SIMULACIÓN DEL PROCESAMIENTO DE SEPARACIÓN DE CONDENSADO DEL GAS, MEDIANTE EL SOFTWARE

Introduction

It took just under two years for the negotiation process leading up to the

Coventry/Dresden project to be completed. The first moves were made in May 1963. The first British volunteers crossed through the Berlin Wall in March 1965. The driving forces behind the process were a curious mixture of political pragmatism and Christian idealism. The negotiations themselves, despite the sometimes lofty ideals o f the participants, were characterised by suspicion and manipulation. The project itself became a pawn in a bigger political game. However, despite the apparently contrasting motives of those involved, the Christians leading the project and the idealistic young volunteers who took part in it shared a common goal with those who wielded political power behind the scenes. This mutual aim was the maintenance of international peace and stability. The Christian reconcilers believed that the future of the world could best by guaranteed by people such as themselves doing what they could to ’heal the wounds of history'.^ Those with political power believed that peace and stability could best be preserved by fostering the ideal of Christian/Marxist dialogue.

Through a detailed examination of documentary evidence, the following two chapters will attempt to tease out the reality of events behind the project, as opposed to the myths and perceptions which either unintentionally or deliberately were created around it. In doing so, they will support the argument that the political purpose of the Coventry/Dresden project was twofold. First, to bring GDR Church leaders such as Bishop Noth into line with the more compliant sections of the Church. Second, to reinforce the concept of

Christian/Marxist co-operation among the ordinary Christians of the GDR by encouraging the project members, and its leader in particular, to preach this message throughout the

The operation aimed at containing the influence of oppositional Church leaders needed to be conducted covertly for two main reasons. Firstly, the official foreign policy of Britain and the official domestic Church pohcy of the GDR prevented the two countries

from initiating or encouraging any overt action. Secondly, for the plan to succeed it was necessary that British and East German Christians should be unaware of the sub-plot in which they were involved. The message needed to be delivered with an air of genuine conviction. The operation, therefore, would be based on the CIA's definition of the most effective form o f propaganda - that in which 'the subject moves in the direction you desire for reasons which he believes to be his own'.^ Or, as Crossman said: 'The way to carry out good propaganda is never to appear to be carrying it out at all'.^ The Coventry/Dresden project would be a classic Crossman/CIA operation in terms of propaganda theory.

Due to the nature of the operation, official documentary evidence is necessarily scanty. On occasion there is evidence o f reports relating to the Coventry/Dresden project, but the reports have not been retained within the files."^ The aim of the writers of letters and reports was not necessarily to record the truth but rather a version o f events which would fit the agenda to which they were working. Obfuscation rather than clarity was the name of the game. Even those involved appear to have found events bewildering. Kreyssig, for example, seems to have been genuinely taken aback to have been excluded from the GDR's official reception for the British volunteers, although it is plain from the documentation that both he and Aktion Siihnezeichen were merely being used as tools. There was confusion within the ranks o f the GDR bureaucrats, who were puzzled about who in the hierarchy was giving the orders. The line of command was deliberately vague. In terms of oral evidence, little is available. Of the main players in the negotiations, only those associated with their respective governments survive. The two most prominent non-governmental figures linked to the project, the Provost of Coventry Cathedral and the head o f Aktion Siihnezeichen, have both died, Williams in 1990 and Kreyssig in 1986. Turner, who led the British group, has a vivid recollection of anecdotal material relating to the GDR but claims to have no knowledge of the negotiations behind the project.^

However, the limited material of governmental organisations is augmented by correspondence and reports which have been retained in the archives o f both Coventry Cathedral and Aktion Siihnezeichen. Within the documentation as a whole it is possible to detect some o f the plans and thought processes of the main participants in the negotiations. The British and West German governments, for example, are initially plainly seen to have been scheming to kill the project in its early stages. Later, the close relationship which developed between the British Foreign Office and Williams is documented as the

negotiations proceeded and the British attitude towards the project changed. The peculiar manner in which both the British and the East Germans attempted to keep the project out of the public gaze is recorded. The possibility that the two countries may have been co­

operating over the project is suggested in a British Foreign Office document which refers to a 'promise' by Seigewasser that the project would not be given publicity.^ Despite Kreyssig's confusion, the GDR government is seen to have deliberately used Aktion Siihnezeichen and Kreyssig as tools which could be discarded. In short, a scrutiny of the relevant

documentation demonstrates the manner in which all parties, both governmental and non­ governmental, attempted to manipulate the negotiations process for their own purposes, and indicates, either explicitly in the case of the GDR, or implicitly in the case o f the British, that the overriding purpose behind the Coventry/Dresden project was to constrain dissident voices within the Church in the GDR in the interests o f stability.

These chapters will examine the extent to which governmental action differed from official policy in connection with the Coventry/Dresden project; the inconsistencies or contradictions on the part o f the chief participants in the negotiation process; the relationship between the key figures and governmental or quasi-govemmental bodies; and examples of instances in which words were at odds with deeds. Probably the most glaring inconsistency to emerge is the fact that Aktion Siihnezeichen, deemed to be a subversive organisation, was brought in as an intermediary while Noth was excluded for the very reason that he was deemed to be subversive. The answer to why this should have been so is key to an

understanding o f the role that the Coventry/Dresden project played in furthering the Ulbricht policy o f Christian/Marxist co-operation. Aktion Siihnezeichen’s role was to neutralise the influence of recalcitrant Church leaders in Saxony. It was a suitable vehicle for this purpose

because its leaders were well-known and highly regarded figures within the Church

hierarchy. But because it was a fringe organisation with little direct influence on Christians in general, it could safely be used to put pressure on the Church in Saxony without the blessing that the GDR regime appeared to be bestowing on it having wider implications. In addition, the organisation was already under close surveillance. It was monitored and infiltrated and appeared to pose little danger. It had also undertaken a project of

reconciliation in Coventry and was known to the British public. It was an organisation which crossed the EastAVest divide.

The Legacy of the Second World War

When Guardian reader, Paul Binks, of Ruislip, Middlesex, wrote a letter to his newspaper in May 1963, he would not have realised that he was about to set in motion a chain of events which would impact upon the future course of the Cold War. Mr Binks had been reading a review of The Destruction o f Dresden by David Irving, an account o f the Allied bombing raid which laid waste to the city in 1945.^ His letter read in part;

"I was reminded o f the symbohc act of atonement made by the German people in their gift to the new Coventry Cathedral. Has any such offer of redemption been made by us to Dresden, and if not, is there any organisation willing and able to undertake an appeal for this long overdue act on behalf of the British nation?"®

The letter was noted by Irving, whose book had aroused public controversy in Britain. For many British people it was the first they knew o f the raid which, according to Irving, killed

135,000 people.^ Although Irving's reputation as a historian was sullied in 2000 when he lost a libel action to clear his name o f accusations o f racism, his book on Dresden was generally regarded as an authoritative if controversial contribution to the record of the Second World War. The seal of approval was given by Air Marshal Sir Robert Saundby in a foreword, in which he described the book as 'an impressive piece of work'.^° Crossman had also

welcomed the book. He credited Irving with having produced 'an admirable piece of historical private enterprise... a superb deadpan narrative which adds a wealth of appalling detail to the dry official record'.

Irving wrote to Crossman to thank him for his review and, picking up on the letter from Binks, inquired if Crossman knew of any non-political organisation which might be

willing to promote a scheme of British atonement. The obvious organisation was sitting on Crossman's constituency doorstep. Coventry Cathedral had been built with the ideal of reconciliation embedded within its fa b ric .C ro ssm a n therefore wrote to Williams, the Provost of Coventry Cathedral, enclosing Irving's letter and asking for his views. Williams responded enthusiastically.

"The idea in your letter is an absolutely right one. We have long been searching after the right thing to do as a reciprocal symbohc act. Dresden has always been in our minds. We have only hesitated lest our purpose of making this a gesture to the whole German people should be frustrated.

Coventry Cathedral, led by Williams, was at the forefront o f the concept of

international reconciliation at that time. The city had been the first to suffer serious bombing damage during the Second World War when, on 14 November 1940, a German air raid had destroyed part of the city centre. The major loss was the cathedral which was burnt to a shell. After the war a new cathedral was commissioned, designed by the architect Sir Basil Spence and consecrated in 1962. Williams was chosen to be the first Provost of the new cathedral partly because he was personally committed to the ideal o f reconciliation. He was a South African by birth, with an English father and a mother o f Huguenot extraction. She had been interned in a British concentration camp during the First World War. Williams often quoted his mother as telling him; 'We must always try to heal the wounds of history'. These words influenced him throughout his life.^^ In 1961, he told an audience in Germany: 'We are trying to make the cathedral a symbol o f reconciliation, internationally,

ecumenically, industrially and personally. It is the one hope and vision which has anything to offer the ftiture.'^^ Williams had a charismatic personality and little patience with

bureaucracy. These traits did not endear him to everyone. Indeed, according to The Times'.

"It sometimes seemed that Wilham's work was more appreciated abroad than at home. He preferred to work on a large canvas, was impatient with what he considered to be the trivialities of church hfe and he had httle fondness for ecclesiastical synods.

The links between Coventry Cathedral and West Germany were strong. In 1958, shortly after taking up his appointment, the Provost met the President of West Germany, Theodor Heuss, to receive a gift of £5,000 for the cathedral. During the ensuing years he built up strong and lasting links with a number o f leading figures, including the former mayor o f West Berlin and later Chancellor of West Germany, Willy Brandt. In 1967,

Williams' work was recognised by the Bonn government with the highest award of the German Order of Merit. In the context o f the Dresden project, these links with West Germany should, on the face o f it, have made the establishment of a relationship with the East Germans difficult, if not impossible. Indeed, until the time of the Coventry/Dresden project, this seems to have been the case. Williams acknowledged the hostility of the GDR towards Coventry Cathedral because of its association with West Germany. He described this hostility as being 'fierce' in 1961 and 1962. One year later, though, the hostility had apparently been 'overcome' when the negotiations for the Coventry/Dresden project were set in motion.^^ Williams never gave a satisfactory explanation of why this should have been so, other than to take some credit for his own success as a negotiator. The change in attitude is one of many policy inconsistencies relating to the Coventry/Dresden project.^^

Williams had had some experience of the GDR before the Coventry/Dresden project negotiations began and was not impressed.

"1 was, when I first visited East Berlin [probably about 1959], not prepared for the intensity of propaganda being unleashed by the communist regime. At the Brandenburg Gate, under the guise of a tourist welcome to East Berlin, one was subjected to a communist sermon of paralysing boredom, made worse by the virulent attacks against certain leaders in West Berlin and West Germany.

Despite these criticisms, Williams liked to think that he and the cathedral were 'aloof from partisan politics or ideologies'.^^ He was aware that many vested interests wished to use the cathedral's influence and reputation for their own purposes and claimed to have believed that he had transcended such dangers. 'We were determined that we would not be "used" by any of the special interests in church or politics who recognised that Coventry Cathedral was a significant "platform" for addressing the public', he wrote.

However, while claiming to be above politics, he acknowledged his close links to the British Foreign Office, links that would have made impartiality an impossibility. 'The

Foreign Office in London could not have been more helpful...', he wrote in connection with politically delicate arrangements for the cathedral's consecration ceremony. And again: 'During those years of contact with Germany, East and West, I maintained contact with the British Foreign Office. In no way did they impede me'.^^ Williams also aspired to playing a

greater political role between East and West. On returning from his first meeting with Seigewasser, he told Crossman that he intended to pursue Seigewasser’s suggestion that Williams could be a ’useful liaison’ between the GDR and the Church in West Germany, as well as with the Church in the GDR.^^ In no way then, was the Provost a non-political person. He was both willing and anxious to play as large a role as possible in the theatre of Cold War politics.

It was in 1959, at a lecture in West Berlin, that Williams was first made aware of the destruction caused in Dresden during the Allied bombing raid of 1945, and o f its

significance for the people of Germany. At the end of his talk a questioner had asked: ’And what about Dresden?’ The Provost became aware from the emotional discussion which followed that Dresden had the same emotional significance for the German people as Coventry had for the British.

The Negotiations

The path of the negotiations which eventually led to the Coventry Cathedral project of reconciliation taking place in Dresden in 1965 was far from straight. Indeed, there was so many twists and turns along the way, so many diversionary side paths which had to be avoided, that a chronological overview o f the proceedings is in danger of confusing by its complexity. However, it is just such a chronological overview which demonstrates so vividly the potentially treacherous waters into which those attempting to deal across the Cold War divide strayed.

Officially, the main negotiator on the British side was Williams. He was the person who entered into discussions at GDR state level. He also liked to stress that he alone was the person in charge o f the project. In the GDR, the role of chief public negotiator was delegated to Seigewasser. Until the beginning of 1964, the other main British participant was

Crossman who operated at both an official and an unofficial level. Following his elevation to the Cabinet, the role of unofficial envoy to the GDR was taken up by Oestreicher who had already established a close working relationship with Seidowsky. These two men conducted negotiations at an unofficial level. Others involved in the negotiations included the British

Foreign Office, Lothar Kreyssig, East and West German Church leaders, the West German government, and a West German woman, Doris Krug, who ran the Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft in West Berlin.

In May 1963, a week after receiving Williams' enthusiastic response to his

suggestion of an act of atonement in Dresden, Crossman replied enclosing a copy of another letter from Irving and querying whether an approach should now be made to

Oberbiirgermeister Schill in Dresden.^^ He was unaware that Irving had already taken the initiative and written to a 'high-ranking official' on Dresden City Council, outlining the plans so far and asking him to take the matter up with Schill in the next few days.^° Williams' response was that Crossman should go ahead and contact Schill himself, but that the West German Ambassador, Hasso von Etzdorf, should also be put in the picture.^^ It is likely that Williams did not wait for Crossman's agreement to this suggestion, as he spoke to the West German Embassy by telephone that day.^^

With things moving on apace. Crossman then approached the British government in order to complete the political triangle. He wrote to the Conservative politician, Edward Heath, then a member of the Government and Lord Privy Seal, requesting an appointment to ascertain the official view of the Dresden proposals to date.^^ In his letter he referred to the fact that he had already discussed the matter with the West German Ambassador who was