Simulación de variaciones de las horas de trabajo para el periodo 1980-82 a 1990-92

Maritime, naval and in some instances more general strategic documentation from a range of states have been considered here to find an answer to the overarching question of whether certain principles have evolved, and how far these evolutions take visibility into account. Whereas early writers of maritime strategy (such as Mahan) might be considered guilty of focusing heavily on the naval affairs and history of predominantly ‘Western’ states, the research underlying the arguments made here has sought to avoid this trap. This is not to suggest that strategic documentation from the Western states is not useful; indeed, the US is an example of one such state where a

plethora of documentation (of a maritime focus in particular) can be found, much of which is highly useful as it displays not only modified understandings of traditional maritime strategic principles but also (to varying extents) reveals the underlying reasons for these modifications. However, by taking into account the strategic thought of states beyond the Western sphere, the aim is to give the arguments presented below a degree of applicability on a global level.

Western states whose maritime and general strategic documentation have been considered here are: the US; the UK; France; Spain; Finland; the Netherlands; Australia; Canada; and New Zealand. Alongside these, eight non-Western states were also considered on the basis of being important global/regional powers/actors. These are: Russia; Turkey; India; Iran; the People’s Republic of China; the Republic of Korea; the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; and Japan248_{. This selection of}

Western and non-Western states was also chosen not just to give a degree of applicability across geopolitical boundaries. It was also chosen so that a broad range of perspectives from states with vastly different levels of naval and maritime power could be taken into account in order to achieve a degree of representativeness. By refining previous classifications, Germond defined a set of naval rankings to reflect the disparate levels of power possessed by navies across the world (see Figure 6). For instance, at one end of the scale we have the world’s principal naval power, the US – a navy with the capability to conduct sustained operations of any mission type across global oceanic distances. The states considered in the research here, however, fall into the categories between the sustained global force projection navy (rank 6) and the coastal defence and constabulary navies unable to participate in projection operations (rank 2). Navies of these ranks have been selected because they are of actual practical usage, unlike rank 1 navies, which tend to be purely symbolic. Thus, it is important to note that the selection of states here is representative of ranks 2-6; it is not representative of navies falling into lower ranks. However, even within the ranks considered there is still a high degree of variation in terms of maritime strategic thought and naval capability; by choosing a variety of state examples across these ranks, the findings of this chapter can still be applicable to a wide range of actors, both large and small, Western and non-Western.

Rank Details Examples249

248 _{Important to note here is that two of the non-Western states listed here, Iran and North Korea, do not} produce any publicly-available strategic documentation; however, plenty of research exists which suggests much about their maritime strategic thought.

Rank 0 Non-state actors possessing a degree of naval capability.

1. Somali pirate groups

Rank 1 Symbolic navies incapable of fulfilling any mission

type. 1. Anguilla MarinePolice

Rank 2 Navies that are able to:

1. Conduct police/constabulary operations in their territorial waters and (sometimes) their EEZs;

2. Contribute to coastal defence (mainly in conjunction with allies);

But unable to:

1. Participate in projection operations.

1. Azerbaijani Navy 2. Islamic

Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (Iran)

3. Korean People's

Navy (North Korea)

Rank 3 Navies that are able to:

1. Conduct police/constabulary operations in their territorial waters and EEZs;

2. Perform coastal defence autonomously; 3. Participate in limited projection operations

as part of a coalition. 1. Finnish Navy 2. Hellenic Navy (Greece) 3. Islamic Republic of Iran Navy

Rank 4 Navies that are able to:

1. Conduct police/constabulary operations in their territorial waters and EEZs;

2. Perform coastal defence autonomously; 3. Conduct limited projection operations

autonomously;

4. Participate in high intensity projection operations as part of a coalition.

1. Indian Navy

2. Japan Maritime Self-

Defence Force

(JMSDF)

3. People's Liberation Army Navy (People's Republic of China)

Rank 5 Navies that are able to:

1. Conduct police/constabulary operations in their territorial waters and EEZs;

2. Perform coastal defence autonomously;

3. Conduct projection operations

autonomously;

4. Participate in high intensity multinational projection operations, assuming the role of leading partner.

1. Deutsche Marine (Germany)

2. French Navy

3. Republic of Korea Navy (South Korea) 4. Russian Navy 5. UK Royal Navy

Rank 6 Navies that are able to:

1. Perform any type of mission assigned to them;

2. Operate on a sustained basis anywhere across the globe;

3. Act unilaterally, without any assistance from the outside.

1. US Navy

Figure 6: Germond’s navy classifications250_.

249 _{The examples listed below were categorised according to the following criteria: numbers and types} of platforms; approximate range of platforms; geographical extent of the state (i.e. length of coastline and whether the navy can realistically protect this; whether the navy has participated in bi- or multilateral exercises/operations; and whether the navy has participated in bi- or multilateral exercises/operations as a leading partner.

250 _{Germond B., ‘Small navies in perspective: deconstructing the hierarchy of naval forces’ in Small}

Navies: Strategy and Policy for Small Navies in War and Peace, ed. By Mulqueen, M. et al, pp. 33-50 (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014). The examples listed for each ranking are merely selected navies from around the world. Note that these examples were not listed by Germond himself when he devised these rankings, but have been allocated by the author based upon a careful consideration of Germond’s

With this methodological point clarified, the next step of the research was to consider the various, traditional maritime strategic principles outlined in Section 2.2. A key rationale for this was to attempt to ascertain whether current strategic documentation from around the world discussed these principles in significantly different ways to how they were discussed in the past.

For this thesis, there are two principal developments in the conceptions of the maritime strategic principles today which are regarded as significant due to the fact they arguably take visibility into greater account than older conceptions. These will form the main focus of this chapter, and they are as follows: 1) an evolution of sea control and sea denial to battlespace control and area denial; and 2) modified understandings of forward positioning in relation to visibility. As will be shown, there is debate around these points; arguments can be made that the principles of maritime strategy as conceived today do take visibility into greater account, though opposing arguments can be put forward to show the limitations of these modified conceptions. Throughout the discussions of these two points, numerous references will be made to documentation from the range of states mentioned earlier, in order to show that the points are applicable across national and naval boundaries. Following this very conceptual discussion of the principles in maritime strategic documentation, space will also be devoted to ascertaining the extent to which modified understandings of the principles are seen in operational practice.

3.2.1 From Sea Control and Denial to Battlespace Control and Area

Denial

As already stated, sea control and sea denial appear to have undergone some form of evolution in the way they are conceived, which raises questions about how they relate to the notion of visibility. Bearing in mind Lautenschlager’s teachings that we should identify trends and patterns first, and then trace them back to their causes, this section will begin by looking at the wealth of US maritime strategic documentation before bringing in documentation from other states. We focus in particular on the US first because the changes in the way sea control and sea denial are criteria.

understood are most thoroughly explained here; however, once the evolution has been shown, we will bring in examples of strategic documentation from outside the US in order to show that this development is by no means limited to the American experience. When considering the documentation, it is important to have an overview covering the last three to four decades. This coincides with the post-Cold War and the information RMA, though it is not strictly limited to it. Whilst the information RMA is the point at which an evolution in the understandings of sea control and sea denial takes place (as will be shown), it is also helpful for us to understand what came before this evolution. In other words, it is helpful to have an understanding of the bigger picture, so that there is a temporal as well as transnational comparison. Having this in mind will help develop a better understanding of the extent to which the principles, as understood in current maritime strategic literature, take visibility into account. Furthermore, in complementing US maritime strategic documentation with strategic documentation from other states, the contribution to the evolution of maritime strategic principles becomes one of a conceptual and contextual perspective rather than a perspective limited to one specific country.

This section of the chapter shall be subdivided thus: 1) a consideration of US maritime strategic literature showing how sea control and sea denial have evolved; 2) a discussion of how the evolved forms feature in maritime and defence strategic documentation from outside the US; and 3) to what extent these evolved forms, in both US and non-US thought, account for visibility. Section 3.3 will then complement the findings of these sections with a discussion of operational cases and the mutually constitutive nature of the relationship between thought and practice. This will be carried out once the modified understandings of forward positioning and visibility in strategic documentation have also been considered.

3.2.2. Sea Control and Sea Denial in US Maritime Strategic Thought

To begin to understand how sea control and sea denial have evolved over time, and what this means in terms of visibility, an initial glance at the vast plethora of US Navy maritime strategic documentation since the 1970s is necessary. Doing so shows many differences in the number of times sea control and sea denial are discussed in these writings. The methodology used here is twofold: it is, to an extent, quantitative

in that it looks at how often the concepts appear in the documents. However, it is not solely a quantitative approach; it is also qualitative in that the count has been taken manually, due to the fact that the concepts do occasionally appear under different names. To give an indication of this, Figure 7 (see below) lists a variety of key US Navy strategic documents251 _{published over the last three to four decades and the}

approximate number of times252 _{that the underlying concepts behind sea control and}

sea denial are either mentioned or discussed in them (furthermore, see Appendix A for additional figures giving a more detailed decade-by-decade overview):

0 20 40 60