a related significance is established via the used ‘language’ (1985: 108). Consequently, a region’s locality, its inhabitants, its resources, etc. certainly exist, meaning reality is a ‘fact’ and ‘out there’. It is the matter of perception – perceiving this reality – that is considered worth in-depth observation and analysis. Along the same lines, Larsen argued that certain non-discursive features constitute a
framework for policy in an almost absolute sense. It is the political discourse that mediates these material structures, as for instance geographical facts (1997: 22–23).
Second, ‘space’ in the context of space and foreign policy may not be that obvious as potentially assumed. Foreign policy is certainly influenced and caused by a certain representation of space; however, in order to adopt a rigid concept of causality – the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable – these two variables would need to be observed independently from each other. Due to poststructuralism’s “insistence on the ontological significance of discursive practice” this remains impossible: space is produced and reproduced during the foreign policy- making process and its discourse. Consequently, no space exists independently prior to the specific foreign policy and gets changed during the creation process (Hansen 2006: 22–23).
However, the specific focus on deconstruction has often prompted the critique that critical geopolitics does not necessarily offer an alternative, better framing of the specifically analysed social situation in a case under scrutiny (Sparke 2000). Accordingly, it has been argued that its “poor achievement in terms of societal relevance” could potentially be bypassed by a stronger commitment to area studies (Mamadouh in Jones & Sage 2010: 321).14 In the context of this dissertation, the potential stronger nexus between critical geopolitics and area studies is of particular relevance. Powell ascribed the Arctic “a peculiar relationship with area studies”, inherent to different Arctic national pre-Cold War approaches on how to understand the northern latitudes and a subsequent opposition to construct a common understanding of a circumpolar entity (2011: 105). As it is briefly highlighted in Subchapter 4.2 and more comprehensively discussed by Keskitalo (2004), the ‘international Arctic’ or the conceptualisation of the Arctic as an international region has only emerged during the last three decades. In fact, if the Arctic is by now essentially considered to be a global region with an emerging international significance it should also be re-imagined in the present configuration of area studies. By scrutinising the EU’s spatial perception concerning an ‘international’ Arctic, this dissertation contributes to the envisaged stronger commitment of both critical
14 According to Hall & Tarrow the concept of area studies is, inter alia, used to refer to a detail
geopolitics and area studies. It eventually provides a proper insight into one of still many Arctic unknowns.
Moreover, as already mentioned in Subchapter 1.2, Keukeleire opted for a dual geographic and disciplinary outside-in approach in EU foreign policy research. An approach that a) gathers a thorough knowledge of the ‘targeted’ country/region and b) incorporates analytical frameworks of other academic disciplines (2011: 2). Eventually, this dissertation applies a concept developed by geographers, elaborately discusses the multidimensional system level of a distinct spatio-temporal context (= an area) and connects this approach with a single case examination of EU foreign policy performance.
Yet, it explicitly does not measure related EU-Arctic ‘actorness’ or exercise of power within the region’s governance structures.15 Instead of evaluating the degree of the EU’s political influence, it rather scrutinises in what way the EU claims relevance and how the related discourse aims to become instrumental. Hence, the dissertation assesses the strategic (foreign) policy reasoning of the EU and the ideas and rationales that determine a particular line of argumentation so as to claim a ‘legitimate’ role in the Arctic and its governance structures.16 Within an organisation, such as the EU, these motivations do not float freely but are essentially grounded in the organisation with (internal) policy controversies being generated if the individual organisational actors articulate and advocate conflicting perceptions. Yet, this dissertation does not analyse the related matter of internal coherence regarding the EU’s foreign policy approach towards the Arctic region in the ‘classical’ European Studies approach. In general, the issue of coherence of EU policies has received broad academic attention over the last decade and has also been rather popular with regard to the EU’s Arctic endeavour. Despite an often assumed general lack of academic interest in EU-Arctic affairs, several scholars have published articles, book
15 As a matter of fact, it is assumed that scientific accuracy and measurability – whatever these two
terms precisely mean – cannot be guaranteed by any scientific work. As prominently put by Nassim Nicholas Taleb, statistician and author of the book ‘The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Impossible’, “As a scientist, I can say that very little is measurable (…) and even those things that are measurable, you cannot trust the measurement beyond a certain point” (as cited in Feiler 2014).
16 In general, “governance refers to the institutions, processes and organizational structures that guide
behaviour in a political system, covering both formal government and other institutions and processes” (Avango, Nilsson & Roberts 2013: 435). The institutions, regimes, processes and organisational structures that structure ‘Arctic governance’ are explained in Subchapter 4.3.
chapters and/or master theses on the EU’s Arctic policy-making process and the related quest of coherence, all emphasising a certain negligence, shallowness and clumsiness in the coherence-aimed internal practices of the Union, see inter alia (Holdhus 2010; Østhagen 2011; Daemers 2012; Wegge 2012; Pelaudeix & Rodon 2013; Rød 2013; Śmieszek 2013; Kobza 2015; Stępień 2015; Stępień & Raspotnik 2015).
The approach of this dissertation is slightly different. In order to understand the on-going policy process on hand, it remains inevitable to not only look at what kind of decisions have been made, which interests are affecting and guiding these decisions and to what effect, but also how decisions come into being through internal processes on related visions that change through time and context. This approach essentially highlights the (geopolitical) paradoxes and ironies in the respective policy-making process (Kuus 2011b: 1142–1143). Internalising Strandsbjerg remarkably simple but all the more plausible assumption that “[w]hat is considered to be geopolitical depends on the eyes that see something as a geopolitical concern or not” (2012: 820), two interrelated factors have to be continuously kept in mind when reading and reflecting on this dissertation:
• “Distance in international relations (…) is an “illusion”” (Henrikson 2002: 441): in addition to an undoubtedly existing physical geography, distinctive mental perceptions of space form and re-form images and ideas of a physical, hard reality and accordingly influence and determine a certain policy and/or related decision. Hence, “spatial imaginaries are not bound to borders” (Knecht & Keil 2013: 180).17
• The setting is crucial: the (re)-formation of these images decisively depends on the global and/or regional environment and spatio-temporal context the respective actor is embedded in. The EU has indeed been designing its own Arctic policy; however, it has not happened in a regional vacuum with the circumpolar North being embedded in a distinct ‘geopolitical’ setting.
17 As explicitly highlighted in Subchapter 2.2 physical geographical facts exist and do matter;
however, it is the respective political interpretation that matters at least as much as any determinant fact of nature. According to Siles-Brügge, it is in general the interpretation of material facts rather
Summary
Especially with regard to King, Keohane & Verba (1994) “[c]ritics of poststructuralism and discourse analysis have often portrayed [the] absence of causal epistemology as the road to theoretical, methodological, and political anarchy” (Hansen 2006: 1). The dissertation’s author is aware of such opinions, yet, it is not this dissertation’s objective to join the lengthy discussions on the great debate concerning ontology (the philosophical study of the nature of being) and epistemology (the theory of knowledge) (Eun 2011: 764) nor to broadly outline the differences and discrepancies between positivism and reflectivism, structuralism and post-structuralism, see inter alia (Keohane 1988; Marsh & Furlong 2002). It is ensured that the dissertation stands up to scientific scrutiny and maintains all necessary academic standards. Likewise, the dissertation and the conducted research are also based on the observed belief that especially younger scholars focus too much on theoretical novelty and methodological sophistication. As most Political Science scholarship is only written to appeal to its own professional members (and supervisors), in-depth knowledge of a certain policy area or geographic region is rather neglected (Walt 2012: 38).18 Moreover, especially Political Science studies on international organisations focus too often only on formal relations of the institutions or on the testing of pre-formulated hypotheses; in-depth fieldwork and description is rather neglected (Bachmann 2013a: 412).
If theories are like maps (Mearsheimer & Walt 2013: 431) – a fitting metaphor of the very basics of (critical) geopolitics and geography – the test of a map does not lie in “arbitrarily checking random points but in whether people find it useful to get somewhere” (Clarke & Primo 2012b). The analysis and description of empirical data, such as the particular attention on one specific region (Nye 2009) can and is valuable, even in the absence of grand theoretical model as for instance the hypothetico-deductive model (Clarke & Primo 2012b). Eventually, this dissertation
18 A general related argument in opposition to single case studies and in-depth thick description
approaches is the ‘lack’ of generalisation mechanism and a more explanatory account based on theory-led comparative studies. The dissertation’s author is aware of these arguments. However, a related ‘either-or-debate’ reminds of the chicken or the egg causality dilemma and is simply not answerable. The present case illustrates a specific problem that was systematically investigated in terms of concept, context and content. If the used approach is eventually fruitful is a different matter. Criticism is an essential, self-fulfilling part of academia and hence other pundits may arrive at a different conclusion.
extensively expounds its what, how and why the comprehensive, interdisciplinary approach taken is the ‘correct’ one for this particular study and the question posed.
The conducted research gives new indication on the fragmented debate regarding ‘Arctic geopolitics’ in general (= ‘unpacking’ geopolitics) and the EU’s regional involvement in particular. Moreover, this dissertation explicitly discusses the conceptual ambiguity of an overused term in international relations that also gains more and more ‘relevance’ in the EUropean debate. Besides, the Arctic region – its challenges, its opportunities, its governance framework and its actors – makes its first ‘EUropean-academic’ appearance in a monograph.
All things considered, this study tells the comprehensive story of how a sui
generis geopolitical actor aims to be seated at the Arctic table – its sui generis
neighbourhood.19