Servicios en línea

Strict requisites for mandatory injunction. Since it commands the performance of an act, a

mandatory injunction does not preserve the status quo and is thus more cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive injunction (Gateway Electronics Corporation vs. Land Bank of the

Philippines, July 30, 2003, 407 SCRA 454,).

When injunction improper

Tay Chun Suy vs. CA, 229 SCRA 151 (1994)

As between the buyer of a vessel at a prior extrajudicial foreclosure and the buyer at a subsequent auction sale, both buyers failing to register their transactions, who has a better right of dominion over the vessel?

Rule that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments of another court with concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction applies only when NO PARTY CLAIMANT involved. When a third party or a stranger to the action asserts a claim over the property levied upon, the claimant may vindicate his claim by an independent action in the proper civil court which may stop the execution of the judgment on property not belonging to the judgment debtor.

Cases where injunction was held improper

1. To restrain collection of taxes except where there are special circumstances that bear the existence of irreparable injury. (Churchill & Tait v. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580 [1915]).

2. To restrain the sale of conjugal properties where the claim can be annotated on the title as a lien such as the husbands obligation to give support. (Saavedra v. Estrada 56 Phil. 33 [1931])

3. To restrain a mayor proclaimed as duly elected from assuming his office. (Cereno v. Dictado, No. L 81550, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 759.)

4. To restrain consummated or ministerial acts:

a. Not proper to restrain against disposing a case on the merits. (Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) v. Florendo, G.R. NO. 48603, September 29, 1989, 178 SCRA 76; Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership v. Court of Appeals, No. L 79128, June 16, 1988, 162 SCRA 165.)

b. Not proper to stop the execution of judgment where the judgment was already executed. (Meneses v. Dinglasan, 81 Phil. 470 [1948])

c. The Regional Trial Court has no power to issue a writ of injunction against the Register of Deeds if its effect is to render nugatory a writ of execution issued by the National Labor Relations Commission. (Ambrosio v. Salvador, No. L 47651, December 11, 1978, 87 SCRA 217.)

d. A writ of injunction is not proper to stop the execution of judgment where the judgment was already executed. (Meneses v. Dinglasan, 81 Phil. 470 [1948])

e. But where the lower court enforced its judgment before a party against whom the execution was enforced could elevate his or her appeal in an injunction suit, which was instituted to prevent said execution, an independent petition for injunction in the Court of Appeals is justified. (Manila Surety and Fidelity v. Teodoro, G.R. No. 20530, June 29, 1967, 20 SCRA 463)

f. A writ of injunction should never issue when an action for damages would adequately compensate the injuries caused. The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue the writ of injunction rests in the possibility of irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary compensation and the prevention of the multiplicity of suits. Where facts are not shown to bring the case within these conditions, the reliefs of injunction should be refused. (Golding vs. Balabat, 36 Phil. 941)

Writ of preliminary injunction may not be issued ex parte

A writ of preliminary injunction shall not be granted without prior notice and hearing to the party or person sought to enjoined (Rule 58, Sec. 5). Reason: the preliminary injunction may cause grave and irreparable injury to the person enjoined.

However, temporary restraining order may be issued ex parte

1. If the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the court may issue a TRO effective only for 72 hours from issuance, renewable after summary hearing for a period not exceeding 20 days including the original 72 hours.

2 Only a TRO issued after a summary hearing can last for a period of twenty days

(Mayor Sampiano v. Judge Indar, A.M. No. RTJ 05 1953; December 21, 2009 ) Issues on jurisdiction

1. Pursuant to the policy of judicial stability, the judgment or order of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be interfered with by any court of concurrent

jurisdiction (Javier vs. Court of Appeals, February 16, 2004, 423 SCRA 11; See also

Chings vs. Court of Appeals, February 24, 2003, 398 SCRA 88). Exc. Third party

claim

2. Injunctions issued by the Regional Trial Courts are limited to acts committed or to be committed within its territorial jurisdiction. The doctrine is, however, limited to prohibitory and injunctive writs.

Section 21 of BP 129 reads: Original jurisdiction in other cases Regional Trial Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction (1) in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any party of their respective regions.

3. Judge's authority to issue a writ of preliminary injunction only within his/her

territorial jurisdiction

As the presiding judge of RTC, Marawi City, he should have known that Makati City was way beyond the boundaries of his territorial jurisdiction insofar as enforcing a writ of preliminary injunction is concerned. Section 21(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, provides that the RTC shall exercise original jurisdiction in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions (Gomos

vs. Adiong, A.M. No. RTJ 04 1863, October 22, 2004, 441 SCRA 162).

1. An original action for injunction is outside the jurisdiction of the Court of

Appeals.

2. The appellate court’s jurisdiction to grant a writ of preliminary injunction is limited to the actions or proceedings before it or in a petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus under Rule 65.

3. An order granting or denying a preliminary injunction is not appeal

f. Grounds for objection to, or for the dissolution of injunction or restraining order

1. Insufficiency of application

2. Other grounds (e.g. applicants bond is insufficient/defective) , upon affidavits of the party or person enjoined, which may be opposed by the applicant also by affidavits.

3. If it appears after hearing that although the applicant is entitled to the injunction or restraining order, the issuance or continuance thereof would cause irreparable damage to the party or person enjoined, while the applicant can be fully compensated for such damages as he may suffer, and the former files a bond in an amount fixed by the court conditioned that he will pay all damages which the applicant may suffer by the denial or the dissolution of the injunction or restraining order.

4. If it appears that the extent of the preliminary injunction or restraining order granted is too great, it may be modified (Rule 57, Sec. 6).

Not allowed to transfer possession

A court should not, by means of a preliminary injunction, transfer the property in litigation from the possession of one party to another where the legal title is in dispute and the party having possession asserts ownership thereto. (Toyota Motors Philippines Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102881, Dec. 7, 1992). The function of injunction is to preserve the status quo ante. (Knecht v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 56122, November 18, 1993)

This is more particularly applicable where the legal title is in dispute and the party having possession asserts ownership in himself. (Gordillo and Martinez v. Del Rosario, 39 Phil. 829 [1919])

Exceptions

a. Forcible entry in which the Court may issue preliminary mandatory injunction (Rule 70, Sec. 15) and by Section 20 thereof involving leases in which the court may, on appeal, grant similar mandatory injunctive relief. The exception applies only to ejectment cases exclusively cognizable by the municipal trial court. (Ramos v. Court of appeals, G.R. 81354, July 26, 1988, 163 SCRA 583 )

b. Property covered by Torrens Title when there is a clear finding of ownership and possession of the land or unless the subject property is covered by a Torrens Title pointing to one of the parties as the undisputed owner. (GSIS v. Florendo,

supra, note 329; Cagayan de Oro City Landless Residents Association, Inc. v. Court

of Appeals, G.R. No. 106043, March 4, 1996, 254 SCRA 229)

Not allowed to dispose of the main case on the merits

Courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which would in effect dispose of the main case without trial. Such granting of JPV's application already amounted to the virtual acceptance of JPV's alleged entitlement to preventing the petitioner from considering and passing upon the applications of other parties like Grahar to operate their own Private Emission Testing Center in Iloilo City based on JPV's still controversial capability to serve all the registered motor vehicles in Iloilo City pursuant to Department Order No. 2002 31. The granting amounted to the prejudgment of the merits of the case, something the RTC could not validly do. (City of

Injunctions not issued where act sought to be prevented had been committed / consummated acts (fait accompli)

1. The remedy of injunction could no longer be availed of where the act to be

prevented had long been consummated. Where a span of seven years has intervened from the time the award of the lot has already been accomplished to the time petitioners complaint for injunction was filed, injunction would just be an exercise in futility (Zabat vs. CA, August 23, 2000, 338 SCRA 551).

2. A writ of preliminary injunction will not issue if the act sought to be enjoined is

a fait accompli or an accomplished or consummated act (Transfield Philippines,

Inc., vs. Luzon Hydro Corporation, November 22, 2004, 443 SCRA 307). By issuing

a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the eviction of the respondents, the Court of Appeals allowed the respondents to stay in the property despite the mandatory provision of Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The appellate court, in effect, granted the same injunctive relief which the respondents failed to secure from the Regional Trial Court due to their procedural lapse (David vs. Navarro, February 11, 2004, 422 SCRA 499).