Palestine.”91 The future of Britain and the defence of the British Empire, he asserted, were indivisible and Palestine was essential to maintaining their well-being.
The task, Amery concluded, was to reduce any advantage that Germany might obtain as a result of the Russian withdrawal from the war, through action by the Allied Powers to achieve “the liberation of Belgium or the conquest of Palestine and Syria”.92 The Memorandum forecast the possibility of the formation by Germany of a huge Middle European block increasing “enormously the danger which would threaten the very existence of the British Empire if Germany should be able to recover any of her Colonies (except possibly those in West Africa), or if the Turk should retain his hold over Palestine”.93 He pointed out that the numbers of people living in countries under German control would then increase from 70 to 170 million, thereby vastly increasing the human resources at their disposal. Furthermore he argued that “if East Africa should, by any chance, be restored to a Germany which, through Turkey, remains in control of, Palestine, our position in Egypt and British East Africa would become one of the utmost difficulty and danger”.94
A few weeks after Amery’s document, “E. R. B” and “J. W. H.” produced the Memorandum on German War Aims for the War Cabinet in July 1917, examining the German views on the possible outcomes to the war and their alternative perspectives.95 The Memorandum assessed the range of views being advanced by the major political parties in Germany and attempted to gauge support for them. The War Cabinet was advised that there were five main lines of thought about German strategy which included: the advocacy of a strategy to increase German sea power and make annexations to “the West”; the consolidation of a “Central European bloc of Allied Powers” reinforcing “Mittel-Europa”; the strengthening of the Berlin-to-Bagdad axis through the control of the Ottoman Empire; the adoption of an extensive colonisation policy to create an African Empire and lastly the acquisition of new land to the East
91 Ibid., 6. 92 Ibid. 93 Ibid., 3.
94 Ibid., 3. Germany had formally held territories in East Africa but had ceded these to Britain in the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890.
95 CAB 24/23. The document is dated 15th July 1917 with a Postscript dated 25th July 1917. Since the document is an exploration of opinions originally expressed in German, interpreted for the War Cabinet in the midst of the conflict it is necessary to add a caveat that it is a British document about their enemy’s thinking.
through the annexation of Russian territory. The document assessed the likely success of the contending views in winning German governmental support and the
consequences of those alternatives for British interests in Mesopotamia and Palestine. If the proposal to expand German interests in east Africa were to be adopted and be successful the authors argued that it would have implications for the fate of the Suez Canal opening it up to German shipping. Such a development would have grave consequences for Britain cutting off vital trade routes and causing problems
domestically for the London Government. Hans Delbrück, cited as “one of the most moderate of the ‘Moderates,’ one of the most emphatic opponents of annexation in the West”, a supporter of the German orientation towards Mittel-Europa and the Berlin-to- Bagdad options, was reported as suggesting that, “if England loses the Canal, all the bands connecting its Empire are loosened” to the extent that even the “Central
Government in London might grow insecure”.96 To Germany the winning of the Suez Canal would have a dual advantage allowing its fleet free access to the Indian Ocean whilst creating instability within Britain itself.97
However, by the time that the War Cabinet came to look at the document, events had already overtaken it. As the Postscript added on Thursday 19th July noted, the Reichstag had already resolved, that Germany was “not animated by lust of conquest” and that the “Reichstag stands for peace and understanding and for lasting conciliation of nations. Annexations, political, economic and financial oppressions are contradictory to such peace”.98 The Reichstag resolution represented a decisive shift in Germany’s ambitions and accordingly the authors of the memorandum amended their own conclusions. They now judged that the creation of a German Empire in Africa, a “German India”, had all but been abandoned.99 The Reichstag, it appeared, had conceded that British naval superiority could not be challenged.
The subject was returned to in a further document, Review of the Near Eastern Situation written by another Conservative Member of Parliament, William Ormsby-
96 Ibid.,11. and Ibid., 7.
97 Ibid., 5. The Suez Canal is referred to as “England’s neck” in the document. 98 Ibid.,18.
Gore, presented just one month later, on 14th June 1917.100 Ormsby-Gore expressed apprehension about the consequences of Germany gaining a foothold in the region with its “vast colonisable and undeveloped lands of Asia Minor, Syria, and
Mesopotamia”. He feared that it would lead to “the absorption of the Ottoman Empire into German Mittel-Europa”.101 A development of such scope, he suggested, would result in Germany holding sway across the Near East constituting a dire threat to British imperial interests, menacing the Suez Canal and its defences and bringing German forces to shores of the Red Sea. Until now this had been averted because of the intervention of the Sharif of Mecca but if that had not been the case then the Baghdad Railway, he concluded, “(would have been) a German arrow pointed directly at India”.102
As the war continued, the loss of life, the privations suffered at home and the growth of industrial discontent took their toll. The Russian Revolution, albeit from a distance, challenged the very premises of the war and suggested alternatives which resonated with masses of people both in Britain, across Europe and even further afield.103 Confronted by this phenomenon the imperial powers were obliged to chart a
new course to achieve their ambitions. Colonial expansionism was politically
discredited and became progressively a military and economic problem for the British. At the beginning of the war Russia, a less potent imperial power moving away from its predominantly pre-capitalist agrarian dominated economy towards a more industrialised capitalist one, was an established member of the Entente Alliance. The Bolshevik led revolution of 1917 ended that union, changing the configuration of the war when it withdrew from the conflict ending the combat on the Eastern Front. However its departure raised other political challenges in the international field. The Bolshevik Government exposed the secret negotiations which had taken place prior to the war between the new-imperialists especially relating to the lands of the former
100 CAB 24/143. 101 Ibid., 1.
102 Ibid. For a lengthier exposition of this issue see also McMeekin, The Berlin-Baghdad Express. Please note although different authors use different spellings I have standardised all spellings as “Sharif”.
103 Declarations of revolt and mass strikes by parties and organisations supportive of the Bolsheviks took place in Holland, Germany, Hungary and in a number of large cities across Europe. It should be noted that in the post-war polarisation fascism too secured a major victory in Italy with the election of Benito Mussolini a former socialist who now promoted a corporatist perspective.
Ottoman Empire laying bare their plans whilst simultaneously raising the standard of self-determination amongst peoples accustomed to being part of the Russian Empire.104
The Russian Revolution constituted a further threat to the new-imperialists’ goal of monopolising the world market. By championing the right of self-determination the Bolsheviks presented a political challenge which disputed the desire by Germany and Britain for example for complete control over the sources of raw material and world markets.
Ultimately the British considered the stance taken by the Bolshevik
government as so threatening that in 1918 the British together with France, the USA, Italy, Japan and a host of other nations, sent troops to fight alongside the anti-
Bolshevik forces who were also joined in the east at Vladivostok by Japanese troops.105 However despite this decision the growing economic challenges facing
Britain forced the government to rethink the strategy. In a House of Commons statement on 13th November 1919, on the subject of opposition to the Bolshevik Government in Russia, the Prime Minister David Lloyd George stated that, “The Government has repeatedly made it clear to the House of Commons that with the crushing financial burden already cast upon it by the Great War, it cannot contemplate the assumption of new obligations under this head”.106 Despite the importance that he
had attached to Russia, because he considered that “a settlement of the Russian problem [sic] … essential to the reconstruction of the world”, he nevertheless felt unable to go beyond the very substantial commitment of around £100,000,000, “in cash and kind” that had been provided as “assistance sent to Russia”.107 The inter-
imperialist rivalry of World War One had drained the economic capacities of the country and the losses of life had induced a deep war-weariness. Even though
Russia’s economy lagged far behind that of Britain the Prime Minister had to concede
104 Eugene Rogan, The Fall of the Ottomans:The Great War in the Middle East 1914–1920 (New York: Basic Books, 2015), 357. Trotsky published the Sykes–Picot agreement in Izvestia in late November which was then republished by the Manchester Guardian on 26th and 28th November.
105 E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917–1923, Vol. 3 (London: Penguin Books, 1953), 95. 106 CAB 23/35. (Conference of Ministers on Miscellaneous Matters. S. Series Volume I). See also HC Deb 13 November 1919 vol 121 cc 469-77.
107 Ibid. “Russia” here is a clear reference to the anti-Bolshevik forces. The French too were in a similarly weak position and were proposing to seek economic help from the United States of America. (See CAB 23/35, Notes of a Conversation between the Prime Minister and M. Loucheur, 3rd December 1919).
that there was nothing more that could be done to support their White Russian allies and in 1920 the troops were withdrawn.
War, Religion and Racism
Ormsby-Gore’s War Cabinet paper raised a new question concerning the potential implications of German influence in the region on “two great world forces … viz., Islam and Jewry”.108 His use of the term “world forces” without elaboration suggests a shared evaluation of the two groups by members of the Cabinet though there is no analysis of the sense in which they might be called “world forces”, nor in what way they might be similar or different. In numerous papers concerns had been expressed about the potential impact on the attitude of the “Moslem world” to British policies since a number of countries of the Empire had majority Muslim populations.
The potential for alienating Indian Muslims weighed on the minds of the British and numerous Cabinet papers refer to political developments that might affect attitudes amongst the Muslim population. General Sir E.G. Barrow, Military Secretary of the India Office, submitting a Memorandum to the Cabinet entitled The Military Situation in India and the Middle East on 24th November 1915, discussed concerns about the potential volatility in India.109 Barrow emphasised the need to send “white
soldiers” [sic] to counter any notions that the British were unable to supply sufficient military to handle any problems and that they might have been weakened by the war efforts. The difficulties inside India could be managed, he argued “if they [the Indian troops] remain loyal, and if the 17,000 Imperial and Nepalese troops also can be relied on, we shall be able to hold our own, but the “if” is fraught with such tremendous issues that I doubt if any Government dare take the risk”.110
Ormsby-Gore was preoccupied with the thought that the Muslim communities would be concerned about the fate of the Islamic holy places and held the view that if Turkish forces retook Mecca then Britain’s credibility in the eyes of the “100 million Moslem subjects of the King-Emperor in Asia and Africa” would be seriously damaged.111 This sensitivity to the opinions of the Muslims also related to the
108 Ibid., 2.
109 CAB 24/1/0046. 110 Ibid. 4.
importance attached to India and the fear that a defeat would further stimulate the developing independence movement.112 The German government were themselves of
the opinion that anti-British propaganda might be spread by pilgrims to Mecca encouraging insurrections in the wider Muslim world.113
If India became independent it would threaten both the economic advantages the British had gained from the country as well as the whole structure of the Empire. The Indian nationalist movement was partially split between Muslims and Hindus but the Muslim community itself was additionally divided by “sect, region, language, and socio-economic status”.114 A development which might lead to the Muslim
community becoming united around their religion could lead to a challenge to the credibility of the British rulers and potentially undermine the structures of the Empire in India. If the Ottoman forces and their allies could defeat the British then that might encourage all Indians to give even more support to the struggle for independence. It was a pragmatic politico-military consideration that lay behind Ormsby-Gore’s apprehension about Muslim responses to the loss by the British of the holy places rather than a religious concern.
At the same time Ormsby-Gore expressed anxiety about divisions within Jewry which might lead some within Zionism to support Germany’s aspirations. He
identified the split between those he called the “Ententophil Jew” and “those who are consciously or unconsciously Pro-German” who were preoccupied “lest a Christian Power rule in Palestine”.115 Ormsby-Gore voiced concern about the ambivalence of these two strands within the Jewish community and the equally equivocal stance of non-Jews within Germany who appeared capable of appropriating Zionist aspirations to their own imperialist agenda.116 Despite describing Germany as “the home of Anti-
Semitism … the chief centre of Assimilation, and the chief enemy of growing Jewish nationalism”, he acknowledged that, out of self-interest, those opinions could easily be
112 CAB 23/36 See also point reiterated by deputation of Indian Muslims on 24th March 1921 emphasising that the “King Emperor was the largest Mohammedan ruler in the world” governing “as much as one fourth”.
113 McMeekin, The Berlin–Baghdad Express. 90.
114 Judith M. Brown, “India”, in The Oxford History of the British Empire Volume IV eds, Judith M. Brown, and Wm. Roger Louis (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 434. 115 CAB 24/143.
116 There is substantial evidence to suggest that the Germans were simultaneously developing their
put to one side.117 Germany’s reaction towards Zionism and the fate of Palestine, as we shall see later, was as pragmatic as that of the British. Based on the evidence of the War Cabinet documents, discussions were taking place about a British occupation of Palestine but the arguments for it were presented more as a question of military advantage rather than arguments for the establishment of a homeland for the Jews.
Ormsby-Gore addressed the question as to what military measures should be taken to secure the region. He was anxious to advocate the “separation of Syria and Palestine from the control of a Power dominated or controlled by Germany (as) the only security that can assure our position in Bagdad and along the Red Sea”.118 In order to prevent the Ottomans holding on to Syria and Palestine and “prevent(ing) Zionism being thrown into the arms of the King of Prussia … when the Germans are at this moment making a bid to capture Zionism”, he argued that the British needed to draw a clear line of defence “from Trebizond to the Gulf of Alexandretta” a line running from the Black Sea south-westwards to the Mediterranean Sea and roughly corresponding to the area of Anatolia. 119
According to reports to the Cabinet, a section of the press in Germany were of the opinion that the British Government’s concerns for the fate of the Jews and the future of Palestine hinged more on imperial self-interest than religious sensibilities. In an article published on 12th May 1918 in the Berliner Tageblatt and translated for the Cabinet, Georg Gothein, a member of the Reichstag, is quoted as expressing the view that the British “are only concerned to make the Indian Ocean into an English lake, and so throw a bridge from Egypt to India over Palestine, Mesopotamia, Persia and Afghanistan. Palestine, as a so-called Jewish State, would be merely an English colony”.120 Gothein acknowledges that any putative state might be described as “Jewish” but that its defining characteristic would be its colonial status within the British Empire. In the view of the journalist, the British viewed the establishment of a homeland for the Jews as exactly the same as the creation of a Jewish State and no different from any other colonial enterprise. The view taken by German strategists
117 Ibid. See also Laqueur, The History of Zionism, 143.
118 Ibid. See also CAB 24/144. The British had a presence on either side of the southern end of the Red Sea. Aden was at this period a responsibility of the India Office and Somaliland was from 1905 administered by the Colonial Office.
119 Ibid.
was that the British regarded Palestine as a means to an end, a mariage de convenance, and a bridge to the furthest reaches of the Empire rather than a land to be restored to a people because of a religious or biblical covenant.121 Certainly some sections of German opinion still hoped for the possibility that the Zionists might align themselves with the Central Powers.122
There were others in the German government however, who had been taking steps to enlist the support of the Ottoman Empire in a jihad to get the backing of the Muslim world for the fight against the Entente Powers.123 Helmuth von Moltke, Chief
of the General Staff gave orders on 5th August 1914 “one day after Britain declared war on Germany – that the German Foreign Office began recruiting spies and agents for the jihad”.124 Religious allegiance was clearly not something that concerned
German imperialism as much as the potential of Islamic communities to add to the potency of the war effort.
The views quoted in the documents, both those of Amery and Ormsby-Gore on the one hand and those attributed to Delbrück and Gothein on the other, were of course partisan, the products of analyses conducted in war time. They did not address any detailed considerations about post-conflict developments in Palestine. The focus of the authors was on the general strategies of their respective countries and how each could achieve and sustain their empires. Both Germany and Britain gave considerable thought to the role that Zionism might play in their ambitions. Endorsement for Zionism was not the exclusive property of the British and nor was Zionism committed to any particular power. In 1889, whilst visiting Constantinople, Theodor Herzl won the backing of Kaiser Wilhelm II for Zionism who afterwards sought to persuade