This thesis sought to resolve which one of three international relations theories – neorealism, neoliberalism or social constructivism – best explains the development of Russia’s nuclear weapons policy during the post-Cold War era. The research carried out first examined the specific way each theory would predict how a country makes decisions surrounding its nuclear weapons policy, leading to the establishment of five hypotheses. Second, this research examined the progression of Russia’s nuclear weapons policy in the post-Cold War era. By looking into the quality and quantity (strength and size) of Russia’s nuclear weapons arsenal, the development of its nuclear threshold and the making of nuclear threats by Russian government officials, it was first established that Russia’s nuclear weapons policy indeed changed over the post-Cold War era. This thesis then turned to testing the hypotheses posited earlier. Having done so, it has become clear that no one hypothesis fully holds against the evidence provided by the Russian case. Thus, no one theory of international relations can fully explain the direction of Russia’s nuclear weapons policy as a whole.
Some elements of change in Russia’s nuclear weapons policy can be explained in some instances, yet not all changes can be explained by one hypothesis alone. Neorealism’s expectation applies in one direction: its explanation of why a country would ascribe more importance to its nuclear weapons closely follows the Russian case. However, neorealism does not account for a decrease in the importance ascribed by Russia to its nuclear weapons. As for neoliberalism, while rising economic interdependence and an increased Russian involvement in the international nuclear regime match with the continuous decline in the size of Russia’s nuclear stockpile, they cannot explain Russian nuclear weapons policy as a whole. The quality
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of Russia’s arsenal, its nuclear threshold and the making of nuclear threats by its government officials all change independently from both Russia’s involvement in the nuclear regime and Russia’s degree of interdependence. Finally, when looking at the hypotheses posited by social constructivism, it becomes clear that these too do not hold. The norm prevalent in Russian society, the idea of commencing deep reductions to the Russian arsenal’s size, has not been reflected fully in Russia’s nuclear weapons policy. Furthermore, changes in the Russian perception of the United States do not add up to changes in the Russian nuclear weapons policy.
All in all, this thesis argues that, when sticking to the application of international relations theory, the best way to explain the development of Russia’s nuclear weapons policy is to combine insights from both neorealism and neoliberalism. In doing so, one can, trough neorealism, explain why nuclear weapons become more significant to Russia’s national security strategy. Additionally, through neoliberalism, one can explain developments regarding the size of Russia’s nuclear arsenal. One should keep in mind that such an approach is far from flawless. Primarily it does not account for reductions in the importance ascribed to nuclear weapons by Russia.
A major challenge encountered in this research is that there happened to be significant overlap between factors which, according to our differing hypotheses, could potentially influence Russian nuclear weapons policy. For example, economic decline (and thus loss of power) for Russia often coincided with a drop in positive public perception of the US. This research has attempted to differentiate as much as possible between the different explanations, offering as much insight in Russian nuclear weapons policy decision-making as possible.
This research has focused exclusively on the utility of international relations theory in explaining Russia’s nuclear weapons policy in the post-Cold War era. However, as we found that no one theory of international relations can fully explain the direction of Russia’s nuclear weapons policy as a whole, additional research should be undertaken. This future research then
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should focus on exploring alternative explanations for the progression of Russia’s nuclear weapons policy, explanations which due to their nature lie beyond the scope of this research. One alternative explanation might revolve around (Russian) economics. From this research itself, it already becomes clear that most changes in Russia’s nuclear weapons policy have occurred in the time periods directly following the three financial crises that hit the country in the post-Cold War era. Around 2000, just after Russia had defaulted on its debt, Russia lowered its nuclear threshold and decided to invest in the quality of its nuclear arsenal. Following the 2008/2009 crisis, Russia recommitted itself to this threshold, and once again pledged to modernize its nuclear arsenal. And, in light of the 2014/2015 economic recession, Russia for the first time in the post-Cold War era increased the size of its active nuclear weapons arsenal.
A second potential factor of influence on Russian nuclear weapons policy is the person in office as the Russian president. The personal preferences and views of a state leader can have tremendous effects on the way he or she acts regarding certain fields of government. Elite thinking about policymaking in all fields can be highly influenced by a nation’s state leader.
A third potential explanation is that the importance of nuclear weapons to Russia’s national security strategy is based solely on a risk-assessment of US or NATO conventional and nuclear forces vis-à-vis the Russian military. As the Russian military currently lacks the conventional means to withstand an assault by NATO forces, it could be possible that Russia, in response to what it perceives as NATO conventional threats, has turned to adhering more significance to nuclear weapons during specific moments in the post-Cold War era. Furthermore, it could be that Russia simply adheres to its nuclear weapons because the United States does so too. Of course, whether this or any of the other alternative explanations touched upon here hold is something for future research to uncover.
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