DE LA SESION DE NEGOCIACIÓN MIXTA

Facts: Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as medical representative on October 24, 1995, after Tecson had undergone training and orientation.

Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment which stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies and should management find that such relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company. If management perceives a conflict of interest or a potential conflict between such relationship and the employee’s employment with the company, the management and the employee will explore the possibility of a "transfer to another department in a non-counterchecking position" or preparation for employment outside the company after six months.

Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo’s products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals (Astra), a competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was Astra’s Branch Coordinator in Albay.

Even before they got married, Tecson received several reminders from his District Manager regarding the conflict of interest which his relationship with Bettsy might engender. In January 1999, Tecson’s superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy gave rise to a conflict of interest. Tecson’s superiors reminded him that he and Bettsy should decide which one of them would resign from their jobs, although they told him that they wanted to retain him as much as possible because he was performing his job well. In November 1999, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City- Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. Tecson asked Glaxo to reconsider its decision, but his request was denied.

Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the grievance machinery level, they submitted the matter for voluntary arbitration. Glaxo offered Tecson a separation pay of one-half (½) month pay for every year of service, or a total of P50,000.00 but he declined the offer. On November 15, 2000, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered its Decision declaring as valid Glaxo’s policy on relationships between its employees and persons employed with competitor companies, and affirming Glaxo’s right to transfer Tecson to another sales territory.

On May 19, 2003, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision denying the Petition for Review.

Issue: Whether or not Glaxo’s policy prohibiting its employees from marrying an employee of a competitor company is valid.

Held: Yes, it is valid. No reversible error can be ascribed to the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Glaxo’s policy prohibiting an employee from having a relationship with an employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of management prerogative.

Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs and information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.

The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo’s employees is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures.

That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied. No less than the Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and growth. Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.

In any event, from the wordings of the contractual provision and the policy in its employee handbook, it is clear that Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition against relationships between its employees and those of competitor companies. Its employees are free to cultivate relationships with and marry persons of their own choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the company that may arise out of such relationships. As succinctly explained by the appellate court, thus:

The policy being questioned is not a policy against marriage. An employee of the company remains free to marry anyone of his or her choosing. The policy is not aimed at restricting a personal prerogative that belongs only to the individual. However, an employee’s personal decision does not detract the employer from exercising management prerogatives to ensure maximum profit and business success. . .

The Court of Appeals also correctly noted that the assailed company policy which forms part of respondent’s Employee Code of Conduct and of

its contracts with its employees, such as that signed by Tescon, was made known to him prior to his employment. Tecson, therefore, was aware of that restriction when he signed his employment contract and when he entered into a relationship with Bettsy. Since Tecson knowingly and voluntarily entered into a contract of employment with Glaxo, the stipulations therein have the force of law between them and, thus, should be complied with in good faith." He is therefore estopped from questioning said policy.

Sexual Harassment – R.A. No. 7877

Philippine Aelous Automotive United Corporation vs. NLRC G.R. No. 124617

PHILIPPINE AEOLUS AUTO-MOTIVE UNITED CORPORATION and/or FRANCIS CHUA vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROSALINDA C. CORTEZ April 28, 2000

Facts: Petitioner Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation (PAAUC) is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, petitioner Francis Chua is its President while private respondent Rosalinda C. Cortez was a company nurse1 of petitioner corporation until her termination on 7 November 1994.

On 5 October 1994 a memorandum was a issued by Ms. Myrna Palomares, Personnel Manager of petitioner corporation, addressed to private respondent Rosalinda C. Cortez requiring her to explain within forty-eight (48) hours why no disciplinary action should be taken against her (a) for throwing a stapler at Plant Manager William Chua, her superior, and uttering invectives against him on 2 August 1994; (b) for losing the amount of P1,488.00 entrusted to her by Plant Manager Chua to be given to Mr. Fang of the CLMC Department on 23 August 1994; and, (c) for asking a co-employee to punch-in her time card thus making it appear that she was in the office in the morning of 6 September 1944 when in fact she was not. The memorandum however was refused by private respondent although it was read to her and discussed with her by a co- employee. She did not also submit the required explanation, so that while her case pending investigation the company placed her under preventive suspension for thirty (30) days effective 9 October 1994 to 7 November 1994.

On 20 October 1994, while Cortez was still under preventive suspension, another memorandum was issued by petitioner corporation giving her seventy-two (72) hours to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against her for allegedly failing to process the ATM applications of her nine (9) co-employees with the Allied Banking Corporation. On 21 October 1994 private respondent also refused to receive the second memorandum although it was read to her by a co-employee. A copy of the

memorandum was also sent by the Personnel Manager to private respondent at her last known address by registered mail.

On 3 November 1994 a third memorandum was issued to private respondent, this time informing her of her termination from the service effective 7 November 1994. On 6 December 1994 private respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of annual service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay and damages against PAAUC and its president Francis Chua.

On 10 July 1995 the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision holding the termination of Cortez as valid and legal, at the same time dismissing her claim for damages for lack of merit. On appeal to the NLRC, public respondent reversed on 15 February 1996 the decision of the Labor Arbiter and found petitioner corporation guilty of illegal dismissal of private respondent Cortez. The NLRC ordered petitioner PAAUC to reinstate respondent Cortez to her former position with back wages computed from the time of dismissal up to her actual reinstatement.

On 11 March 1996 petitioners moved for reconsideration. On 28 March 1996 the motion was denied.

Issue: Whether or not respondent should be entitled to exemplary damages.

Held: No, she should not be. On the issue of moral and exemplary damages, the NLRC ruled that private respondent was not entitled to recover such damages for her failure to prove that petitioner corporation had been motivated by malice or bad faith or that it acted in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner in terminating her services.

Public respondent in thus concluding appears baffled why it took private respondent more than four (4) years to expose William Chua's alleged sexual harassment. It reasons out that it would have been more prepared to support her position if her act of throwing the stapler and uttering invectives on William Chua were her immediate reaction to his amorous overtures. In that case, according to public respondent, she would have been justified for such outburst because she would have been merely protecting her womanhood, her person and her rights.

We are not persuaded. The gravamen of the offense in sexual harassment is not the violation of the employee's sexuality but the abuse of power by the employer. Any employee, male or female, may rightfully cry "foul" provided the claim is well substantiated. Strictly speaking, there is no time period within which he or she is expected to complain through the proper channels. The time to do so may vary depending upon the needs, circumstances, and more importantly, the emotional threshold of the employee.

Private respondent admittedly allowed four (4) years to pass before finally coming out with her employer's sexual impositions. Not many women, especially in this country, are made of the stuff that can endure the agony and trauma of a public, even corporate, scandal. If petitioner corporation had not issued the third memorandum that terminated the services of private respondent, we could only speculate how much longer she would keep her silence. Moreover, few persons are privileged indeed to transfer from one employer to another. The dearth of quality employment has become a daily "monster" roaming the streets that one may not be expected to give up one's employment easily but to hang on to it, so to speak, by all tolerable means. Perhaps, to private respondent's mind, for as long as she could outwit her employer's ploys she would continue on her job and consider them as mere occupational hazards. This uneasiness in her place of work thrived in an atmosphere of tolerance for four (4) years, and one could only imagine the prevailing anxiety and resentment, if not bitterness, that beset her all that time. But William Chua faced reality soon enough. Since he had no place in private respondent's heart, so must she have no place in his office. So, he provoked her, harassed her, and finally dislodged her; and for finally venting her pent-up anger for years, he "found" the perfect reason to terminate her.

In determining entitlement to moral and exemplary damages, we restate the bases therefor. In moral damages, it suffices to prove that the claimant has suffered anxiety, sleepless nights, besmirched reputation and social humiliation by reason of the act complained of. Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are granted in addition to, inter alia, moral damages "by way of example or correction for the public good" if the employer ''acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner."

Anxiety was gradual in private respondent's five (5)-year employment. It began when her plant manager showed an obvious partiality for her which went out of hand when he started to make it clear that he would terminate her services if she would not give in to his sexual advances. Sexual harassment is an imposition of misplaced "superiority" which is enough to dampen an employee's spirit in her capacity for advancement. It affects her sense of judgment; it changes her life. If for this alone private respondent should be adequately compensated. Thus, for the anxiety, the seen and unseen hurt that she suffered, petitioners should also be made to pay her moral damages, plus exemplary damages, for the oppressive manner with which petitioners effected her dismissal from the service, and to serve as a forewarning to lecherous officers and employers who take undue advantage of their ascendancy over their employees. Domingo vs. Rayala

G.R. No. 155831

MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO vs. ROGELIO I. RAYALA

Facts: On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala before Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). She filed the Complaint for sexual harassment on the basis of Administrative Order No. 250, the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7877 in the Department of Labor and Employment.

The Committee heard the parties and received their respective evidence. On March 2, 2000, the Committee submitted its report and recommendation to Secretary Laguesma. It found Rayala guilty of the offense charged and recommended the imposition of the minimum penalty provided under AO 250, which it erroneously stated as suspension for six (6) months.

Rayala filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the OP denied in a Resolution dated May 24, 2000. He then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure before this Court on June 14, 2000.9 However, the same was dismissed in a Resolution dated June 26, 2000 for disregarding the hierarchy of courts. Rayala filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

In its Resolution dated September 4, 2000, the Court recalled its June 26 Resolution and referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) for appropriate action.

The CA rendered its Decision13 on December 14, 2001. It held that there was sufficient evidence on record to create moral certainty that Rayala committed the acts he was charged with. It also held that Rayala’s dismissal was proper. The CA pointed out that Rayala was dismissed for disgraceful and immoral conduct in violation of RA 6713, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Rayala timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Justices Vasquez and Tolentino voted to affirm the December 14 Decision.

Domingo filed a Petition for Review before this Court, which we denied in our February 19, 2003 Resolution for having a defective verification. She filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court granted; hence, the petition was reinstated.

Rayala likewise filed a Petition for Review with this Court essentially arguing that he is not guilty of any act of sexual harassment.

Meanwhile, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the CA’s October 18, 2002 Resolution. The CA denied the same in its June 3, 2003 Resolution.

Held: Yes, Rayala committed the acts complained of – and was guilty of sexual harassment – is, therefore, the common factual finding of not just one, but three independent bodies: the Committee, the OP and the CA. It should be remembered that when supported by substantial evidence, factual findings made by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are accorded great respect and even finality by the courts. The principle, therefore, dictates that such findings should bind us.

He insists, however, that these acts do not constitute sexual harassment, because Domingo did not allege in her complaint that there was a demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor as a condition for her continued employment or for her promotion to a higher position. Rayala urges us to apply to his case our ruling in Aquino v. Acosta.

We find respondent’s insistence unconvincing. Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action for each can proceed independently of the others. This rule applies with full force to sexual harassment.

The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877. Section 3 thereof defines work-related sexual harassment in this wise:

Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. – Work, education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.

(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:

(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in a way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee;

(2) The above acts would impair the employee’s rights or privileges under existing labor laws; or

(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee.

This section, in relation to Section 7 on penalties, defines the criminal aspect of the unlawful act of sexual harassment. The same section, in relation to Section 6, authorizes the institution of an independent civil action for damages and other affirmative relief. Section 4, also in relation to Section 3, governs the procedure for administrative cases, viz.:

Sec. 4. Duty of the Employer or Head of Office in a Work-related, Education or Training Environment. – It shall be the duty of the employer or the head of the work-related, educational or training environment or institution, to prevent or deter the commission of acts of sexual harassment and to provide the procedures for the resolution, settlement or prosecution of acts of sexual harassment. Towards this end, the employer or head of office shall:

(a) Promulgate appropriate rules and regulations in consultation with and jointly approved by the employees or students or trainees, through their duly designated representatives, prescribing the procedure for the investigation or sexual harassment cases and the administrative sanctions therefor.

Administrative sanctions shall not be a bar to prosecution in the proper courts for unlawful acts of sexual harassment.

The said rules and regulations issued pursuant to this section (a) shall include, among others, guidelines on proper decorum