Tilly’s influential definition of social movements emphasizes the fact that they are sustained interactions between participants making collective claims at power
holders.321 While useful for understanding certain movements, the formal state-based
model that Tilly suggests does not account for many contemporary social movements engaged in transnational activism. Mario Diani, on the other hand, argues that social movements are more than the sum of sustained interactions and instead exemplify particular political and social forms of collective action. According to Diani, social movements are “networks of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups, or associations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a
320 PACBI, “Debating BDS: On Normalization and Partial Boycotts,” 1 April 2012;
http://pacbi.org/etemplate.php?id=1850.
196 shared collective identity.”322 In their work on transnational advocacy networks, Keck
and Sikkink say, “The network concept travels well because it stresses fluid and open relations among committed and knowledgeable actors working in specialized
areas.”323 Conceptualizing the BDS movement in this way emphasizes its networked
nature and is useful for analyzing its border-crossing structure and processes, which in part indicates how the movement is organized.
Many contemporary social movements, including the BDS movement, are comprised largely of groups and organizations that work with or have connections with other groups. Within the movement, there is extensive layering in the networks, further contributing to the dynamic web that forms the border-crossing BDS
movement. According Keck and Sikkink, networks are “communicative structures” and “the flow of information among actors in the network reveals a dense web of connections among these groups, both formal and informal.”324 In the following
paragraphs, I show the “dense web of connections” among some of the participant groups in the BDS movement. I outline how groups and organizations working in the BDS movement are networked, and how the movement is coordinated through its participants’ websites, social networking sites, email lists, and frequent conferences. The movement is comprised of networks upon networks and through informal, loose coordination, which further illustrates the movement’s decentralized structure and fluid organizational processes.
As was explained in chapter two of this thesis, BRICUP is one of the main groups in Britain promoting an academic boycott of Israel. The group has worked
322 Mario Diani, “The Concept of Social Movement,” The Sociological Review 40, no. 1 (February
1992): 13.
323 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, Google ebook, 22.
324 Ibid, “Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics,” UNESCO (1999),
197 with numerous groups such as PSC, BIG, J-BIG, BIN, and the Architects and
Planners campaign. In addition, a number of BRICUP members have been active in the academic unions, which as discussed in the case study chapter, have repeatedly debated and voted on boycott-related matters. In addition to these formal networks and areas of coordination, scholars and cultural workers often have other networks (formal and informal), such as professional networks, that may be utilized to disseminate information and garner support for specific campaigns or events.
The We Divest campaign that was analyzed in chapter three of this thesis is coordinated as a coalition-based initiative. JVP has local offices across the US that work with other groups in their locales. Adalah-NY works with other New York- based groups on a number of campaigns and actions. Among other activities in 2013, they participated in protest against SodaStream with JVP-NY and Park Slope Food Coop Members for BDS. On the TIAA-CREF Student Day of Action, they
participated in demonstrations with New York City-based SJP chapters. The group also participated in a number of conferences, workshops, and other educational activities such as the US Campaign to End the Occupation’s 12th Annual Organizers
Conference, and organized cross-issue events such as “Building Solidarity across Black, Native American, and Palestinian Struggles,” featuring discussion and music.325
Other members in the We Divest Coordinating Committee such the US Campaign to End the Occupation, is a coalition-organization that currently comprises over 400 Palestine solidarity groups across the US, and the USPCN is a network of diaspora Palestinians throughout the US. The AFSC has 38 offices in the US and has a presence in 15 international locations. The AFSC Screen List of 29 companies
198 mentioned in chapter four was taken from the New England Conference of the United Methodist Church that was researched and compiled with the assistance of Who Profits. It was also the list that the Mennonite Central Committee would go onto use for monitoring its investments starting in 2013. Grassroots International works with partners in 13 countries. As stated in the case study, nearly all organizations that Grassroots International works with in Palestine are signatories to the 2005
Palestinian call for BDS. In addition to these networks, the companies targeted within the campaign against TIAA-CREF (Africa Israel, Caterpillar, Elbit, G4S, Hewlett- Packard, Motorola, Northrop Grumman, SodaStream and Veolia) are the same targets in other BDS campaigns, thus providing opportunities for networking and
coordinating with other Palestine solidarity groups and/or the BNC.
In the consumer boycotts against Ahava that were discussed in chapter four of this this thesis, many of the groups active are also working on other issues and
coordinating with a variety of other groups. Codepink, the group that organizes the Stolen Beauty campaign against Ahava, works on numerous other campaigns (outside the BDS movement) and has an entire web page with links to a long list of “campaign allies.”326 PSC in the UK has over 40 branches working on a number of Palestine-
related campaigns and coordinates with trade unions, students, faith groups, and other Palestine solidarity groups. Numerous PSC activists are involved in other groups such as trade unions in the UK, and the PSC has recently announced that it will be
coordinating a trade union network to strengthen and widen work on Palestine in UK trade unions. At the regional level, PSC works to ensure Palestine is on the EU agenda with the European Coordination of Committees and Associations for
199 Palestine, which is comprised of 52 European committees, organizations, NGOs, unions and international solidarity movements from 22 European countries.
As demonstrated in the previous paragraphs, the BDS movement is comprised of extensive connections among groups. Palestine solidarity groups work with other Palestine solidarity groups. Christian churches active in issues related to the Middle East work together and share information, particularly regarding divestment. Large organizations such as AFSC and Grassroots International have partner organizations in several other countries. Various groups participate in cross-issue events and numerous groups have allies and partners working on issues other than Palestine. In addition, common targets within the movement provide the opportunity for
networking and coordinating. Illustrating the extensive networks present in the BDS movement is useful for understanding its structure and processes, as they in part describe how the movement is organized.
Similar to much of the BDS movement, coordination through these networks is often informal. Groups can and do coordinate with each other and the BNC on campaigns, actions, events, etc. although none of it is required within the movement. In the organizational survey that I conducted on the BDS movement, the following two statements were posed to Palestine solidarity groups: “My group coordinates with the Palestinian Boycott National Committee (BNC)” and “My group coordinates with other Palestine solidarity groups on BDS campaigns.” 75 groups responded to the first statement and 78 responded to the second statement. With respect to coordination with the BNC, 18 (24 percent) responded Frequently, 37 (49.3 percent) responded As Needed, and 20 (26.7 percent) responded Never. Regarding coordination with other
200 Palestine solidarity groups, 47 (60.3 percent) responded Frequently, 30 (38.5 percent) responded As Needed and 1 (1.3 percent) responded Never.327
In addition to the above statements in the organizational survey, groups were asked if coordination with the BNC and other Palestine solidarity groups working on BDS campaigns should increase. 76 responded to the first statement regarding coordination with the BNC and 74 responded to the statement regarding coordination with other Palestine solidarity groups. With respect to the first statement that
coordination should increase with the BNC, 23 (30.3 percent) responded Strongly Agree, 35 (47.4 percent) Agree, 14 (18.4 percent) Neutral, 2 (2.6 percent) Disagree, and 1 (1.3 percent) Strongly Disagree. With respect to the second statement that coordination with other Palestine solidarity groups working on BDS campaigns should increase 35 (47.3 percent) responded Strongly Agree, 27 (36.5 percent) Agree, 12 (16.2 percent) Neutral, and none responded Disagree or Strongly Disagree.328 Taken together, the survey data indicates that coordination is medium between Palestine solidarity groups working on BDS and the BNC (just as many groups
frequently or never coordinate as those that coordinate on an as needed basis). Thus, most groups coordinate on an as needed basis with the BNC, although many groups believe that coordination should increase.
With respect to Palestine solidarity groups working on BDS campaigns there is strong coordination (of those groups that responded to the question, only one said they had never coordinated with another group). The same amount of groups think
coordination between Palestine solidarity groups and the BNC should increase as
327 BDS Survey, Question number 18 and Question number 19. See Appendix II for complete survey. 328 Ibid, Question number 20 and Question number 21.