Sintesis del trabajo

• Direct the regional combatant commanders to maintain a

portfolio of contingency operational campaign plans

- Spanning peacetime, war, stabilization and reconstruction - For countries ripe and important

• In support of these plans

- Direct your intelligence organs to maintain a portfolio of contingency intelligence campaign plans

- Direct the Services to reshape and rebalance their forces to provide a stabilization and reconstruction capability, meeting as well as possible the criteria we have proposed for an effective S&R capability

- Direct OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Services to make language and cultural capability part of the normal readiness assessment and requirements process

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perform quantitative analysis of their likely expected needs with at least the same veracity as they do for combat force structure.

The secretary should also direct the services to take skills in languages and cultures as seriously as they take skills in combat; otherwise the nation may win the war but will surely “lose the peace.”

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The foundation of the aforementioned planning, and operational execution, is intelligence, information, knowledge, and

understanding.

The secretary should accelerate the ongoing transformation of the Defense HUMINT Service, with particular attention to ensuring that the nation has the global coverage and sustained foreign presence that is needed in regions ripe and important. This is a long-lead item: if the department does not lay the HUMINT groundwork years in advance, and sustain its attention and presence, the United States will not be prepared.

Much of the needed information and knowledge can be found in unclassified sources, although we acknowledge it may take a lot of work to find and organize it. The pursuit, exploration, and

exploitation of open sources have taken a back seat to learning

secrets. While we in no way denigrate the importance of the latter, we ask the secretary to instruct DIA to establish a vital and active effort focused on using open sources to provide information on cultures,

Mr. Secretary, we respectfully recommend . . .

. . . that you use your authority to . . .

• Accelerate the transformation of the Defense HUMINT Service to

provide sustained coverage

• Direct DIA to revitalize our collection, analysis, and use of open

source information

• Direct your intelligence organs to substantially improve all-source

analysis

- Address the gamut of selection and recruitment, training, equipping, and rewarding all- source analysts

- Expand the role of senior analysts so as to shape collection and classification - Perform analysis in a problem-centered manner

- Ensure that analysts are “born joint” so that analysis is aligned with intelligence questions rather than organizational divisions

• Ensure adequate attention and resources are devoted to close-in,

terrestrial sensing, tagging, and tracking so as to find the targets most important in asymmetric warfare

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infrastructure, genealogy, religions, economics, politics, and the like in regions, areas, and states deemed ripe and important.

All-source analysis can transform raw intelligence, data, and information into knowledge and understanding. Analysis is not just an art form, but also a craft and engineering discipline demanding specific attentiveness to recruiting individuals with the right skills and mental capacities, providing adequate and continuing training, providing feedback and assessment, equipping with the right computer tools, and ensuring incentives to promote creativity and insulation from group pressure. We ask the secretary to direct all of his intelligence organs to jointly enhance all-source analysis.

Finally, in light of the actual enemies, weapons, materiel,

installations, tactics, and strategies the United States faces in dealing with failing and failed states, U.S. ISR capabilities, brilliant though they are, are inadequate to the task, insofar as they were developed

for cold war purposes. More intimate, terrestrial, 21st_{-century ISR is}

required, composed of elements like tagging, tracking, and locating capabilities. A “Manhattan Project” in scale, intensity, and focus is required to transform the nation’s portfolio of tagging, tracking, and locating programs into an institutionalized discipline to serve the United States for decades to come. We ask the secretary to instigate that development swiftly; again, this is a long-lead item demanding preparation years in advance of need.

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In addition to strengthening capabilities within the Department of Defense, we urge the secretary to use his considerable influence to propel needed changes that span the government’s agencies and departments or that are centered on cabinet departments other than Defense. We identify three areas where the secretary’s effort could have considerable impact.

The secretary can accelerate the institutionalization of an effective pangovernment strategic planning and integration process for

addressing issues in countries ripe and important; but need not wait to institute DOD’s own improvements in planning, stabilization, strategic communication, and intelligence.

The secretary should lend his support to the efforts of other departments and agencies as they undergo transformation,

particularly in their approach to instituting management discipline for contingency planning and for maintaining contingency

capabilities.

Finally, the secretary should urge the establishment of an effective national strategic communication capability and lend DOD’s

resources and capabilities to this effort, as appropriate.

. . . and that you use your influence to . . .