Nehru, pp.67-l8Tl The Indian Quarterly Register, 1928, vol.i. pp.401 - p, 416-20; the Indian Quarterly Register,
176
Dominion Status, he said, wanted only an Indianisation of administration - the substitution of the brown in place of the white rulers, while retaining intact the existing politi cal, social and economic order. Independence stood, he
claimed, for a new state and a new society - democratic and socialistic. Indians could not, he feared, do away with land lords, princes and capitalists while maintaining the British connection. He also feared that though Dominion Status might give India a larger measure of political liberty, it would keep her economically tied with a thousand strings to British capitalism.
Jawaharlal considered the very idea of a vast and
ancient country like India remaining a Dominion of England to be ridiculous and humiliating. He did not believe in reforming, imperialism by entering into a partnership with it. The Brit ish Commonwealth, in spite of its high-sounding name, he
pointed out, did not stand for true international cooperation. It was an exclusive system whose membership would deprive
India of the freedom to develop contacts with the world at
large, especially with the other countries of Asia. He did notb stand for a narrow, isolated nationalism, but he felt that a true commonwealth of nations could not grow out of the
British Empire.
British foreign policy, especially as witnessed in Britain1s dealings with countries in the Middle East and with China, came in for severe criticism at the hands of Indian nationalists. Jawaharlal denounced Britain as the greatest
17 7]
enemy of national freedom* of. disarmament and peace throughout the world. One of his great objections. to Dominion Status was: that it would mean the involvement of India inj the reactionary foreign policy of Great Britain. As early as 1927-28 he had
started feeling that imperialism was preparing for a war. He believed that a firm and unequivocal declaration on the part of India that she would not allow her man power and resources to be exploited for waging an imperialist war might have a restraining influence on British policy. He attacked the Nehru Report for postulating a joint foreign policy for India and Great Britain.
Jawaharlal considered Great Britain to be 'the arch priest of imperialism1^* and India the pivot of her imperial policy. In order to retain her hold on India, Britain had sub
jugated the other parts of Africa and Asia. Indian soldiers
2
had been used to 'the dirty work of British imperialism*. The independence of India would be a death-blow to British imperialism and the signal for the liberation of other op pressed nationalities.
The idea that the Congress, having declared complete independence as its objective at Madras in 1927, should, as a matter of expediency, accept the ideal of Dominion Status was highly distasteful to Jawaharlal. He told his elders at the Calcutta Congress in December 1928 that if they were
‘prepared to pull down the flag of independence* they must 1. Dwivedi, op.cit. p.146.
17 Q
give him and men of his thinking 'the liberty to hold on to that flag*. 'This is a vital issue,1 he said, 'and we feel with regard to it that there can be no compromise. It is a matter with us of what we think is the honour of the country. ' And he warned that the issue might lead to a fratricidal
struggle similar to that which tore Ireland after the con clusion of the treaty of 1921, ^
Jawaharlal, however, always took care to emphasise that their struggle was directed not against England or the English people. 'Our quarrel,1 he said, 'is not with the people of England but with the imperialism of England. ' 'The day England sheds her imperialism, 1 he affirmed, 'we shall gladly cooperate with h e r . I n d i a could have no truck with British imperialism. Nor could she have *a real measure of freedom within the limits of the British Empire1.^ 'Before a new bridge is built,' he insisted, 'on the basis of friend ship and cooperation, the present chains which tie us to
England must be severed. Only then can real cooperation 5
take place.'
The Dominion-Status-versus-Independence controversy in 1928-29 was but a symptom of the deeper schism within the Congress. It was a conflict between age and youth within the
organisation. A wave of leftist ideas was rolling forward 1. The Indian Quarterly Register, 1928, vol.ii, pp.34-5* 2. Dwivedi, o-p.clt. p. 137*
3. Ibid, p.146. 4. Ibid. p.104. 5. Ibid. p.95.
17 9
in India. Youth Leagues, volunteer corps and Independence Leagues were being organised all over the country. The
Soviet Union, China, Turkey and Egypt attracted the younger men. More and more young Congressmen began to drift away from pure Gandhi-ism and call themselves socialists and com munists. Even secret revolutionary and terrorist societies
grew up. The communists exploited the industrial unrest in the country . The Congress old guard became, more than ever, anxious for a settlement with the Government. The Viceroy, Lord Irwin, had by the force of his character and the sin cerity and nobility of his utterances held out hope. It was encouraged by the remark of Ramsay MacDonald at the British Commonwealth Labour Conference on 2 July 1928: 'I hope that within a period of months rather than years there will be a new Dominion of another race, a Dominion which will find self-respect as an equal within the Commonwealth. I refer to India. Gandhi was not very happy with the young radicals within the Congress. In preference to Jawaharlal and Valla- bhbhai he put 'the crown of thorns' - the presidentship of the Congress - on the head of the elder Nehru, considering him to be an influence for conciliation - 'an eminently worthy ambassador of a nation that is in need of and is in the mood to take an honourable compromise'. 'Let the impat-
2
ient youth of the country wait a while,1 he remarked. When 'the impatient youth* threatened to reject the Dominion
1. The Indian Quarterly Register. 1928, vol.ii. p.293- 2. 'Crown of Thorns^, roung India, 26 July 192o,
180
Status ideal of the Nehru Report at the Calcutta Congress towards the end of December 1928, Gandhi used all his person al influence and persuasive skill in favour of that ideal. The radicals demanded that the Congress should start a cam paign of civil disobedience at once. Gandhi requested them to wait at least for two years. With great difficulty a oomprom- ise was arrived at: If Great Britain did not accept the Nehru Report by the end of 1929 the Congress would organise a cam paign of non-oooperation. Gandhi did his best to take the sting out of the ultimatum. He appealed to the authorities not to treat the resolution as a threat, but as an address.
'If there is the slightest trace of a change of heart of the Government they will understand it as the yearning of a
nation which is trying to throw off thraldom, 1 he remarked, fIf the Viceroy, 1 he added, 'is a worthy representative of his King and his nation, he will take note of this resolution even though it does not contain the clause which I should
2
have liked to be inserted,» Gandhi cancelled his proposed visit to Europe in 1929 and waited in faith and hope.
The Irwin Declaration
The Viceroy did not disappoint Gandhi. As 'a worthy representative of his King and his nation', he rightly under
stood his 'double duty', to see that the King's Government was carried on and to serve as an intermediary between India 1. The Indian Quarterly Register, 1928, vol.ii, p*42.
2. Ibid, p.43. Gandhi wanted a clause to be introduced into