relations in the section above were compared between these regionsu The grouping method combines the values of both factors in deriving regions, and these regions are given below: Sydney Northern : Southern : Eastern : CENOPRTUY ABDFHT JLMQUW
GKSXZ
Melbourne Western : Central : Eastern : BEIOQRSTUV ADGKMN CFHJLP Sydney Nth Sth S0$ II . 8 3 2 . 8 9 0 LCS II -.228 . ^75 CC II - . 8 1 9 - . 5 ^ 6 S0$ III .762 . 9 0 9 LCS III - . 3 9 9 . 3 5 9 Table 20, Correlations < Melbourne E a s t W e s t C e n t E a s t . 701 - . 6 9 6 - . 8 7 0 - . 7 2 7 . 696 . 5 1 5 .868 - . 1 1 4 0 - y 0 0 i . 6 6 7 O VO n 0 0 % ,872 * 587 - . 0 7 3 . 4 4 6 - . 0 1 2 • 2 5 7 - . 3 8 5 - . 7 9 3 I -3*• On -3- X^nC with sociological factors, three city regions (signs as in table 16 )Sydney showed some weighting variation between city centrality and life-cycle stage, the latter changing sign in the northern and southern regions; socio-economic status was very important in the southern region, contrasting to
the other regions and the whole city.
In Melbourne there was a reversal in the importance of socio-economic status and life-cycle stage (three factor) between the whole city and the three regions. Although
life-cycle stage (three factor) had no correlation with informal vote for the whole city, it correlated negatively in each region. The positive correlation with socio-economic status (three factor) for the whole city was reduced to
zero for two regions and made positive in the central region. It is apparent that a simple or multiple linear
correlation for the whole city does not do justice to the regional variation in relations with the informal vote, and that as with participation, the whole city regression is
d) Melbourne central area
The inner city dichotomy region and the central city trichotomy region for Melbourne both overlap but are not identical. Both contain a similar 'contrary' relation between socio-economic status and participation and the informal vote respectively, participation decreasing and the informal vote increasing as socio-economic status
increases. Whether this is due to an inadequacy of method, or to an aggregate pattern of behaviours and social
characteristics mixing as observed is unknown and has not been further analysed. Given the existing measures, and assuming that the pattern of city centrality in the region contributes to the positive correlation between socio-economic status and the informal vote, then when city centrality is partialled from this correlation, it changes from r = .446 to r = -.379* For the inner city dichotomy area, the
correlation os r = -.635 between participation and socio economic status becomes r = .169 when city centrality is partialled out. Xn both regions there is an approximately 40$ covariation of city centrality with socio-economic status
(r = .620 for the dichotomy and r = .678 for the trichotomy region)„
Thus within these regions city centrality characteris tics increase as socio-economic status increases, and this
contributes to the 'contrary' patterns observed. However, the data is aggregate, the areal units are large, and the
'sample' is small, and so there is a possibility that the relations are a function of inadequate analytic design, i.e. they hold for the few large units, but may drastically change if based upon smaller areas.
ft. The components of informal voting
The percent participation figures included the technical and sociological non-voting behaviour, and the informal
voting figures also include accidental and deliberate
informality. A crude estimation of the proportions of the deliberate and accidental informal vote is possible, and this estimate suggests that for the measure used for the
1 9 6 6 election, the deliberate informal vote predominated (one would expect this because of the subtraction of the variance due to the number of candidates).
The only detailed information available on types of informal voting is given for N.S.W. divisions for the Senate election of 19^9 (presented by R.W. Evans to the Senate
Select Committee on the Cons t i t u t i o n Alter a t i o n (Avoidance of Double D i s s olution Deadlocks) Bill, Commonwealth
Parliamentary Pap e r SI 1 9 5 0 . p.2 5 - 2 7 ) « The obvious
drawbacks are the variations in voting for the Senate and House of Representatives, and the elec t i o n sample of one -
and that for 17 years before 1 9 6 6. Although the i nformal vote for the Senate is about five times that for the House
of Representatives elections, an assessment can be made of the magnitude of the d e l i b e r a t e l y informal vote«, It is assumed that because there are a very large number of
candidates for the Senate (23 in 19^9)» most of the informal vote is accidental (at
\
to for each candidate, this gives 6 to 11$>) .A table in the P a r l i a m e n t a r y Paper gives the bre a k d o w n in the types of informal vote, and from these the d el ib er a t e l y informal vote was taken to be those ballot papers either
completely unmarked, or w ith a line d ra wn through, or w it h funny or other writing on them. A sel e c t i o n was made of the remaining categories to give the clearly accidental vote
(for the table in the Parlia m e n t a r y Papers these are sections 2c, 3c , 4bcde, 5a bcd). The appropriate categories were
summed for the m e t r o p o li t a n divisions and made a percentage of the divisional total informal vote. The correlation between the two measures was r = .6 8, or about 5 0$ variance overlap.
a) relevance for 1 9 6 6
In the 19^9 Senate election, 11.2^ of the total vote was informal, and a m i n imum of 1.3
%
was d e l i b e r at el y informal(from the tables in the Parlia m e n t a r y P a p e r s ). In the 19^9 House of Representatives e l ection the total informal vote was 2.2^, and if a similar number voted deliberately informal for both House and Senate, then the p ro po r t i o n of d e liberate
176 /
-0.82 V
. u
-0.84 J
Fig. 21a. The 1949 Senate deliberate informal vote as a percentage of the total vote in standard form
/ \ /
«. I
- 0 9 8 v / ( -0.15 V h ' 'x V -167 -0.13 /"<177
N.
I-0.20 v
—0.37 —0.04 - 0 64
Fig. 22a. Deliberate in form al vote independent o f accidental in fo rm a l vote
/ /
N. I
-0.58 v, 0.42 ^ 'v ' C /
informal voters f or the House i n 19^9 would a t f i r s t seem to be about 1.3/2*2 or 58$. However, f i r s t l y because of the l a r g e r number of candidates and the g r e a t e r lack of i n t e r e s t f o r Senate e l e c t i o n s , the absolute magnitude of the d e l i b e r a t e l y informal vote could be g r e a t e r , and t h i s could reduce t h i s percentage. Secondly, i t i s known t ha t the number of candidates influence the size of the informal vote, t h i s presumably being an e r r o r c o n t r i b u t i o n . I f
the figure of 2.2$ f o r 1 9 ^ 9 i s correct ed f o r the influence of the number of candidates by s u b t r a c t i n g ^$ for each candidate per d i v i s i o n , the average i s reduced from 2.1 9$ to 1.46$, and the new d e l i b e r a t e vote estimate becomes 87$• Using the r e g r e s s i o n t ransformat ion as used f o r 1 9 6 6
data, the c o r r e l a t i o n between the number of candidates and the informal vote f o r 1949 (House) was r = .38, and i f the mean i s reduced by r $ (as i n chapter 4, s ecti on 5a ) i t becomes 1.88$ and the new estimate becomes 6 8$. These figures (8 7$ and 6 8$) are simply two separate estimates of the d e l i b e r a t e l y informal vote. Thus i n using the informal vote corrected f or the number of candidates, then on 1949 f i g ur e s , and allowing f o r Senate i n f l a t i o n of f i g u r e s , between h a l f and three q u a r t e rs of t h i s measure most probably r ep r e s e n t s d e l i b e r a t e l y informal voti ng.
b) geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n s
The number and shape of the metropolitan d i vi s i on s varies between 1 9 ^ 9 and 1 9 6 6, but the approximate d i s t r i butions for 19^+9 can be p l o t t e d on the maps f o r 1 9 6 6, and
these are given i n figures 21 and 22, Figures 21a and 21b show the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the d e l i b e r a t e and a c c i d e n t a l informal votes i n standard score form, and i t i s apparent from these t h a t there i s a great concentration of both i n the c i t y c e n t e r . There i s a l s o some overlap of the
p a t t e r n s i n the western and northern areas of the c i t y .
The p a t t e r n s independent of the overlap can be given
by obtaining the r e s i d u a l s from t h e i r c o r r e l a t i o n , a l t e r n a t e l y subtr act ing the variance of the d e l i b e r a t e from the
acci d ent al vote and vice versa. These r e s i d u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n s are given i n f i g u r e s 22a and 22b, and i t i s apparent that the
distribution of the deliberate minus the accidental informal vote corresponds closely to the distribution of the informal vote (corrected for candidates) in
1966 (figure
9h),The deliberate informal vote is geographically
associated mostly with the city center and with low socio economic status, and therefore largely with the ALP vote; the accidentally informal vote (independent of the
deliberately informal vote) does not seem to be geographi cally associated with the extremes of any sociological factor, nor with party vote. Rydon (19^3> page 180,
footnote 21) quotes a study of voting in
193^ to the effect
that deliberately informal votes varied from27$» to 66$
of the total informal vote (n ,B. uncorrected for candidates); perhaps the mapped distributions show more clearly the
sociological and party correlates of this variation.
c) summary
These estimates are crude and obviously are only a first approximation based upon the only available data on this topic. The analysis has been made in order to get some idea of what the informal vote measure (l6nC)
represents, and it seems likely that it is predominantly a measure of deliberately informal voting.
9« Within-division variability again
Given two areal scales of units, e.g.electoral divisions and subdivisions, then if the frequency distribution of a variable is highly skewed, e.g. an exponential curve
towards the city center, and if the geographical patterning of subunits is appropriate, e.g. concentricity for the
example given, then there is almost certain to be a
correlation of within unit variability with the magnitude of the variables’ averages for the larger units.
In this example the concentric patterning of
subdivisions together with the exponential curve ensures an increasing within-division variability towards the city
center, and this increase will correlate with the increasing magnitude of the variable.
There remains an unexplained difference b e t w e e n the
two cities in that the p a t t e r n of with:in-division variability is more no n - r a n d o m for Sydney, and corr e s p o n d i n g l y explains more of the variance b e t w e e n some correlations for Sydney
(table 21). W h y this difference (if real) should exist is unknown. There are on a v e rage fewer electoral sub divisions in Melbourne, and this could poss i b l y cause the difference. The ’meaning* of w i t h i n - d i v i s i o n variability is also unknown. E ven if it is a function of distrib u t i o n shape t hen it still has an ecological significance
(chapter 6, section 12b).
More r e s e a r c h is needed on the scale v a r i a b i l i t y of ecological effects, using more precise measures t han those used in this thesis.
Sy d n e y __________ __________ Me lb ourne r 12 " , 8 " r45 r ! 2 . 3 = -8 3 4 r 45.6= „ 7 9 ^ . 7 2 9 r l 2 = .796 r 45 = r l 2 . 3 = ' 7 7 ° r 45 .6= - . 9 2 3
-.914
reduction 1 b j om
§ja
Ik
1 = $ALP b=
</o p a r t i c i p a t i o n 2 = S 0 $ X X 5 = cc h i 3 = W i t h i n - d i v . v a r . ($ALP) 6 = W i t h i n - d i v .v a r . ( *p) Table 21. Partiallings of w i t h i n - d i v i s i o n variation 10. C o m b i n a t i o n regionsFor the entire city then there is no c o r r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n and the A L P vote, but the informal vote correlates w ith both (table 13)» Because each has a different geograp h i c a l d i s t r i b u t i o n (figures 9 and 10) then there will be different combination patterns of them in different parts of the city. Cox (1 9 6 8 ) ment i o n s some e x p e ctation that n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n should vary w i t h h igh Labour Party voting, but finds only a w eak c o r r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n the two in London. A l t h o u g h voting is compulsory
in Australia, an y combination patterns involving participation may be reflected in part where voting is not compulsory.