’Dutch politics used to be so reliably dull…’ the Economist lamented, just as the Netherlands was witnessing the resignation of its government, the rise of new right-wing political parties, and the conflicts between leaders in the traditional parties (Economist 020504). In the week after its publication, the Economist also reported on the first political assassination since the seventeenth century in the Netherlands (Economist 020511). But before that fateful day, Dutch politics could indeed be described as very stable. Though it used to be a federal republic, based on consensus, cooperation and decentralization between the seven united provinces, the Netherlands has been a constitutional monarchy since Napoleon left the Lowlands. The consensus-seeking attitude that served as a basis for cooperation in the old
mist 020504). The head of state is Queen Beatrix, who assumes various po-
litical duties. She represents the nation abroad, signs laws (with a counter- signature by the prime minister, who is politically responsible), and nomi- nates the informateur and formateur of coalition government building after a national election (Neelen et al. 1999). The head of the government is the prime minister, who, along with his coalition cabinet report to the democra- tically elected Parliament.
The Dutch have always had a multi-party system because of the ‘pillariza- tion’ of their society, which basically meant that society used to be segment- ed along ideological differences (Lijphart 1968). The oldest major political parties long represented tightly organized social groups or subcultures (pil- lars) that structured not just national politics, but nearly every aspect of so- cial life. The pillars were not ordered along a single ideological dimension, however because religion and social class both played a role. Pillarization has weakened since the 1970s, but continues to play a role as political par- ties and societal institutions maintain formal and informal relations based on their common ideological perspective (Keman 1996: 212). The main parties since 1980 are the Christian Democrat cda, the Social Democrats PvdA, and the conservative liberal vvd.
Additionally, the small1conservative parties sgp, gpv and rpf represent
religious minorities within the Gereformeerde and the Dutch Reformed pil- lar. The small progressive cpn, psp and ppr were not based on religious de- nomination, but partly on social class (cpn is the communist party) and on progressive political ideas regarding environmental protection, women’s emancipation, anti-proliferation, etc. They later merged into Groen Links (or Green Left). On the far left, we find the Socialist party sp. In 1966, the political party d66 was founded, as a ‘progressive liberal’ party with a mid- dle-class, left-wing constituency. It strives for the institutionalization of democratic values in governance, such as the introduction of a popular ref- erendum.
Since the Dutch political system is a system of proportionality, it is possi- ble to have many, smaller parties represented in Parliament. The seats in both Houses of Parliament, as well as in provincial and municipal countries, are distributed in proportion to a party’s share of the votes. The portfolios in the cabinet and provincial and municipal governing bodies are also dis- tributed in this manner among the parties in the ruling coalition. The Dutch political system is often described as a very stable system, although it is very segmented. Lijphart (1975) explains this by referring to ‘the politics of ac- commodation’ at an elite level. Very segmented societies are governed by consensus between the elites of each ideological segment, or ‘pillar.’ Instead
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of competition, the Dutch political elite have a tradition of cooperation, based on principles such as executive power sharing or a grand coalition and a high degree of autonomy for each of the segments (Lijphart 1977; Andeweg and Irwin 2002). Lijphart’s theory of ‘consociational’ democra- cies has been challenged particularly when ‘accommodationist’ practices continued, despite the crumbling pillars. In this study, Lijphart’s theory is only presented to briefly point out some characteristics of Dutch politics, however, without considering it as the only possible interpretation.
Because of the system of proportionality, political parties never have a majority in Parliament unless they form a coalition. They usually form a coalition with two or more other parties.
There used to be a tradition of dualism between the cabinet and Parlia- ment. Ministers were not members of Parliament, because Ministers had a special mandate with the country and not their party, and in general there are no close daily contacts between ministers and party representatives in Parliament (Daalder and Irwin 1989). Executive-legislative relations have become more ‘monistic’ since the 1960s, however. Because the decision- making process in the cabinet has become increasingly more political rather than functional in recent years, ‘today’s ministers wear two hats and this does complicate decision-making from time to time’ (Andeweg and Irwin 2002: 119). Dutch cabinets are now ‘both a board of departmental minis- ters and a coalition of political parties’ (Andeweg and Irwin 2002: 120).
Party discipline has increased in Parliament as well. The Proceedings of the Second Chamber typically record the party votes rather than the indi- vidual votes in Parliament. The government can usually count on its ‘own’ parties, which is a majority by definition. The opposition is powerless un- less a wedge can be driven between the coalition parties (Andeweg and Irwin 2002). The Cabinet is legally structured as a collective entity; mem-
Table 6.1 Political Parties and % of Votes at Parliamentary Elections (on a Left-Right Scale)
Green PvdA D66 CDA VVD SGP Other Coalition after
Left RPF elections GPV 1986 3.1 33.3 6.3 34.6 17.4 3.6 1.6 CDA/VVD 1989 4.5 31.9 7.9 35.3 14.6 4.1 2.1 CDA/PvdA 1994 3.5 24 15.6 22.4 19.9 4.8 8.8 PvdA/D66/VVD Source: Keman, 1996: 219
Even though they may debate issues vigorously in cabinet meetings, once a cabinet decision is taken, it becomes cabinet policy. Every cabi- net member is then bound not only by it, but also to defend it in public, even if he or she had violently opposed it in private. If a minister cannot abide by a cabinet decision this way, then he or she must resign or face dismissal (Gallagher, Laver and Mair 1992: 27).
The coalition program largely determines most of the cabinet’s decisions. In order to form a coalition after the elections, the participants must come to a government agreement. This entails broad policy guidelines and more de- tailed compromises on controversial issues. The government agreement has become steadily more important since the 1960s.
The Netherlands has a bicameral Parliament. The First Chamber, or Sen- ate, has to approve a proposal after a majority in the Second Chamber has supported it. It seldom rejects a proposal that has already been approved by the Second Chamber. It does not have the power to initiate or amend legisla- tive proposals. It is primarily a chamber of revision. The Senate can informally threaten to reject a proposal however, and by doing so, force the Second Chamber to make suggested amendments beforehand (Neelen et al. 1999). Officially, the Senate has to swallow its critique or reject the pro- posed bill entirely. Because the Senate cannot make amendments, there are no differences between bills that pass the Second Chamber and bills adopt- ed in the First Chamber (Andeweg and Irwin 2002).
Both the Second Chamber of Parliament and the government can intro- duce legislative proposals. In practice, most bills originate in the cabinet. Members of Parliament can amend the proposal during the readings. Amendments introduced are adopted or rejected by simple majority votes. When the Second Chamber approves an entire proposal in the final vote, it is referred to the Senate for approval. Once adopted, both the responsible min- ister and the queen sign the bill (Andeweg and Irwin 2002).
An important part of the policymaking process in the Netherlands is char- acterized by the interplay between the government and the social partners. Since this relationship is based on exchange (influence for support) and has a cooperative character, Dutch governance could be called ‘corporatist’ (Andeweg and Irwin 2002; Siaroff 1999). The next section explains how the relationship between the state and representatives of labor and capital is or- ganized and what position the social partners take towards each other.
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