SIMÓN GUARDADO PÉREZ DÑA EVA LEDO CABALEIRO

Table 7 provides descriptive statistics of the provincial-level analysis of four “high risk” countries from 2000 to 2014. The countries are Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Colombia. Of the 1,522 observations, attacks against aid workers occurred in 354 of the province-years, while 1,168 did not have any. Of those observations with security incidents, the number of aid workers attacked in a province per year ranged from a low of 1 to a high of 90 in 2014 for Herat,

Afghanistan. The highest number of aid workers killed in a province-year was 18 in 2014 for Helmand, Afghanistan, while the most wounded was 17 in 2003 for Kandahar, Afghanistan. The highest number of aid workers abducted, 78, occurred in Herat, Afghanistan during 2014. The average amount of apolitical aid received was $4.16 million a year, with a high of $193.2 million distributed in 2003 for Baghdad, Iraq. The average amount of political aid received was $5.07 million a year, with a high of $154.77 million in 2002 for Kabul, Afghanistan.

A panel-corrected standard error regression model was used to analyze the 102 provinces between 2000 and 2014. Similar to the country-level analysis, the provincial-level research design also confronts the same methodological issues of endogeneity and multicollinearity. As for endogeneity, a Hausman specification test suggests that aid worker insecurity and aid distributed are not reciprocally related. A two-tailed t-test of the null hypothesis of no

simultaneity could not be rejected at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels of significance, respectively. Regarding multicollinearity, the highest correlation between variables was .79 between modest and ambitious, with all others falling below .33. The mean VIF outcomes for the models was 8.26.

Table 7 Descriptive Statistics, Four Cases

Variables Observations Mean SD Minimum Maximum

Aid Workers Attacked 1,522 1.223 4.127 0 90

Aid Workers Killed 1,522 .362 1.267 0 18

Aid Workers Wounded 1,522 .301 1.175 0 17

Aid Workers Abducted 1,522 .561 3.140 0 78

Apolitical Aid (millions$) 1,522 4.162 11.857 0 193 Political Aid (millions$) 1,522 5.071 10.792 0 155 Total Aid (millions$) 1,522 9.233 21.823 0 327

Modest 1,522 .644 .479 0 1 Ambitious 1,522 .258 .437 0 1 NGOs 1,522 29.153 45.451 0 492 Journalist Fatalities 1,522 .247 1.679 0 42 Terrorist Attacks 1,522 17.789 64.061 0 907 Islamic Population 1,522 .684 .465 0 1

Military Civil Affairs 1,522 .556 .497 0 1

Literacy Rate 1,522 54.681 30.832 7 99

Drug Trafficking 1,522 .227 .419 0 1

UN Mission 1,522 .160 .366 0 1

Table 8 provides four baseline models of the number of NGO security incidents, which includes the sum of aid workers killed, wounded, and abducted. Models 25 and 26 highlight the impact of apolitical aid on the dependent variable, while models 3 and 4 reflect that of political

aid. Models 25 and 26 suggest that apolitical aid tends to increase the likelihood of aid worker

attacks when modest aid is set to zero, with coefficients of .324 and .253 respectively at 1

percent level of significance. The main effects in models 27 and 28 also indicate that political aid is likely to lead to insecurity of aid workers when both modest aid and ambitious aid are set to zero, with coefficients of .375 and .304 respectively at 1 percent level of significance. Consistent with the country-level baseline models in table 2, the findings reject the argument that

politicization of aid tends to increase the insecurity of aid workers.

However, the results of the interaction terms are quite different from the country-level baseline models in table 2. While the interaction terms in all four models presented in table 2 are statistically significant, only model 26, apolitical x ambitious, in table 8 is statistically

these results show that neither the type of aid nor its magnitude are significantly influencing attacks at the subnational level. In fact, the only statistically significant marginal effect shows that a 1 percent increase in apolitical aid when a recipient province receives any level of ambitious aid is likely to result in one fewer aid worker being attacked, holding other variables constant. Unlike the country-level analysis, hypotheses 1, 2 and 4 are not supported at the provincial-level. Only hypothesis 3 is partially supported by the results.

Table 8 Baseline Models of NGO Security Incidents, Provincial-Level Analysis

Variables Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 Intercept .313 -.005 -.029 -.294 (.438) (.185) (.416) (.268) Apolitical .324*** .253*** (.088) (.064) Political .375*** .304*** (.083) (.079) Modest -.325 -.629 (.566) (.693) Ambitious 7.953*** -1.018 (2.701) (2.598) Apolitical x Modest -.070 (.120) Apolitical x Ambitious -1.032*** (.399) Political x Modest .011 (.150) Political x Ambitious .248 (.378) Pseudo R2 _{.04 .06 .06 .06} Chi-Square 35.23*** 46.32*** 40.61*** 37.73*** N 1,522 1,522 1,522 1,522

Note: Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses below the estimates. *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, one-tailed test

Table 9 adds control variables to the models. Models 29 and 30 highlight the impact of

apolitical aid on the dependent variable, while models 31 and 32 reflect that of political aid. The

main effects for apolitical and political aid in model 29 and model 31 are not statistically significant. Model 30 suggests that apolitical aid tends to decrease the likelihood of aid worker

attacks when ambitious aid is set to zero. The main effect in model 32 indicates that political aid is likely to decrease insecurity of aid workers when ambitious aid is set to zero. Consistent with the country-level models in table 3, the findings reject the argument that politicization of aid tends to decrease security of aid workers.

The marginal effects in table 9 are different from the baseline models presented in table 8. Apolitical x ambitious is no longer statistically significant, while apolitical x modest and

political x modest are now statistically significant. The marginal effect of political x ambitious is

the only interaction term that remained the same (not statistically significant) in both baseline and full models. Using formula 2, the marginal effect of model 29 is -.125, while model 31 is - .161, both statistically significant at 5 percent level. This suggests that aid workers engaged in modest aid are less likely to experience attacks in the field. However, unlike the country-level findings in table 3, the interaction terms for ambitious aid are not statistically significant. Regardless, both the country- and provincial-level analyses reveal that the magnitude of foreign aid appears to be the most statistically significant factor in explaining attacks compared with the purpose of aid. The results from table 9 fully support hypothesis 1, partially support

Table 9 Full Models of NGO Security Incidents, Provincial-Level Analysis

Apolitical Aid Political Aid

________________________ _____________________________ Variables Model 29 Model 30 Model 31 Model 32 Intercept 1.023* .896 .935* 1.032* (.742) (.721) (.722) (.738) Apolitical -.013 -.119** (.060) (.063) Political .016 -.121** (.056) (.066) Modest -.035 .182 (.302) (.422) Ambitious 2.623 -.200 (2.236) (2.230) Apolitical x Modest -.125** (.072) Apolitical x Ambitious -.253 (.336) Political x Modest -.161** (.097) Political x Ambitious .155 (.325) NGOs .020*** .020*** .020*** .020*** (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) Journalist Fatalities .160** .168** .157** .157** (.088) (.088) (.088) (.088) Terrorist Attacks .005*** .005*** .005*** .005*** (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) Islamic Population .407 .382 .332 .309 (.420) (.443) (.406) (.408)

Military Civil Affairs 1.058*** .985*** 1.086*** 1.088*** (.292) (.298) (.294) (.297) Literacy -.023*** -.022*** -.023*** -.023*** (.007) (.008) (.008) (.008) Drug Trafficking .330 .353* .359* .358* (.274) (.268) (.274) (.274) UN Mission 1.046*** 1.014*** 1.062*** 1.059*** (.375) (.371) (.375) (.375) Pseudo R2 _{.18 .18 .18 .18} Chi-Square 337.65*** 328.56*** 319.47*** 328.82*** N 1,522 1,522 1,522 1,522

Note: Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses below the estimates. *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, one-tailed test

Most control variables are consistent with the country-level analysis, except for journalist

fatalities and Islamic population. Contrary to the country-level study, the argument that aid

workers may be collaterals of general civilian attacks by combatants or antagonistic groups is supported in all of the four models. Although not captured at the country-level, it is probable that NGOs operating in regions that are volatile for other civilian actors are more likely to experience insecurity at the subnational-level. The Islamic population variable is not statistically significant although three of the four case studies are Islamic nations. Compared with the country-level analysis, there is less variation at the provincial-level.

Consistent in both country- and provincial-level full models, military forces engaged in humanitarian and relief operations, UN peacekeeping and political missions, drug trafficking, and terrorism all seem to have major effects on NGO insecurity. Also consistent in both

analyses, literacy rate appears to have a mitigating impact on attacks. Perhaps populations with higher levels of education are less likely to adhere to extremist ideologies or engage in hostilities toward civilians.