Silvanus - Silvanae

In the previous section it was shown that since the actual outcome of one's action is never guaranteed (since it is beyond the agent's control), Epictetus argues that the agent ought not lose her peace of mind if she meets with failure instead of success in what she tried to achieve. Only what is within her power is the proper object of concern. To desire to have power over what is beyond one's control Epictetus considers to be simply irrational. But not only are the eventual results of one's own actions beyond one's control, but all events, all occurrences, all things which happen external to one's own prohairesis are also beyond one's control and are consequently neither good nor bad but indifferent. 'Whenever some disturbing news is reported to you, have this at hand: News about the volition never occurs' (3.18.1), and so since news does not pertain to one's moral responsibility, it should not be disturbing. Thus there is no justified reason for being disturbed by any event To become upset by any extra-prohairetic event is to forget the fundamental division between what is and what is not one's own, and then to want that which is not one's own to be one's own. 'There is but one way to serenity (keep this thought ready for use at dawn, and by day, and at night), and that is to yield up all claim to the non-volitional things, to regard nothing as your own possession; to surrender everything to the deity, to fortune' (4.4.39). The rational acceptance that all things outside one's prohairesis are essentially beyond one's control and so not part of one's true self, and the consequent judgement

How must I view the use of externals ? 55 that they are not to be claimed or clung to at even the least sacrifice

of one's dignity, virtue, or moral integrity - this is the one way to serenity.

Once one has firmly grasped the truth of the judgement that what is beyond one's control lies entirely outside the realm of one's moral responsibility, then one can judge that from a moral standpoint any result, outcome, event, occurrence, or happening is utterly indifferent. For Epictetus, since they are morally indifferent they are at most only of conditional concern. This conclusion can be drawn on entirely secular grounds; it is free of any theological or cosmological presuppositions.

To convince us that no course of events prevents us from producing the correct dogmata which allow us to live in accordance with nature, i.e. virtuously, is according to Epictetus just what the philosopher does. To what end, then, do philosophers have precepts to offer? - To this end, that whatever happens, our governing principle shall be, and abide to the end, in accord with nature' (3.9.11). The philosopher's hegemonikon, because it is equipped with correct judgements, is not disturbed or upset by worldly happenings, since whatever these happenings may be, the philosopher can conform his desires and aversions accordingly:

... we picture the work of the philosopher to be something like this: He should bring his own will (boulesis) into harmony with what happens, so that neither anything that happens happens against our will (akonton hemon), nor anything that fails to happen fails to happen when we wish it to happen. The result of this for those who have so ordered the work of philosophy is that in desire they are not disappointed, and in aversion they do not fall into what they would avoid ... (2.14.7-8)

Here we see Epictetus extending his reasoning about what our attitude toward happenings ought to be. Not only should we view what happens in the external, extra-prohairetic world as indif-ferent, but the philosopher is the one who has trained himself10

to accept and embrace all happenings. He in fact wants only what does actually happen to happen: 'Do not seek to have everything

that happens happen as you wish, but wish for everything to happen as it actually does happen, and your life will be serene' (Ench. 8).

This is because 'the origin of sorrow is this - to wish for something that does not come to pass' (1.27.10).

Here Epictetus has moved from arguing that since external events need not disturb one's prohairesis one need not worry or care about them (one may view them as indifferent), to making the stronger claim that the philosopher in fact wants events to happen as they do. He has gone beyond inferring that the Stoic is justified in being apathetic about fate to asserting that the Stoic is positively pleased with whatever fate brings.

Although this unconditional affirmation of every twist and turn of fate would strike most as such an extreme form of optimistic fatalism as to severely strain the bounds of psychological realism, for Epictetus it follows quite naturally from traditional Stoic precepts. Epictetus, like his early Stoic predecessors, believed that orthos logos pervaded the whole universe. Each event is thus fateful in that it unfolds according to the rationality of the whole. Thus a divine providence steers all events. 'Whenever you find fault with providence (prxmoia), only consider and you will recognize that what happens is in accordance with reason (kata logon)' (3.17.1).

Therefore, since each and every event is in this sense rational, and '[t]o the rational being only the irrational is unendurable, but the rational is endurable' (1.2.1), every event, no matter what it may be, is endurable to the rational being, e.g. the true philosopher.

This supposition that fate is rational, however, rests on the common belief of the Greeks that the kosmos is a rational order. For the Stoics, this meant that each particular event within the kosmos on a microscopic scale reflects the eminently rational organization of the whole on the macroscopic scale. Epictetus staunchly holds this belief because he holds the orthodox Stoic view that Zeus is the perfectly rational orderer of the kosmos, and that he has constituted the world and ordained the entire course of nature so as to unfold, even down to the smallest occurrence, in complete accordance with reason.

The benefits of belief in the rationality of fate are the peace of mind and mental freedom which, for Epictetus, constitute real

How must I view the use of externals ? 57 happiness. When one conforms one's desires to the governance

of Zeus, obeys it, and is well satisfied with it, one never suffers misfortune, ill fortune, or blames anyone (2.23.42). There is no such thing as bad luck or misfortune since every event happens just as Zeus, in his supreme rationality, wants it to. Epictetus'

reasoning is that one is only compelled if one resists fate by wanting events to occur other than they do: 'in a word, give up wanting anything but what god wants. And who will prevent you, who will compel you? No one, any more than anyone prevents or compels Zeus' (2.17.22). Just as Zeus' will can never be hindered, by aligning her own mind, as it were, to that of Zeus the true philosopher can say:

But I have never been hindered in the exercise of my will