Simulacions en ANSYS

Despite its potential and usefulness in assessing policies in terms of individual freedoms and well-being, the capability approach attracts criticism on a number of issues. To begin with, one of the major and well known criticisms of Sen‘s framework relates to the question of identification of valuable capabilities that public policies need to promote. Some commentators criticized Sen for his failure to supplement his framework with a coherent list of relevant capabilities that are needed to be taken into account (Nussbaum, 1988; Williams, 1987).

Consequently, Sudgen (1993) questions the feasibility of operating the approach, since it is deliberately and fundamentally incomplete. On this ground, Robeyns (2000) points out that although the approach is highly appreciated, it is still considered by some as an unworkable idea, while others saw it as being insufficiently specified. She argues that the capability approach is just a framework of ‗thought‘ and cannot be taken as a fully specified theory that can answer all normative questions, unless it is supplemented with additional theories (see Robeyns, 2005). To Robeyns, therefore, poverty, inequality, well-being, development, marginalisation or oppression are not social phenomenon that the capability approach seeks to explain, but seeks to conceptualise in the light of individual freedom.

85 Robeyns‘ position and argument cannot, however, go without a comment and a few analyses. First, the Oxford English Dictionary for Students, defines

‗theory/theories‘ as ―a reasoned set of ideas that is intended to explain why something happens or exists‖ (p. 1074). The same dictionary defines ‗idea‘ as ―a thought or suggestion about a possible course of action‖ (p. 500). Given that theories are defined and recognised as set of ‗ideas‘, and ‗ideas‘, as ‗thoughts‘, it could, therefore, be established that theories are a structured system of thoughts.

Therefore, from the definitions of these two words – ‗theory‘ and ‗idea‘ as provided above, one could argue with some magnitude of certainty that the capability approach qualifies under the heading as ‗theory‘. Second, it is also worthy to point out that a single theory is not always enough for the analysis of inequality, well-being, development and marginalisation, which are normatively multi-dimensional. In this case, supplementing capability approach with other theories in analysing the above mentioned phenomena does not object to its use as a ‗theory‘.

Commenting on the issue of incompleteness of Sen‘s capability approach, Nussbaum argues that its inherent nature, as seen above, causes it to encounter the same deficiencies as the preference approach. She supports her argument with the reason that, ―just as people can be taught not to want or miss the things their culture has taught them they should not or could not have, so too they can be taught not to value certain functionings as constituents of their good living‖

(Nussbaum, 1988: 175). Consequently, she contends that some contexts need to be given to the ‗capabilities that what people have reason to choose and value‘, and with this equal freedom for all can be respected (Deneulin and McGregor, 2009: 16). Nussbaum based her argument on the fact that what people may consider valuable can be the product of structures of inequality and discrimination, given that not all human freedoms are equally valuable.

86 Sen explains that the selection and weighing of capabilities depend on personal judgments. Although he provides examples of intrinsically valuable capabilities such as, being able to ―live long, escape avoidable morbidity, be well nourished, be able to read, write and communicate, take part in literary and scientific pursuit and so forth‖ (Sen, 1984:497). He declines to endorse a unique list of capabilities as ‗objectively correct‘ due to practical and strategic reasons (Sen, 1993: 47). Rather, Sen emphasizes the role of agency, the process of choice, as well as the freedom of reason in selecting the relevant capabilities. He argues further that the selection should rather be left to the democratic processes and social choice procedure to define the distributive policies.

This study embraces this particular argument and position of Sen. This is because when capability approach is used for policy work, it is just ethically sound that the people who are affected by these very policies should be allowed to decide on what things count as their valuable capabilities in this policy question (Robyns, 2003: 42). In the words of Peter Fabien (2003: 42), taking people seriously as agents entails giving them a chance to be heard, and to be involved in collective evaluations and decisions. The people within fishing communities in Ghana, as previously stated, are not only beneficiaries of development but they are also agents of change, and should be able to elucidate the capabilities or assets through which they can develop their livelihood strategies.

The capability approach has also been judged by its critique to be too individualistic due to its failure to regard individuals as a component of their social environment. They argue that agents should not be reduced to individuals, but should rather be recognized as socially embedded and connected to others (Deneulin and Stewart, 2000). Robeyns (2003: 44) refutes this criticism and states that the argument put up suffers from an error of merging three different types of individualism which are ethical, methodological and ontological

87 individualism. Bhargava (1992) points out that all social phenomena are to be explained wholly in terms of individuals and their properties. Bhargava based his argument on the fact that in the ontological perspective, only individuals and properties exist, and as a consequence, all social entities can be identified by reducing them to individuals and their properties.

Robeyns (2003: 44), however, disagrees with Bahargava and contends that although ontological and ethical individualism are similar, the capability approach embraces ethical individualism only. In this way she argues that the capability approach accounts for social relations, constraints, opportunities of societal structures and institutions of individuals, and by this recognizes the social and environmental factors that influence their capability. In their explanation on this issue Dreze and Sen state that:

The word ‗social‘ in the expression ‗social opportunity‘ […] is a useful reminder not to view individuals and their opportunities in isolated terms. The option that a person has depend greatly on relations with others and on what the state and other institutions do (Drèze and Sen, 2002: 6).

Linking the above exposition to a wide spread description of African traditional society we may find that the act of caring for one another through social capital, as a common practice, affects the position of many in the society. This means that people are interconnected in such a way that decisions of individuals are made in relation to others. Hence, actions, needs and desires of individuals can influence other people‘s actions, freedom and well-being. Moreover, there is a growing body of evidence and argumentations, which point to the fact that individual freedoms can impact negatively on the well-being of all, either in the present or the future (see Deneulin and McGregor, 2009).

88 Many and more weaknesses and strengths are pointed out by various scholars concerning the applicability of the capability approach enunciated by Sen and Nussbaum, which this study cannot exhaust, since it is outside its scope.

Nonetheless, what is of specific importance to the approach of this study is the fact that it allows for the analysis of what individuals are able to do and to be.

This is due to its multi-dimensional characteristics. In particular, the approach contributes to this study by allowing well-being evaluation and assessment of freedom of individuals and households. This is because the approach, as argued by Sen, focuses on the substantive freedoms that people have, rather than on the particular outcomes with which they end up. For responsible adults, the concentration on freedom rather than achievement has some merit, and it can provide a general framework for analysing individual advantage and deprivation in a society (Sen, 2002: 83).

In sum, the capability approach serves as a potential analytical framework to complement human rights and livelihood system models. Given that they focus on valuable things that people can do and be, they make it possible to explore how individuals and groups employ their freedom and agency in the cause of their livelihood activities. This will enable us to understand the interactions between the smallest units, such as individuals and households, and the large-scale economic, social and political processes.