It will not be possible to do more than deal with some of the outstanding representatives of each of the two points of view. In fact it is around two names in particular that we wish to center the discussion of this subject. There is first the name of Dr. Abraham Kuyper, Sr., founder of the Free University of Amsterdam. Then there is the name of Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield, outstanding theologian of Princeton Theological Seminary. Frequently the difference between the two points of view on apologetics is spoken of as the difference between the Princeton and the Amsterdam point of view. (It should be noted that since the reorganization of Princeton Seminary in 1929, neither the theology nor the view of Scripture entertained by Warfield are now taught at that institution. The representatives of the new Princeton should be classified with the modern rather than with the orthodox theologians. This fact has become particularly clear now that in his book The Westminster Confession for Today Dr. George Hendry has completely rejected the theology of Dr. Warfield and the other earlier Princeton theologians.)
In looking into the differences between the Amsterdam and the Princeton schools of apologetics it should be noted first that there is little difference between them on the theology of Scripture. Barring relatively minor matters, the school of Princeton as represented by Warfield and that of Amsterdam as represented by Kuyper are remarkably similar in the presentation of what Scripture teaches. More than that, there is as equally close a similarity between the views of Scripture as there is between the views of the content of Scripture. Both hold to the idea of God as controlling whatsoever comes to pass. Both hold with Calvin to man’s having a sense of deity that is ineradicable because he is made to be in the image of God. Both are therefore equally opposed to the “evangelical” view of man, to the extent that it attributes autonomy to him in relation to God. Both hold with Calvin to the idea of the necessity of the testimony of the Holy Spirit if the natural man is to accept the Bible as the Word of God.
It is because of this large measure of agreement on the doctrine of Scripture as well as of the content of Scripture that the difference between them on the matter of natural theology is so remarkable.
Generally speaking, Warfield’s method of apologetics implies a much higher view of natural theology than does that of Kuyper. But in saying this a word of explanation is in order as to what each of these two men mean by natural theology. Kuyper frequently uses it as synonymous with the idea of general, non- soteriological revelation. Again he speaks of it as being that natural knowledge which man has by virtue of the fact that he is made in the image of God and has within him the sense of deity. So when he deals with the Belgic Confession and particularly with its statement to the effect that there are two ways of knowing God, one through nature and one through. Scripture, he says that this must not be taken to mean what rationalists have made of it but must be taken to mean simply that “without the substratum of natural theology there would be no redemptive theology.”2 It is not therefore the idea of the autonomous man that Kuyper thinks of when he speaks of natural theology. When he discusses the sinner and the fact that this sinner has usurped the authority of judging the work of redemption that God has wrought for man, he speaks of the natural principle, principium naturale.3 He then contrasts with it the special principle, the principle by which God has in Christ and through the Spirit come to save sinners. These two principles, he argues, stand utterly opposed to one another. “Since the revelatio specialis presupposes the fact that the operation of the natural principle has been disturbed in its healthful function through sin, it follows as a matter of course that this natural principle has lost the power of judgment. Whoever attributes this power of judgment to it recognizes it eo ipso as sound, and has therewith done away with the ratio sufficiens of special revelation.”4
Warfield also uses the idea of natural theology sometimes as referring to natural revelation within and about man. Usually, however, he refers to the conclusions which men in general, whether Christian or
2 Abraham Kuyper, Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, Vol. 2 (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1909),p.
328.
3 Ibid., p. 335. 4
not, have drawn from natural revelation. And the issue with respect to natural theology is with respect to this latter matter. It does not refer to natural revelation, either round about or within men. It does not refer to what men ought to infer from this natural revelation whether external or internal. Nor does it refer to what those who have been redeemed have learned to infer from natural revelation inasmuch as they regard it in the light of Scripture. The question is, What evaluation is to be placed upon the interpretation of natural revelation, internal and external, that the natural man, who operates with the principle of autonomy, has given of it? Can the difference between the principle of autonomy and that of Christian theism be ignored so that men can together seek to interpret natural revelation in terms of one procedure? It is on this point that Kuyper and Warfield differ materially. At first sight at least it seems as though the difference between them is irreconcilable. It is this apparently irreconcilable difference that must first be delineated.
Kuyper’s position has already been indicated in the telling sentence quoted. The idea of two ultimate principles is, he insists, a contradiction in terms. Either allow that the natural principle has within itself the legitimate powers of self-interpretation and then expect the special principle to be destroyed by it, or else maintain that the natural principle is in any case finite and more particularly sinful and then present the special principle to it with the demand of submission. Of course Kuyper chooses the second of these alternatives. Of course, says Kuyper, the natural man has power to observe the facts of the physical universe, to weigh them and arrange them. He can reason logically; sin has not made man insane. But the direction of the human person has changed. The power of thought may be compared to a sharp blade. If this blade is put into a mower but it is put too high so that it cannot reach the grass, there is no good result.5 The result is, says Kuyper, even worse than this illustration would indicate. For the action of sinful human thought is not merely fruitless; it is destructive of the truth. Sinful man is out to destroy the special principle when it comes to him with its challenge. The natural principle takes an antithetical position over against the special principle and seeks to destroy it by means of logical manipulation.6 The natural principle lives from apistia ; its faith is fixed upon the creature instead of upon the Creator.7 It will therefore use its principles of discontinuity and of continuity in order by means of them to destroy the witness of Scripture to itself. The natural man is perfectly consistent with himself and intellectually honest in doing so. He is simply true to his principle in doing so. A principle, a first premise, cannot be proved. It is the basis of proof. If proof were given of a principle, it would cease to be a principle.8 The Christian realizes that the non-Christian does not know the truth about himself and of his power of reason. He should therefore expect that the non-Christian will, from his natural principle, seek to destroy the special principle. He will do so by saying that the “irrational” element, that is the supernatural, is like the irrational element found everywhere. He will by means of his principle of continuity absorb all the claims of Scripture into a system of logical gradation. “ Zelf toch erkent ge van uw eigen standpunt, dat wie buiten photismos staat het werkelijk bestand van zijn eigen wezen, en dus ook van zijn rede, niet inziet en niet inzien kan .”9 When you as a Christian present the unbeliever with the fact of miracles performed, this has no power of compulsion for him who, because on his principle, cannot even allow for the possibility of miracles.10
Kuyper makes a special point of the necessity of holding that Scripture is not merely a record of but is itself revelation. One cannot separate cool atmosphere from the ice through which it comes. Without the Scripture as revelation there is no revelation. If one does not take the Scripture itself as revelation, then one ends by way of Origen in the philosophy of Plato or of Aristotle.11
Similarly the idea of the testimony of the Spirit, too, is part of the special principle the whole of which one makes the foundation of his thought or the whole of which one rejects in the name of the natural principle.12 With the light of Scripture it is possible for man to read nature aright. Without that light we cannot, even on the Areopagus, reach further than the unknown God.13
5 Ibid., p. 241. 6 Ibid., p. 242. 7 Ibid., p. 254. 8 Ibid., p. 338. 9 Ibid., p. 339. 10 Ibid., p. 341. 11 Ibid., p. 316. 12 Ibid., p. 320. 13 Ibid., p. 332.
It is thus that the enlightened consciousness of the people of God stands over against the natural consciousness of the world. For the believers, Scripture is the principle of theology. As such it cannot be the conclusion of other premises, but it is the premise from which all other conclusions are drawn.14 From what has been said it is not to be concluded that Kuyper had no great appreciation of the knowledge of God that may be obtained from nature. The contrary is true. He lays the greatest possible stress upon the idea that the Bible is not a book that has fallen from heaven. There is a natural foundation for it. This natural foundation is found in the fact that “nature” is itself the creation of the same God who, in the special principle, comes to man for his redemption. In form at least Kuyper would therefore agree with Aquinas when he says that the supernatural or spiritual does not destroy but perfects nature. But Kuyper’s ideas of the natural and the supernatural are quite different from those of Aquinas. For Aquinas the natural is inherently defective; it partakes of the nature of non-being. Hence sin is partly at least to be ascribed to finitude. For Kuyper the natural as it came from the hand of God was perfect. To be sure, there was to be development. Historically, this development has come by way of grace. But for all that, grace is an “accident,” something that is incidental to the fulfillment of the natural. Christ came into the world to save, and in saving it developed to its full fruition the powers of the natural. Thus grace is not reduced to something that is to be naturally expected as a development of the natural. The gradation motif of Aquinas is replaced by the idea of grace as “accidental,” as the means by which sin, which is wholly unnatural or contrary to the natural, and destructive of the natural, is removed, in order that the truly natural may thus come to expression.
The natural man, working on his principle, working from the principle of his second nature, must not be given the opportunity of destroying the “accidental” character of redemption. He would be given this opportunity if his principle of autonomy were not challenged. Working on his principle he would destroy the “accidental” character of grace altogether. He would do what Romanism has so largely done. He would seek to show that the redemptive is to be expected by man. He would show, on the other hand, that the redemptive is something without determinate character in history so that every man may regard it as he pleases.
It will now be seen that what has been advocated in this work has in large measure been suggested by Kuyper’s thinking. The interdependence of the various aspects of what Kuyper so effectively speaks of as the special principle is something that would seem to be of the essence of a sound doctrine of Scripture. It is difficult to see how else the Scriptures can be presented as self-attesting. As soon as the elements of the special principle, such as the indications of divinity, the testimony of the Spirit, or the words of Christ are set next to one another, as largely independent of one another, the natural man is given an opportunity to do his destructive work. He is then allowed to judge at least with respect to one or more of these elements apart from the whole. If he is allowed to judge of the legitimacy or meaning of any one of them, he may as well be given the right to judge of all of them. If the natural man is allowed the right to take the documents of the gospels as merely historically trustworthy witnesses to the Christ and his work, he will claim and can consistently claim also to be the judge of the Christ himself. For it is only if the Christ be taken as the Son of God that he can be said legitimately to identify himself. If he is not presupposed as such, his words have no power. Then they too are absorbed in what is a hopeless relativity of history. Kuyper then has done great service to Christian apologetics by thus stressing the interdependence of the various elements of the special principle, and by stressing also its “incidental” or “accidental” nature. It is thus alone that the idea of Scripture as self-attesting, and as at the same time based upon the natural as it came from the hand of God, is really maintained.
There is one main conclusion that Kuyper has drawn from this his general position, and that is that because of it there is virtually no use in Christian apologetics. Not that Kuyper has himself always been true to his virtual rejection of apologetics. But he frequently argues that since the natural man is not to be regarded as the proper judge of the special principle and since this is true because his understanding is darkened, there is no use and no justification for reasoning with the natural man at all. The question is whether this conclusion can be harmonized with the fact that Christianity is the true religion and has the criterion of truth within itself. In his Institutes Calvin greatly stresses that men ought to see God’s presence as Creator, Provider, Benefactor, and Judge in nature and in history because this presence is clearly there. Men have not done justice by the facts, by the evidence of God’s presence before their eyes,
14
unless they burst out into praise of him who has made all things. Christ himself says that men should believe him as being in and with the Father because of his words, but if not for his words then for his works’ sake. Does not this imply that there is a clearly distinguishable presence of God in history? Does not the doctrine of Scripture itself maintain that this book has in it the marks of divinity so that it is clearly distinguishable from all other books as being the very Word of God? And does not the Holy Spirit testify to the Word with definite content as being the Word of God?
Shall we then simply say that since the natural man is blind there is no purpose in displaying before him the rich color scheme of the revelation of God’s grace? Shall we say that we must witness to men only and not reason with them at all? How would witnessing to them be of any more use to them than would reasoning? If men cannot in the least understand what he who witnesses is speaking of, will the witnessing be any challenge to him at all?
To find an answer to such questions as these it is well that we turn to the objection that Warfield raised against the position of Kuyper. In the ‘Introductory Note’ to the work on Apologetics written by Francis R. Beattie, Warfield expresses vigorous dissent from Kuyper’s view of Christian apologetics. He speaks of the “widespread misprision of apologetics” that has come about because of rationalism and because of Mysticism. For rationalism religion is expressed only in value judgments; hence it is impossible to know anything of God. Then, Warfield adds: “In a somewhat odd parallelism to this (though, perhaps, it is not so odd, after all) the mystical tendency is showing itself in our day most markedly in a widespread inclination to decline apologetics in favor of the so-called testimonium Spiritus Sancti . The convictions of the Christian man, we are told, are not the product of reasons addressed to his intellect, but are the immediate creation of the Holy Spirit in his heart. Therefore, it is intimated, we cannot only do very well without these reasons, but it is something very like sacrilege to attend to them.”15
Warfield recognizes that this mysticism is often the expression of modern irrationalism. As such, he says, it is to be expected. But he adds that “the case is very different, however, when we encounter very much the same forms of speech on the lips of heroes of the faith, who depreciate apologetics because they feel no need of ‘reasons’ to ground a faith which they are sure they have received immediately from God. Apologetics, they say, will never make a Christian. Christians are made by the creative Spirit alone. And when God almighty has implanted faith in the heart, we shall not require to seek for ‘reasons’ to ground our conviction of the truth of the Christian religion. We have tasted and seen, and we know of ourselves that it is from God. Thus, the sturdiest belief joins hands with unbelief to disparage the defenses of the Christian religion.”16