effective sanction. I have no information that can provide a confident answer to this question. However party reprimands are often accompanied by party recommendations to institutional leaders that the disciplined individual be demoted or
dismissed from his post. Serious party reprimands, particularly those arising from poor "production" performance, probably affect promotion prospects.
work of the office before the manager of the branch.^
Partiinaia zhizn ' explains the matter more fully in its reply to a letter from a combine party secretary who asked if his party organisation had the right to
examine and come to a decision on the behaviour of a non- party worker. The party members had done so in an open party meeting and suggested to the administration that it give him a reprimand and a final warning. However the deputy secretary of the party committee of the local
production committee (the PPO's immediate superior in 1964, the equivalent of today's raikom) said that they did not have the right to do so and that the matter should have
been dealt with in the trade union committee. The secretary declared that the trade union committee had not shown
sufficient initiative. Partiinaia zhizn' answered that although the party organisation does not have the right to discipline a non-party worker it can talk to him about his behaviour. However, the journal continued, it is better that the party organisation not deal with the matter, but that it should help develop the initiative of the trade
2
union committee or the people's court. The answer
indicated that the official attitude is that the PPO should be able to manage affairs, using its "leading" role in
1 2
P.zh.t 10/61, p p . 55-56. P.2/2., 20/64 , pp. 45-46 .
social organisations, without involving itself directly, although if it becomes essential it can do so.
It should be remembered that once the situation becomes so serious that some radical action is required, particularly applying party discipline to institutional leaders, the nature of the system ensures that higher party authorities become involved. The system is deliberately organised so that higher authorities will immediately know
if the state of affairs in any institution becomes serious. The consequences of an error are so severe that no PPO secretary would be willing to risk a full-scale assault on an institutional leader without at least being strongly confident of support from higher party authorities. The Soviet press is full of complaints from PPO secretaries who feel that they are not getting the necessary support from their raikom or gorkom.
Therefore means have been developed of attracting the attention of higher party bodies. One is failure to elect an institutional leader to the party committee or buro. This is probably not a common example of the use of
party membership to influence the behaviour of an institutional leader, but it is one that is highly effective. It is
unheard of for the head of an institution not to be a member of the party committee or buro for any period of time;^
1 It appears that ministers are probably an
the organisation could not act in anything like the proper way in such a situation and the vaikom or gorkom would have to take quick action if such a situation arose. A case reported in Pavtiinaia zhizn' in 1955 illustrates this well. The PPO of a research institute failed to elect the director of the institute to the party buro. The vaikom investigated and found serious shortcomings in his work. The vaikom sent the information to the relevant ministry, upon which the collegium of the ministry dismissed him.^ In 1963 the party members of the Moscow Design-
Construction Office Glavsantekhmontazh of the State
Production Committee for Assembly and Special Construction Work was dissatisfied with the head of the office. At the election-report meeting he was nominated for election as a member of the party buro. He refused the nomination, but the party members rejected his refusal, placed him on the the ballot, but then failed to elect him. The consequences are not recorded.^
Another means of attracting the attention of higher authorities is to use party meetings to criticise
institutional leaders when it is certain that the authorities will become aware of the proceedings of the meetings. For example, at the election-report meeting of the PPO of the Ukrainian Institute for the Design of Heavy Machine
1 2
P .zh. , 5/55 , p . 80. P.zh. , 13/63, p . 52.
Construction Factories the director and chief engineer were criticised for poorly organising and planning the production process. This was probably for the benefit of the raikom first secretary who was present at the meeting.^
The reliance on higher party bodies must play an enormous role in the informal relations between PPO's and
"host" organisations. But higher party bodies figure largely even in the formal expressions of PPO powers. Many of the statements regarding laying party charges against
institutional leaders add that this can be done only after 2
application to higher party bodies. This therefore is a 3
formal as well as practical necessity.
PPO's have the right to make recommendations to institutional leaders, recommendations that should carry some weight. It appears that in some circumstances they are able to oblige the institutional leaders to act, but even
1 P.zh., 22/74, pp. 45-46. Although in any case such as this we cannot be certain that the criticisms were not made at the instigation of the raikom.
2 P.zh., 10/68, pp. 41-42.
3 There is some confusion over who must appeal to higher authorities in the case of dispute. Some reports make PPO decisions obligatory for
institutional leaders, it being up to the latter to appeal if there is disagreement. P.zh. ,
23/65, p. 34. However most make it the respons ibility of the PPO to appeal. P.zh., 4/68,
pp. 40-41. This is what one would expect, given the PPO's place in the system.
then they are not able themselves to make the decision on what is actually to be done. The directives can only be generally-worded demands for action.
It is difficult to say how seriously an
institutional leader has to take these generally-worded orders. The fact that Soviet sources stress that such orders can be given only in exceptional circumstances and that there are in fact few examples of them being given suggest that on those rare occasions an institutional leader would do well to take notice of the PPO. A PPO driven to such extremes, if it had not already conferred with higher party representatives, would at least be
confident of their support. In such cases some rapid improvement in the situation is expected and probably gained.
The situation with regard to PPO recommendations is even more uncertain. The vast majority of reports in the Soviet press declare that recommendations were accepted without disagreement. However cases where recommendations were rejected are perhaps less likely to be reported. A number of other factors also have to be mentioned. Firstly, there is a strong possibility that recommendations have
already been agreed on by the PPO and institutional leaders. Institutional leaders are almost always members of the party buro or committee, the organs where final decisions,
party meetings, are made. In normal circumstances any differences of opinion are presumably worked out in the meetings of these organs. Our knowledge of what happens in these meetings is extremely limited. Complaints about institutional leaders using party meetings simply as forums for giving operational orders suggest that party recommend ations could often be little more than party support for such orders.'*'
At times when the role of PPO's in "production" control is being particularly emphasised, at which times the PPO's are more likely to receive support, and
even suggestions on what recommendations should be made, from higher party authorities, it is probable that recomm endations often are not arrived at in collusion with
institutional leaders. In such a situation the general state of party-state relations and support for the PPO
from higher authorities make it probable that recommendations will be accepted.
It can be seen that the powers of the right of control are of great potential in the hands of PPO's. The
1 In 1954 a party group organiser in
the Administration for Bridge Construction complained that the decisions of party meetings in the administration were written with the cooperation of the administration leaders and were usually taken from their own administrative
degree to which that potential is realised depends on the general state of party-state relations at the time and specific local relationships between local party
authorities, PPO leadership and "host" organisation
leadership. The unlimited access to information and the right to make recommendations give PPO*s sufficient power to play a staff generalist role.
The PPO does have other means at its disposal for the exercise of control, usually used in close conjunction with the right of control. One of these is the use of party influence over the various organs of collective leadership that exist in Soviet institutions. Ministries have collegiums, while other types of non-production
institutions have the various Academic, Teaching,
Scientific-Technical and Artistic Councils. The situation with regard to the collegiums and councils is rather
different and must be considered separately.
The councils have very extensive, if only advisory, powers within their institutions. Their main concerns are in the areas of planning - academic plans, research plans and artistic repertoires, but they also involve themselves in personnel matters and other matters
of current concern.
Collective organs, being part of the administration of the institution, are subject to the PPO's right of
control. The secretary of the party organisation of the Moscow Technical College writes:
Obviously the party organisation of the educational institution or faculty cannot directly influence the activity of the Academic Council in such matters as,
for example, the granting of academic degrees and the defence of dissertations. But to control the organisation of this work, to control the activity in general of the Academic Council is, in our view,
2