CAPITULO II. ASPECTOS GENERALES DEL INSTRUMENTO PÚBLICO 13 Conceptos Doctrinales:
6. Si el cartulario no conociere a las partes o a alguna de ellas, deben
In British history, OHS had a special place compared to general IR. Some studies have underlined that health and safety were relatively uncontentious.204 The consensual approach
around OHS is illustrated by the appointment of the National Joint Advisory Council for Industry in 1954. This Council was a place where the Confederation of Employers, the TUC and the Minister of Labour were discussing industrial problems on a monthly basis.205 One
reason that can explain this difference between the OHS and the other IR topics is that the TUs insisted that the employer should be the only responsible for the management of the OHS matters.206 It was only in 1964 that TUC changed its approach to OHS by officially launching
a campaign for legislation and asked, among other things, for more compulsory provisions for safety delegates.207 Additionally, the UK has not been marked by significant worker protests
204 Sirrs, C., 2016. Health and Safety in the British Regulatory State, 1961-2001: the HSC, HSE and the
Management of Occupational Risk (Doctoral dissertation, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine). p.77
205 O'Brien, T., 1954. Trade unions and responsibility. Blackfriars, 35(410), p.206
206 Glendon, A.I. and Booth, R.T., 1982. Worker participation in occupational health and safety in Britain. Int'l
Lab. Rev., 121, p.409 ; Crouch, C., 1978. The intensification of industrial conflict in the United Kingdom. In The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe Since 1968. Palgrave Macmillan Uk. pp.191-256
67 regarding OHS. In the 1960s, the protest issues related to raising wages rather than OHS and working conditions. Indeed, even if some workers’ representatives tried to bargain for better protection, they sometimes had to face negative reactions from the workers who would rather have a bonus than better protection.208
On a factual basis, an increasing number of workplace accidents marked the 1960s.209
After years of decrease, the number of workplace accidents plateaued and represented a high number of accidents.210 According to Duncan, in 1969, two or three people were killed at their
workplace in the UK every day.211 Throughout the 1960s, there were between 600 and 700
fatalities and over 300.000 accidents reported per year. As noticed by Beck, at that time workplace safety increasingly gained political importance.212
In reaction to these dramatic numbers, a first ‘wave’ of proposals was addressed to reform the OHS legislation in 1967 but left the existing fragmented framework unchanged.213
There were continuous tripartite consultations in 1968 but without any success. In 1969, the Department of Employment and Productivity recognised that a more radical approach was necessary to change the situation. Barbara Castle, MP and Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity at that time, was convinced that an independent committee was required to provide a significant break with the previous system.214 She was also persuaded that the size of
that committee was the key to its independence and future efficiency: small with only a few members. Therefore, the committee ought to represent both sides of industry, with
208 James, Phil. Interview 25 July, 2017. Archives, University of Glasgow p.1
209 There was an increase in all accidents at work, but an overall decrease in the fatal accidents at work, in the UK
between 1961 and 1970. See tables in Robens, Safety and Health at Work, (vol1) pp. 161-162
210 Sirrs, C., 2015. Accidents and Apathy: The Construction of the ‘Robens Philosophy’of Occupational Safety
and Health Regulation in Britain, 1961–1974. Social history of medicine, 29(1), p.73 - Archives, University of Glasgow p.1 – See Archival records of these organisations are kept at The National Archives (TNA) in Kew, Surrey (for government records), and the Modern Records Centre at the University of Warwick for the TUC and BEC/CBI. For archival records of the Robens Committee, see TNA LAB 96; confirmed by interview with Walters David, Interview 25 Mai, 2017. Archives, University of Glasgow p.1
211Duncan, K.P., 1971. Occupational health and safety in Great Britain, 1969. British Journal of Industrial
Medicine, 28(2), p.201 - Annual Report of H.M. Chief Inspector of Factories for 1969 (1970). H.M.S.O., London
212 Beck, M. and Woolfson, C., 2000. The regulation of health and safety in Britain: From old Labour to new
Labour. Industrial Relations Journal, 31(1) p.37
213 Sirrs, C., 2015. Accidents and Apathy: The Construction of the ‘Robens Philosophy’of Occupational Safety
and Health Regulation in Britain, 1961–1974. Social history of medicine, 29(1), p.77 ; Robens, A., 1972. Safety
and health at work: report of the Committee, 1970-72 (Vol. 1). HM Stationery Office p.188
214 TNA LAB 96/447, Memorandum by the First Secretary of State ; Doc 1, summary of replies to Sir Derek
68 representatives from political parties, the academic sphere, and the fieldwork and science fields.215 The aim of this committee was to
review the provision made for the safety and health of persons in the course of their employment and to consider whether any changes were needed in: (1) the scope or nature of the major relevant enactments, or (2) the nature and extent of voluntary action concerned with these matters.216
Lord Alfred Robens was appointed as the head of this Committee. He was a former TU official, a Labour MP, and was also minister of labour for few months in 1951. Since then, he had been the shadow minister of labour and was one of the leading figures of the Labour Party.217 In 1960, the Conservative Prime Minister Harold Macmillan offered him the
chairmanship of the National Coal Board (NCB), which he accepted. At that time, this appointment was very controversial and was a significant disturbance in the inside organisation
of the Labour Party.218 Lord Robens also served as a member of the Donovan Commission,
appointed in 1965, with the report published in 1968.219 Considering his knowledge of IR, both
sides of industry respected him, and his value was recognised by both the Labour and the Conservative Parties. Lord Robens’ previous functions — especially his experience as chair of the NCB and the Donovan Commission — influenced his vision of OHS and the recommendations made. However, one might raise questions regarding the appointment of Lord Robens at the head of the Commission in charge of reforming the OHS legal framework considering that he was the chair of the NCB at the time of one of the biggest industrial disasters in the 1960s: the Aberfan disaster. Some scholars argued that contrary to what Lord Robens said,220 the NCB had the technology to prevent the disaster221. The reason for his appointment,
215 Robens, A., 1972. Safety and health at work: report of the Committee, 1970-72 (Vol. 1). HM Stationery Office,
v; the final composition of the Committee appointed on the 29th May 1970 was Lord Alfred Robens as the Chair
of the Committee; John C. Wood, a law professor; Anne Shaw, a management consultant; Mervyn Pike, a Conservative MP; Sir Brian Windeyer, a radiologist; Sydney A. Robinson, a trade unionist; and George H. Beeby, an industrialist
216 Robens, A., 1972. Safety and health at work: report of the Committee, 1970-72 (Vol. 1). HM Stationery Office
– see preface
217 Tweedale, G., 2010. Robens, Alfred, Baron Robens of Woldingham (1910-1999). Oxford Dictionary of
National Biography
218 Robens, A., 1972. Ten year stint. Cassell. p.3
219 Report of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations (Donovan)
220 Lord Robens said that “there must have been some human error” and that “it was impossible to know” this risk
– See Robens, A., 1972. Ten year stint. Cassell. pp.249-251
221 Sirrs, C., 2016. Risk, Responsibility and Robens: The Transformation of the British System of Occupational
Health and Safety Regulation, 1961–74. In Governing Risks in Modern Britain. Palgrave Macmillan, London. p.267
69 according to Phil James, might be that it was particularly important to have someone from the NCB because they were the main opposition to the previous attempt of reforms.222
3.2.2. The basis of the OHS approach in the UK: The Robens Report and