SIGMA-DELTA CONVERSIÓN DE ANALÓGICO A DIGITAL

Pan-Slavists believe that Russia should support other Slav nations. In the conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia, however, the leading protagonists were all Slavs. Nevertheless, taking into account religious affinity, there were calls for Russia to support the Serbs because they are Slav and - as a generalisation - Orthodox. Supposedly, there were historical links between Russians and Serbs based on this ethno-religious affinity and there were many calls for Russia to support its ‘traditional ally’.

This historical assumption was deep-rooted, even within the administration. For example, when I interviewed an MF A official, he began by stating:

As you w ill realise, Yugoslavia has always been traditionally and historically our major partner in the Balkans/^

Yet this is simply not true. For forty years after 1948, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) regarded the Soviet Union as its greatest threat. In the inter-war period, official relations between the Soviet Union and all o f the Balkan states were negligible, primarily for ideological reasons. Even before the First World War, relations between Russia and Serbia varied over time. Certainly, there were links based on common religion and ethnicity and there was a perception o f having a common enemy, first in the Ottoman empire, and then in the Habsburg empire. But the historical record is more complex.

Firstly, both the Tsarist administration and the Balkan leaders placed their own interests foremost. As we have seen, Russia’s main interest in the Balkans was strategic; control o f the Straits. Two contradictory policies were pursued to achieve this, sometimes simultaneously by different members o f the diplomatic service. At times, Russian policy supported the independence movements of the Balkan nations in the belief that this would give it influence once the nations had gained independence. At other times, Russia aimed to preserve the weak Ottoman empire, from which it was able to extract concessions and exert influence; it was feared that in the event of Ottoman collapse, other powers would gain control o f the Straits, or a major war might break out for control o f them.

Even when Russia did support the Balkan nations, this was fraught with problems. Since these nations were in competition for control of territory, it was impossible to support all o f them equally in their aims; nor was it possible to choose the Slav, Orthodox nation when - as was the case with Serbia and Bulgaria - both nations were Slav and Orthodox. Russia generally favoured Bulgaria because it provided more direct access to the Straits. For example, even after Russia had supported the Serbs in their struggle against the Ottoman empire in 1876-78, the Russian-brokered treaty o f San Stefano would have created (had it been implemented) a Greater Bulgaria, upsetting the local balance of power and frustrating the ambitions o f Greece and Serbia in Macedonia (as well as Romania, which lost southern B essarab ia).W h en the Serbs protested, they ‘were informed bluntly that Russia’s interests came first, Bulgaria’s second, and Serbia’s last’.^"^ Serbia subsequently looked to Austria-Hungary to further its interests.

22

Interview with representative of MF A (1 July 1998). ^ Lederer (1962a), p. 435.

effectively moving into its sphere of influence, and it was only after 1907 that Serbia again appealed to Russia.

Russian policy in the nineteenth century was not motivated purely by self-interest; there was genuine ideological support for the Slav and Orthodox Balkan nations. But, once again, the historical record is complex. Certainly, there was a surge o f popular sympathy for the Serbs and Bulgarians in the 1870s, particularly in response to massacres o f the latter by Ottoman forces, and this influenced the Tsar’s decision to fight Turkey. Successive Tsars also felt bound by treaty obligations and a sense of personal honour to protect the Balkan nations. Nicholas II stated in his manifesto on 3 August 1914:

Today it is not only the protection o f a country related to us and unjustly attacked that must be accorded, but w e must safeguard the honour, the dignity, and the integrity o f Russia and her position among the great powers.

But there was also a further manifestation o f ideology in the Tsarist foreign policy: at various times in the nineteenth century, the Tsar strongly resisted change. This was particularly true of Nicholas I. Nicholas Riasanovsky writes that Nicholas I was ‘determined to maintain and defend the existing order in Europe, just as he considered it his sacred duty to preserve the archaic system in his own country’; this ‘conservative and legitimist orientation’ represented the very opposite of the messianic role that the pan-Slavists envisaged for R u s s i a . A s a result. Tsarist Russia at times worked in concert with other autocratic states, in particular the other key multi-national European empire, Austria, to withstand progressivism. So, in August 1849, Russian troops helped to put down the uprising in Hungary, thus re-establishing stability within Russia’s main rival in the Balkans. At the same time, Russia carried out similar actions in the Ottoman possessions, demonstrating that ideological as well as strategic considerations lay behind the policy of upholding the Ottoman empire.

Thus, just as the two strategic approaches contradicted each other, so did the two ideological principles. It is wrong therefore to suppose that Russia always supported the Balkan Slav and Orthodox nations (and Serbia in particular) in their fight for independence from the Ottoman empire. Again, this does not mean that there are not wide-spread perceptions in Russia (and Serbia) that there is a history o f strong links; whatever the reality of Russian-Serbian relations in the nineteenth century, the truth ^ Quoted in Jelavich (1991), p. 275; for a discussion of the influence of notions of ‘honour’, see ibid., conclusion, and Glover (1999), chapter 21.

26

Riasanovsky (1974), pp. xxiii, xxxiii. Jelavich (1991), p. 110.

does not diminish the potency o f the myth o f eternal friendship.^^ Furthermore, present day pan-[Orthodox] Slavists might attack the government for not offering the Serbs sufficient support, just as their predecessors did in the 1870s.

Liberal internationalists would, o f course, reject a policy based on such an approach; although they might support intervention on behalf o f the oppressed or persecuted, this would not be because of religious or ethnic affinity but because of universal moral duty and international legal - not just narrow treaty - obligations. Neo­ realists would also oppose an ideological pan-Slavic/pan-Orthodox Slavic policy, although they might use ethnic-religious links to promote Russian interests. But they may also have learnt the lessons of 1914, which would make them wary o f risking conflict with other great powers in support o f one o f the sides in the Yugoslav conflicts. Instead, they might hope to develop a great power concert in order to avoid a split between the powers and the danger of a proxy war (a direct war being unlikely in the era of nuclear deterrence).

More radical realists might look for close relations with the FRY, perhaps even a confederation. This is also true of pan-Orthodox Slavists; during the conflicts, there were calls for the formation of a Slavonic union, incorporating Russia, Belarus, and Serbia and Montenegro. Such proposals, and appeals for support of the Serbs, also served political purposes: they were a means of attacking the government. But the political dimension had another aspect: the opposition in Russia supported Serbia because it was pursuing a policy in former Yugoslavia that they wanted Russia to pursue in the former Soviet Union. There was also a domestic political agenda common to the Serb authorities and the Russian nationalist-communist opposition.