Despite being camouflaged under a more ‘progressive’ language than it
previously was, Joppke and Rosenhek (2009) observe that the enduring preoccupation with ancestral ties in immigration and citizenship policies might
push certain migrants to ‘prove’ their ethnic affinity to the host nation. This has
arguably led to the occurrences in which ideas of ‘race’ as discussed above do not only relate to skin colour as such, but are also determined in the mind-sets of various social actors – whether more or less powerful – according to whether the
person in question can be said to possess the ‘adequate’ ancestral ties to a
particular nation. It must here be pointed out how the determination of who does
and who does not possess the ‘adequate’ ancestral ties in various contexts and in
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attributes of the individual in terms of his or her skin colour. Patricia Hill Collins (1998) demonstrates that popular beliefs about the nation-state have related to the
presumed common ‘blood lines’ amongst its members – or the supposed
primordial status of the nation-state – which more often than not have been established by state and other social actors in the host nation according to arbitrary physical attributes such as skin colour. Although references to a
‘primordial, biological status’ of the nation-state might seem tempting in the way
in which it can, in the imagination of some, presuppose the ‘natural’ and ‘self-
evident’ logic of blood lines and family ties, it is important to recognise that “[e]ven in its most stable ‘primordial’ forms, however, belonging is always a
dynamic process, not a reified fixity – the latter is only a naturalized construction
of a particular hegemonic form of power relations” (Yuval-Davis 2011a: 12,
inverted commas in original).
Pointing to the flawed legitimisation of ancestral, family or blood lines – or however a primordial status is defined – is not to deny the real consequences that the circulation of any undercurrents of such notions in British society can have, which in the present case undoubtedly put ‘non-white’ South Africans at a disadvantage versus white South Africans. Moreover, this does not tell the story in its entirety; there are also reasons to believe that there exist internal boundaries of ‘whiteness’ even within the white South African migrant group in the UK pertaining to whether or not they are seen as possessing the ‘sufficient’ ancestral ties to Britain. Specifically, it will be shown below that the more common presence of British ancestral ties amongst English-speaking than Afrikaans- speaking white South Africans, might put them at some advantage in their
negotiations of access to British territory and, in turn, the ‘British nation’.
Notwithstanding, it will be shown that even the possession of British ancestral ties amongst certain South Africans might not be deemed sufficient by some members of the host population, whom might still label them as ‘immigrants’ at the end of the day. This can reveal that even for relatively privileged white migrants with ancestral ties such as some white South Africans possess, boundaries of exclusion might in certain circumstance be erected by the host population in the currently restrictive immigration and citizenship policy environment in the UK.
To demonstrate first the ways and instances in which ancestral ties benefitted certain white South Africans, a point of departure is to consider the
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legal easiness that the proof of ancestral ties may grant. Although it was expressed by an applicant for British ancestral visa that the British immigration
officials “wanted a lot of documentation, like I had to have all the original birth certificates of my grandparents and my parents”, she also considered this process to be “very actually hassle-free, I didn’t expect it to be that easy” (Christina, 29,
white English-speaking, travel agent). If any significant problems presented themselves for applicants for a British ancestral visa – those with at least one grandparent of British nationality – the immigration process was, needless to say, even easier for those who arrived on a British passport. For example, James had acquired dual citizenship already upon birth – South African and British – as his British parents migrated to South Africa before he was born in South Africa. He therefore had visa-free access to the UK and did not have to go through any residency or citizenship tests. As he states, “in terms of legal status, it was pretty
simple. We didn’t even have to sign forms, it was, you just get on a plane and you join the British passport queue in Heathrow and walk in” (James, 26, white
English-speaking, researcher in the financial sector). The visa-free access also enabled James to arrive in the UK at a convenient time in that his parents came with him when he was 16 and still young enough to get into the later stages of the British education system, arguably equipping him with a competitive edge in the labour market. Below, James reflects on the consequences of this strategic move – arguably facilitated by his British family ties – on his sense of belonging in British society:
I have moved to London and had different jobs … I also think time makes you get used to all. So the thing that I miss about South Africa, which was quite painful when I left, that pain numbs off for a while. And of course there are things I miss about South Africa, but those have been replaced by other things over time. (James, 26, white English-speaking, researcher in the financial sector)
This quote shows that the length of residency – 10 years in his case – has helped James settle in and generate a sense of belonging to British society, in addition to his lingering attachments to South Africa. Dora Kostakopoulou (2010) demonstrates that migrant incorporation usually takes place as migrants go on with their everyday lives and become enmeshed in the social life of the host society in various ways by developing interdependent relationships with others.
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This process should therefore be recognised by politicians, argues Kostakopoulou,
as migrants’ ability to incorporate themselves in the host society is not necessarily
a lengthy process unless, of course, they are being prevented from initiating and
pursuing this process by the host society’s legal structures. Hence, the British nationality of James’ parents that had granted him status as a British citizen long
before he had set foot in the UK, may have enabled him to devote more time and energy on settling in to British society, rather than having to deal with the potential obstacles and anxieties of migration law procedures. Although James’ account might somewhat exaggerate the significance of immigration/citizenship policies in facilitating or preventing a sense of belonging to British society, it can at the very least demonstrate how the first hurdle to the development of a certain sense of belonging – in the form of legal obstacles – can be more easily surpassed by some white South Africans than others. Perhaps to a certain extent, the differential access to visas and passports could also create some friction between South Africans in the UK:
I think it’s not a harsh resentment, but it’s with South Africans here, when you’ve got an easy passport. I mean, a lot of South Africans can’t afford
the passport, they have to work very hard to get it. It gets very expensive for them to always keep renewing their visas and that sort of thing. So,
y’know, I think that they get quite envious. (Mario, 31, white English-
speaking, accountant for an investment bank)
Although some possess sufficient ancestral ties to Britain or another EU/EEA country granting them legal access to the UK, it is important to note the additional challenge that might present itself for Afrikaans-speaking white South Africans – let alone for most ‘non-white’ South Africans – by way of not usually having the same immediate ancestral ties to Britain like a number of English- speaking white South Africans. This would normally put them at a disadvantage, unless they of course can gain relatively easy access by being in possession of the
right qualifications that generate them enough ‘points’ through the stipulations of
the points-based migration system. It appeared that for at least a few of my participants without immediate British ancestral ties, it had taken up a lot of time and energy to prepare the right documents and to argue their case for their legal access to British territory. For a white Afrikaner respondent arriving in the UK as late as in 2008 (Jacob, 27, health and safety employee), his initial difficulties with
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the visa application surfaced prominently in his account, as well as a strong feeling of resentment to the entire migration system. He did eventually manage to extend his stay in the UK on a spousal visa as a cohabitant to a white South African with British ancestral ties, but the amount of paperwork which had to be prepared to prove that she was his cohabitant, and that he was not just claiming so to get access to the UK, was clearly stressful for him. The inference that we can make here is that because the person that this particular participant had gained his visa through was not seen to be of his ‘blood’ – by virtue of ‘only’ being his co- habitant – this very relationship status probably resulted in an added layer of scepticism on the part of the British migration authorities (Hill Collins 1998).
The issue cannot be approached thoroughly enough by only considering the potential legal obstacles, as these might intersect with the adverse reception
that some South Africans without the ‘adequate’ British ancestry can receive in
British society, even if white. We should not ignore the potentially damaging effect on a sense of belonging to Britain that can be attributed to the stereotypes that are aimed at white South Africans who are without, or are believed to be without, British ancestral ties. I believe that this issue can be best approached by considering the circumstances under which Afrikaner white South Africans – by lacking the same type of assumed connectivity to Britain – are more easily subjected to cultural stereotypes than their English-speaking white South African peers. The potentially adverse treatment of Afrikaans- as opposed to English- speaking white South Africans might be prevalent despite the fact that, contrary to the typical pattern, there are still certain members of the former group who very well may possess close ancestral ties to Britain, while at the same time certain members of the latter group would lack such ties.
A common theme running through my various interviews with both groups of white South Africans was that Afrikaner white South Africans often
were constructed as ‘masculine subjects’. Related to this was the assumption by a
white English-speaking female on a British ancestral visa that “the South African
culture is still very, very masculine” (Felicia, 30, web developer). The participant may here be pointing to the legacy of the apartheid state and the manner in which it was highly patriarchal in its orientation and, as a consequence, constructed
‘masculine subjects’. A specialist on the apartheid history writes that “[t]he apartheid state’s response to objectors drew from constructions of hegemonic
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white masculinity in South Africa and from powerful cultural discourses that
defined white nationalism in virile, militaristic and defiant terms” (Conway 2007:
427). Due to the pervasive influence that the apartheid regime had in South Africa, the above-participant was willing to admit that the notion of South
Africans as being ‘masculine subjects’ could apply to all South Africans irrespective of their ‘racial’ or ethnic background.
With regard to white South Africans, however, it must be noted how the participant particularly referred to the alleged ‘masculine’ or even ‘aggressive’ behaviour of some Afrikaner men. The implication when they migrate to the UK, as evidenced from my interview data, is that white Afrikaner South Africans are typically being labelled as more ‘racist’ than English-speaking white South Africans. People falling into the latter category may also on some occasions be associated with the apartheid regime simply by virtue of being white South Africans, but the interview data indicated that they seemingly had the benefit of
being portrayed as somewhat more ‘liberal’ and ‘tolerant’ than their Afrikaner
counterparts. As stated by the above-quoted English-speaking white South African, “I think it’s probably even worse for Afrikaans white South Africans,
cause I think they’re immediately judged to be racist and ignorant … luckily as an
English white South African, we are thought of as more the liberals” (Felicia, 30, web developer). Such notions have been given credence by the fact that the rulers of the apartheid government mainly consisted of people with Afrikaans background – even though, of course, it must be stressed here that the main fault line during apartheid was drawn between white and ‘non-white’ people and that white people in general were privileged vis-à-vis ‘non-white’ people (Neocosmos 2006).
The implicit assumption amongst some people that Afrikaners are less liberal than English-speaking white South Africans, clearly troubled the following white South African respondent with Afrikaner origins and no immediate ancestral ties to Britain:
So yeah, being Afrikaans is quite different to being a normal English person. Afrikaans people are quite proud of their heritage. I know a lot of
people who are like ‘the Afrikaans and apartheid’ and all that stuff, but it’s
not really about that. Anyone should be proud of what their ancestors were or did, the heritage at the end of the day. And most Afrikaans South Africans, a lot of them are labelled in a bad light, especially with the
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whole racism thing and stuff like that. I think it’s just each to one own
really. If I’m proud of it, then you shouldn’t really look down on me for being proud of my heritage. If you’re English or British or whatever, you
gonna be proud of that. (Jacob, 27, white Afrikaans-speaking, health and safety employee)
That some people automatically and uncritically associated being an Afrikaner with being a racist and sympathiser with the apartheid regime, saddened Jacob as he felt that he should be allowed to be proud of his heritage. Although his affinity with his Afrikaner heritage may have been challenged by some people, it seemed obvious that he was determined not to let any such assumptions disrupt or alter his attachments. What this seems to suggest is that ethnic attachments can become
more urgent for some if they are “threatened in some way” (Yuval-Davis 2011a:
10). The perceived threat articulated by Jacob derives from many years of tension between English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking groups in South Africa (see Cornell and Hartmann 2007:135-146 for a historical overview). Although respondents were frequently keen to label the resentment that existed between Afrikaner and English-speaking white South Africans in the UK as only minor, and that their common identity as South Africans was more important in a
‘foreign’ environment, we can nevertheless suspect that the tension between the two groups has heightened in Jacob’s view after facing the possible anxieties of
relocating from South Africa to the UK. This may specifically be the case since he possesses no immediate British ancestral ties, as supposed to a number of English-speaking white South Africans in particular. Indeed, he legitimates his own ethnic pride by going on to suggest that he would also expect ‘English’ or
‘British’ people13 – however he defines them – to be proud of ‘their’ alleged
ethnic attachments. By stating it as such, this participant is perhaps attempting to reassure that even though he feels strongly about his ‘own’ heritage, he expects English/British people to be proud of ‘their’ heritage too. In this sense, he signals that he is not intending to threaten English/British people’s presumed identity in any way, despite the persistence of his strong Afrikaner attachments.
13
Showing also the uncritical equation that is often being made between ‘English’ and ‘British’ people, despite the three other nationalities than England that Britain also constitutes (Skey 2011).
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What comes to mind here is therefore Chris Rojek’s (2007) theoretical distinction between ‘nationalism light’ and ‘nationalism strong’. The former refers to the way in which people feel attachments to a nation through
‘instrumental’ needs or as part of their life choices. This would possibly relate to Jacob’s comfort of being in British society and, thus, the expression of his
appreciation of the presumed identity of English/British people in order to minimise the perceived conflict caused by his own presence and different identity.
This ‘nationalism light’, however, can develop alongside his ‘nationalism strong’
in terms of his white Afrikaner identity, which is arguably more deeply felt and
would in this case seem to represent a form of emotional attachment that “requires
individuals and groups to be ready to sacrifice tooth and claw for the [Afrikaner]
nation” (Rojek 2007: 206).
In light of the strong emotional attachment in terms of their ancestry that
was, in fact, evident in most of my Afrikaner participants’ accounts, it is
undeniable that some white Afrikaner South African men may hold certain views due to the particular structural circumstances that they have been previously exposed to. Nonetheless, we should pause for a second and refrain from the lure of reconstructing the common notion about them as inevitably racist (Gallagher 1999; Garner 2006). An intersectional sensitivity could help us to discover and
explain how notions about white Afrikaner South Africans as more ‘masculine’ and ‘racists’ were indeed initiated – stretching back in time even before the
apartheid era – by the intersection of ethnic and class differences between the two main groups of white South Africans. Cornell and Hartmann (2007: 135-146) demonstrate that it was not inevitable that the main division line was to be drawn
between ‘whites’ and ‘non-whites’ in apartheid South Africa, as it might as well
have been based on the class differences that historically have persisted between the two groups of white South Africans. Briefly put, as the Afrikaner colonisers pursued a life style oriented around self-sufficiency and farming, they were put at a disadvantage with the changes in agriculture and the industrialisation of the economy initiated by the British colonisers in the early twentieth century. This forced Afrikaners to migrate to the cities to find employment as ‘unskilled’ workers. For their part, white South Africans with British connections were, in general, wealthier as they already dominated trade and commerce in the cities. Disguised in this privileged position, a number of them were able to claim part as
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representatives of the British Empire and take up the position as, supposedly,
‘noble liberals’ responsible for the development of South Africa (Cornell and