Sistema de alertas

A groundbreaking book in IPE is Robert Gilpin with Jean M. Gilpin, The Political

Economy of International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,

1987). An important book on the development of IPE as an academic discipline is Benjamin J. Cohen, International Political Economy: An Intellectual History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).

economism 4 globalization 6 gross domestic

product 9

gross national income 9

gross national product 9 hyper-globalists 7 infrastructure 4 internationalists 7 market 3 moderate globalists 7 politicism 4 state 3

Notes 15 Two useful studies on approaches to theorizing in IPE and IR are Thomas J.

Biersteker, “Evolving Perspectives on International Political Economy: Twentieth- Century Contexts and Discontinuities,” International Political Science Review 14, no. 1 (January 1993), pp. 7–33; and James N. Rosenau and Mary Durfee,

Thinking Theory Thoroughly, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000),

chs. 1 and 9.

Recent studies on globalization from different perspectives include Jagdish Bhagwati,

In Defense of Globalization (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Martin

Wolf, Why Globalization Works (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 2004); David Held and Anthony McGrew, Globalization/Anti-Globalization: Beyond the

Great Divide, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2007); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007); Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,

2005); Michael M. Weinstein, Globalization: What’s New (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Ngaire Woods, The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank

and Their Borrowers (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); and Linda Weiss, The Myth of the Powerless State (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

NOTES

1. Stephany Griffith-Jones, José Antonio Campo, and Joseph E. Stiglitz, eds., Time

for a Visible Hand: Lessons from the 2008 World Financial Crisis (New York:

Oxford University Press, 2010).

2. James A. Caporaso, “Global Political Economy,” in Ada Finifter, ed., Political

Science: The State of the Discipline II (Washington, DC: American Political Science

Association, 1993), p. 451.

3. Kathleen R. McNamara, “Of Intellectual Monocultures and the Study of IPE,”

Review of International Political Economy 16, no. 1 (February 2009), p. 73.

4. Robert Gilpin, with Jean M. Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 8–11.

5. Philip G. Cerny, The Changing Architecture of Politics: Structure, Agency and the

Future of the State (London: Sage, 1990), pp. 228–229; Philip G. Cerny, “Para-

doxes of the Competition State: The Dynamics of Political Globalization,”

Government and Opposition 32, no. 2 (April 1997), pp. 251–274.

6. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Invest-

ment Report 2009 (New York: United Nations, 2009), p. xxi; Lorraine Eden,

“Bringing the Firm Back In: Multinationals in International Political Economy,” in Lorraine Eden and Evan H. Potter, eds., Multinationals in the Global Political

Economy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), p. 26.

7. Richard K. Ashley, “Three Modes of Economism,” International Studies Quarterly 27, no. 4 (December 1983), p. 463; Colin Hay and David Marsh, “Introduction: Towards a New (International) Political Economy?,” New Political Economy 4, no. 1 (1999), pp. 9–10.

8. Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Theory,” Millennium 10, no. 2 (1981), p. 128.

9. Robert Gilpin first identified these three perspectives in IPE in U.S. Power and the

Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment

(New York: Basic Books, 1975). See also Gilpin, The Political Economy of Interna-

10. For example, see Matthew Watson, “Theoretical Traditions in Global Political Economy,” in John Ravenhill, ed., Global Political Economy, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 27–66.

11. Mark Rupert and Hazel Smith, eds., Historical Materialism and Globalization (New York: Routledge, 2002). Some historical materialists examine the relation- ship between ideas and material circumstances. See Robert W. Cox with Michael G. Schechter, The Political Economy of a Plural World: Critical Refllections on

Power, Morals and Civilization (New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 26–27.

12. Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Aseem Prakash and Jeffrey A. Hart, “Globalization and Gover- nance: An Introduction,” in Aseem Prakash and Jeffrey A. Hart, eds., Globalization

and Governance (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 4–17.

13. Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies (New York: Free Press, 1995), p. 5.

14. Linda Weiss, ed., States in the Global Economy: Bringing Domestic Institutions

Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 3, ch. 1.

15. Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question: The International

Economy and the Possibilities of Governance, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Polity

Press, 1999), p. 7.

16. Buzan in Barry Buzan, David Held, and Anthony McGrew, “Realism vs Cos- mopolitanism,” Review of International Studies 24, no. 3 (July 1998), p. 392. 17. David Held and Anthony McGrew, Globalization/Anti-Globalization: Beyond the

Great Divide, 2nd ed. (Malden MA: Polity Press, 2007), pp. 6–8.

18. Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction, pp. 59–75.

19. Philip G. Cerny, “Globalization and Other Stories: The Search for a New Paradigm for International Relations,” International Journal 51, no. 4 (Autumn 1996), pp. 617–637.

20. David P. Rapkin and Jonathan R. Strand, “Competitiveness: Useful Concept, Polit- ical Slogan, or Dangerous Obsession?,” in David P. Rapkin and William P. Avery, eds., National Competitiveness in a Global Economy (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 1995), pp. 1–20.

21. John H. Dunning, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy (Wokingham, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1993), pp. 14–15.

22. Russia is not yet a WTO member.

23. On the GNP and GNI, see Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop- ment, System of National Accounts, 1993—Glossary (Paris: OECD, 2000), p. 23; World Bank, World Development Report—2003 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003), pp. 233, 245.

24. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990), p. 70.

25. Paul R. Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, International Economics: Theory and

Policy, 7th ed. (New York: Pearson Addison-Wesley, 2006), pp. 11–14 and

280–283.

26. Lester Thurow, Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle Among Japan,

Europe, and America (New York: Morrow, 1992).

27. Mike Mason, Development and Disorder: A History of the Third World Since

1945 (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1997), p. 1.

28. Howard Handelman, The Challenge of Third World Development (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1996), pp. 3–10.

Notes 17 29. Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What

Can Be Done About It (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

30. United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Human Development Report

2005, p. 36, http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005, p. 37.

31. United Nations (UN) Department of Economic and Social Affairs, The Inequality

Predicament: Report on the World Social Situation 2005 (New York: United

Nations, 2005), p. 49.

32. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” The National Interest 16 (Summer 1989), p. 4.

33. On the inadequate attention given to IOs see J. Martin Rochester, “The Rise and Fall of International Organization as a Field of Study,” International Organization 40, no. 4 (Autumn 1986), pp. 777–813.

34. World Trade Organization, Regionalism and the World Trading System (Geneva: WTO, April 1995), p. 27.

18

I

Conference, and within 22 days they endorsed a framework for international

economic cooperation after World War II. Two international economic organizations resulted from the Bretton Woods Conference—the International

Monetary Fund (IMF) and International Bank for Reconstruction and

Development (IBRD) or World Bank—and in 1948 the General Agreement on

Tariffs and Trade (GATT) became the main global trade organization. These

organizations were part of a complex institutional framework to help manage the postwar global economy. Although the Bretton Woods negotiations were “the first successful attempt . . . by a large group of nations to shape and control their economic relations,”1_{only a small number of states had a critical role in the}

process. The three years of prenegotiations before Bretton Woods and the con- ference itself were “very much an Anglo-American affair, with Canada playing a useful mediating role,”2_{and the chief conference planners were Harry Dexter}

White of the U.S. Treasury and John Maynard Keynes of Britain. Although French delegates were at the conference, France was still occupied by Germany; and Germany, Italy, and Japan as enemy states were not represented. Despite some basic differences of outlook, the Western DCs generally agreed on the postwar institutional order. Above all, they wanted to avoid a repetition of the interwar period experiences, when exchange controls and trade protectionism contributed to the 1930s Great Depression and World War II.

After providing some background on economic relations before World War II, this chapter introduces the postwar institutional framework that the North developed to manage the global economy. The chapter also focuses on two other groups of states that played only a limited role in establishing the postwar

Managing the Global