Consideration of the nature of truth and knowledge has been debated and discussed by philosophers reaching back to ancient Greece (Johnson & Gray, 2010). More recent
philosophical discussion and debate has focussed specifically on the nature of science and the scientific method. Keegan (2016) argued that if we assume that sport and exercise
psychology is embodied by the application of scientific research then it is vital to understand the scientific process, as well as the assumptions and decisions that have informed this process. Much of the debate relating to the philosophy of science in the last 100 years has been dominated by the positions put forward by two of the most prominent research philosophers: Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn (Fuller, 2004). Popper and Kuhn provided influential perspectives on scientific progress and the processes by which science should be conducted.
Popper’s (1969) central thesis regarding science is best considered through his notion of fallibility; he argued that no amount of evidence can ever prove a theory to be correct, yet it is much easier for a theory to be proven to be incorrect. In addition, induction is not possible because observation is always preceded by theory and therefore one can never truly investigate a phenomenon without pre-existing knowledge. This philosophical approach to research – known as critical rationalism – argues that although theories can never be definitively proven to be correct, scientists should develop and implement studies which specifically try to disprove theories (Popper, 1969). Theories which are tested in such a manner and placed under scrutiny will either be disproven or have errors removed and better reflect the truth. Theories that are disproven will be either discarded or put to one side in favour of theories which have more ‘truth content’ (i.e., they explain known facts and accurately predict new ones; Hassmen et al., 2016). Popper argued against scientific approaches which aim to verify existing theories or protect those theories through ad hoc explanations of contradictory findings (Magee, 1973).
In contrast to the philosophy of science put forward by Popper, Kuhn (1962) proposed a dramatically different position. Kuhn argued that ‘normal science’ was typified not by the critique of existing theory but by research paradigms. These paradigms are world views which encompass specific theories and methods of testing them, and essentially define the question worth answering and the methods of answering it. In essence, researchers are trained and cultured within these paradigms, and those working within the accepted paradigms do so dogmatically by defending pet theories through verification research and ad hoc explanations of inconvenient or unexpected results (which Popper referred to as pseudoscience).
Protection of paradigms may also lead to falsification studies not being published due to researchers and publishers not wishing to publish negative results (Chambers, 2017). Despite the possible negative outcomes associated with this paradigmatic approach, Kuhn (1962) did argue that scientific progress was still made possible through the accumulation of
unexplainable anomalies within existing theories which would eventually lead to a crisis and a shift towards a new paradigm.
Popper and Kuhn were followed by other prominent philosophers who attempted to continue and refine the debate and the positions of their predecessors, the most well-known of whom were Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabrand (Hassmen et al., 2016). Lakatos (1970) tried to find a middle ground between Popperian and Kuhnian perspectives by proposing science as a series of research programmes which are either progressive or degenerative
Where Popper and Kuhn attempted to demarcate science and pseudoscience, Lakatos (1970) proposed criteria to identify good and bad examples of research. Progressive programmes reflect those in which scientists adhere to some of the tenets of Popperian falsification by applying theories which are better able to predict facts and stand up to robust testing. Degenerative research programmes, on the other hand, reflect what Kuhn (1962) referred to as normal science and would see researchers try to ‘save’ their theories by adding ad hoc hypotheses as a means to explaining findings not explained by the theory.
In stark contrast to other philosophical positions, Feyerabrand (1975) proposed an approach described as epistemological anarchism (Hassmen et al., 2016). Feyerabrand argued that as all evidence cannot be approached in the absence of theory (i.e., incommensurability), the approaches proposed by Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos would limit the generation of new knowledge. New theories and ideas should be developed and compete with one another, and theories that are disproved should be improved rather than disposed. The attempts by
preceding philosophers to specify methods of generating knowledge were considered by Feyerabrand to be inhibitive due to them not leading to new alternative ideas and theories, and therefore the only solution is for an ‘anything goes’ approach to generating knowledge. Science should therefore aim to generate new theories and knowledge by comparing theories and bringing in content from a broad spectrum of sources.
The preceding discussion demonstrates the importance of considering philosophy of research as different philosophical positions have implications for knowledge development and application. Despite this, there is a lack of engagement with, or discussion of,
philosophical assumptions within sport and exercise psychology research. For instance, of the 19 articles considering the simultaneous influence of coaches, parents and peers summarised in Table 1 only four explicitly stated their philosophical position (i.e., Keegan et al., 2009, 2010a, 2014a, 2014b).