CAPÍTULO V: Programa de intervención
5.8 Desarrollo de las sesiones
5.8.1 Sesión N°1
A US engagement strategy toward Iran would not be strictly
bilateral.
1015In fact, improved relations between these two countries
would have a positive ripple effect for the United States across the
whole world.
1016Foremost, the United States has its European allies
to consider, who still represent Washington’s most obvious foreign
policy asset.
1017Washington’s stance on Iran has historically differed
from these various allies, and as discussed above, these differences
seriously undercut Europe’s Critical Dialogue policies.
1018But like in
the 1990s, Europe still has too much to gain from investment in Iran,
and the presence of US investment there, while competitive, would
army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1265; Maimuna Ashraf, Iran nuclear deal and future prospects, FOREIGN POL'Y NEWS (July 30, 2015), http://foreignpolicynews.org/2015/07/30/ iran-nuclear-deal-and-future-prospects/.
1012. See Mousavian, The Rise of the Iranian Moderates, supra note 848; Khamenei: Nuclear Deal Could Allow Ralks ‘On Other Issues’, AL-MONITOR (Apr. 12, 2015), http:// www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/04/khamenei-iran-deal-engagement-west.html (citing Khamenei’s comments on the future potential of cooperation with Washington).
1013. See supra notes 988-89 and accompanying text.
1014. See Thomas Erdbrink et al., After a U.S. Shift, Iran Has a Seat at Talks on War in Syria, N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 28, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/29/world/middleeast/ syria-talks-vienna-iran.html; Ian Black, Iran’s Invitation to Syria Talks Marks Significant Shift for US and Allies, GUARDIAN (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/ 27/irans-invitation-to-syria-talks-marks-significant-shift-for-us-and-allies (explaining the significance of Iran’s participation in international Syria talks).
1015. See infra notes 1016-41 and accompanying text. 1016. See infra notes 1017-41 and accompanying text.
1017. Joseph S. Nye, Europe Remains America’s Most Powerful Ally, ATLANTIC
COUNCIL (Jun. 10, 2010), http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/europe-remains-
americas-most-powerful-ally; Luke Coffey, Keeping America Safe; Why U.S. Bases in Europe Remain Vital, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/ 07/keeping-america-safe-why-us-bases-in-europe-remain-vital (last visited Apr. 11, 2016); Donna Miles, Europe Remains Strategically Vital, IIPDIGITAL (Mar. 18, 2013), http:// iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2013/03/20130318144377.html#axzz41y42zq2f.
1018. See supra note 767 and accompanying text (listing the reasons Critical Dialogue failed as a strategy).
provide at least some sign of security that Washington is not going to
complicate Europe’s long-term operations. In particular, Europe’s
current reliance on Russian natural gas to meet its massive domestic
energy needs would be mitigated, were it to increase imports from
Iran.
1019Although this development is likely to occur whether or not
the US chooses to further engage Iran, any future US action targeting
or limiting Iran’s gas sector would come at the expense of indirectly
harming the United States’ allies. If, in the event of JCPOA
noncompliance, the US were forced to take action against the Islamic
Republic, then doing so after a genuine and good faith effort at
attempting engagement would at least soften the blow inflicted on
Washington’s traditional friend base.
1020At the same time, perhaps a more damning consequence of a
future US failure to engage with Iran concerns Washington’s
traditional adversaries.
1021This cuts at one of the fundamental flaws
of the entire sanctions regime: where the United States and its allies
choose policies of isolation, somebody else is always standing on
deck, ready to seize opportunities.
1022While internally sanctions
against Iran tended to empower hardliner elements like the IRGC, on
the international stage, China and Russia directly benefited from US-
imposed sanctions against Iran.
1023Throughout the sanctions regime,
Iran “explicitly sought to utilize China as a bulwark against Western
pressure, deliberating privileging Chinese companies with major
deals,” while Beijing was of the mindset that “commercial
arrangements should have no bearing on security issues, and vice
versa.”
1024Sure enough, from 2010 onward, Chinese FDI was the
only significant player left within Iran’s energy sector, with firms like
China National Petroleum Company (“CNPC”) and Sinopec landing
1019. SeeHow Much Europe Depends on Russian Energy, N.Y.TIMES, Sept. 2, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/03/21/world/europe/how-much-europe-depends-on- russian-energy.html?_r=0 (calculating the extent of Europe’s reliance on Russian natural gas); Steinhauser & Norman, supra note 495 (exploring Iran’s potential of meeting Europe’s gas needs).
1020. See supra note 826 and accompanying text (anticipating the importance of goodwill with Washington’s European partners, if the United States ever needs to reimpose sanctions against Iran); see also Haass & O’Sullivan, Conclusion, supra note 778, at 162.
1021. See infra notes 1022-41 and accompanying text. 1022. See infra notes 1023-31 and accompanying text.
1023. See supra note 366 and accompanying text (discussing Russia and China’s enrichment under the sanctions regime).
1024. MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 407.
major deals there.
1025By consistently ducking under sanction-
triggering thresholds and resorting to US dollar-avoiding buybacks
and bartering, China positioned itself as a powerful competitor in
Iran’s post-sanctions future.
1026Meanwhile, Russia has also gained from the United States’ past
anti-Iran policies.
1027Although for centuries Moscow and Tehran
have shared (and in fact, still do share) a turbulent relationship, US
policies on Iran have provided ample posturing opportunities for
Russian President Vladimir Putin to expand his role in the region.
1028This is most evident in the Kremlin’s recent intervention in Syria: an
intervention that, while premised on combating ISIS and Sunni
extremists, was debuted with targeted airstrikes on moderate US-
backed Syrian rebels.
1029The trouble with Russia’s Syrian
intervention is that it need not be confined to Syria’s borders.
1030If
1025. Seeid. at 408-10; Chen Aizhu, Exclusive: China Slows Iran Oil Work as U.S. Energy Ties Warm, REUTERS (Oct. 28, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-iran- oil-idUSTRE69R1L120101028 (detailing Iranian participation in Iran’s oil sector through the late sanctions regime).
1026. See Michael Lelyveld, China Faces Challenge Dodging US Sanctions Over Iranian Oil Imports, RADIO FREE ASIA, (Sept. 2, 2013), http://www.rfa.org/english/ commentaries/energy_watch/oil-09022013111150.html; Wayne Ma, Sanctions Gap Allows China to Import Iranian Oil, WALL ST.J., Aug. 21, 2013, http://www.wsj.com/articles/ SB10001424127887324619504579026333611696094 (explaining how China dodged sanctions against Iran); see also John S. Park, Iran and China, in THE IRAN PRIMER,supra
note 12, at 184 (“Gaps left by Western and other Asian firms forced out by sanctions present Chinese companies with strategic opportunities to enlarge their share of key sectors amid reduced competition.”).
1027. See infra notes 1028-31 and accompanying text.
1028. See Mark N. Katz, Iran and Russia, in THE IRAN PRIMER,supra note 12, at 186- 89; Alexander A. Pikayev, Why Russia Supported Sanctions Against Iran?, JAMES MARTIN
CTR.NONPROLIFERATION STUD. (June 23, 2010), http://
cns.miis.edu/stories/100623_russia_iran_pikayev.htm (tracing the evolution of Iran’s relationship with Russia). Though much has been made of Russian-Iranian cooperation and their shared mistrust of the West, the depth of this friendship is probably limited. See Samuel Ramani, So Are Russia and Iran Best buddies Now? Um, Maybe Not, WASH.POST (Nov. 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/11/12/so-are-russia-and- iran-best-buddies-now-um-maybe-not/; Kambiz Foroohar, Gifts and Praise Can’t Obscure Limits to Iran-Russia Relations, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/ news/articles/2015-12-18/gifts-and-praise-can-t-obscure-limits-to-iran-russia-relations.
1029. See Nancy A. Youssef, Putin Hits West’s Rebels Instead of ISIS, THE DAILY
BEAST (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/09/30/putin-orders-u-s- jets-out-of-syria.html; Ian Johnston, Russia in Syria: Over 90% of air strikes not targeting Isis, says US, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle- east/russia-in-syria-us-and-turkey-claim-russian-warplanes-hitting-moderate-syrian-rebel- groups-a6685496.html (critiquing Russia’s conduct in Syria).
Iran were to fall entirely into the Russian sphere of influence, then
from Lebanon to Iraq to Yemen, Moscow will find no shortage of
theaters to severely frustrate US regional interests.
1031Nations like Russia and China represent much larger potential
hazards to Washington than Iran or any other State (or non-State
actor) in the Middle East region.
1032If the United States fails to
engage Iran, it is likely that the Islamic Republic will fall even further
under the influence of these globe-spanning rivals.
1033The head start
in Iran that Russia and China secured through the sanctions regime
places the United States and its allies at a comparative
disadvantage.
1034In its current form, footnote six of the JCPOA
provides little hope of outpacing the growing influence of these rival
States.
1035While troubling in itself, this influence would also cripple
any future multilateral efforts at pressuring or constraining Iran.
1036Russia and China’s permanent-member vetoes in the UN Security
Council could effectively shield Iran from future multilateral action,
were their partnerships with Tehran to grow in the absence of US
competition.
1037This could look very different, however, were the
United States to abandon its commitment to footnote six and facilitate
1031. Russian Cooperation with Iran and Iraq has Broader Consequences Than Saving Assad, THE CONVERSATION (Oct. 15, 2015), http://theconversation.com/russian-cooperation- with-iran-and-iraq-has-broader-consequences-than-saving-assad-49164; Stephen Pitt-Walker,
Russia and Iran:The Implications of a Reactionary Alliance, INT'L POL'Y DIG. (Feb. 14, 2015), http://intpolicydigest.org/2015/02/14/russia-iran-implications-reactionary-alliance/;
1032. SeeRussia and China Pose Largest Security Threats, Says US military Report,
GUARDIAN (July 1, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jul/01/russia-china-us-
mlitary-national-security; Jonathan Adelman, Why Are We Treating Iran as a Great Power?,
WORLD POST (July 6, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-adelman/why-are-we-
treating-iran_b_7738946.html (assessing the greatest threats to US security).
1033. Alicia Garcia-Herrero, Europe Risks Losing Iran to China and Russia, BUS.
INSIDER (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/europe-risks-losing-iran-to-china-
and-russia-2015-8; The Shanghai Cooperation Organization Waits for Iran, AL ARABIYA
ENGLISH (July 9, 2015), http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2015/07/09
/The-Shanghai-Cooperation-Organization-waits-for-Iran.html. 1034. See supra notes 1021-33 and accompanying text.
1035. See supra notes 1021-33 and accompanying text; see also supra Part II.A.2. 1036. See infra note 1037 and accompanying text.
1037. Cf. Neil Macfarquhar, With Rare Double U.N. Veto on Syria, Russia and China Try to Shield Friend, N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 5, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/06/world/ middleeast/with-united-nations-veto-russia-and-china-help-syria.html (Syria); Mark N. Katz,
The Russia and China Factors in Sanctions, THE IRAN PRIMER (Nov, 28, 2011), http://iran primer.usip.org/blog/2011/nov/28/russia-and-china-factors-sanctions (examining Russia and China’s conduct through the sanctions regime).