SISTEMA DE PATIOS

Heidegger’s foundationalist approach is very different from the para-foundationalist one: as we have seen, the former is a consistent theory and it uses a consistent foundational element (BeingMET) while the latter is an inconsistent theory and it uses an inconsis-

tent foundational element (BeyngMET). However, these two grounding theories have

something in common. Both of them take the foundational element (BeingMET and

BeyngMET) to be what determines entities as entities. Nevertheless, as we have already

seen in both chapter 1 and chapter 2, in the very late period of Heidegger’s philosophy, he starts to characterize the foundational element in a slightly different way, equating

BeyngMET with being self-identical. Let’s recall that, in his Identity and difference (1957a), Heidegger claims that all entities are entities in virtue of the fact that “each entity is itself” (Heidegger, 1957a, p.28). Now, BeyngMET (interpreted as being self-

identical) still determines entities as entities because all entities are entities in virtue of

the fact that they are exactly what they are. Any entity is that specific and unique entity that is: the reason for an entity to be an entity is itsbeing identical to itself. However, if

we work with this new understanding ofBeyngMET, we have a new (and more extreme)

form of para-foundationalism. Let’s see why.

First of all, if BeyngMET determines all entities as entities, and if BeyngMET is

being self-identical, since all entities are entities, all entities are self-identical. Secondly,

according to the inconsistent account of the foundational element, since BeyngMET is an entity and not an entity, BeyngMET is self-identical and not. Moreover, be- cause in Heidegger’s metaphysics, everything is an entity only, with the exception of

BeyngMET(which is an entity and not), everything is self-identicalonly with the excep- tion ofBeyngMET (which is self-identical and not). Now, given this framework, all the structural properties previously attributed to para-foundationalism hold. BeyngMET grounds all entities and, because BeyngMET itself is not an entity, it is ungrounded.

From here,[AR]holds. [AS]holds as well because, if all entities depend onBeyngMET andBeyngMETdoes not depend on any entity (not even on itself), no elements depend on each other. However, since BeyngMET is also an entity, BeyngMET depends on itself and, thus, both [¬AR] and [¬AS] hold too. Finally, [¬E] holds because, since BeyngMETis not an entity and it is ungrounded, something (namelyBeyngMET) does not depend on anything else. In other words, the negation ofExtendabilityholds because,

sinceBeyngMET is ungrounded, it is not the case that everything depends on anything else. Indeed,BeyngMET itself does not.

Until here, everything is exactly the same as in the para-foundationalist case previ- ously described. However, if we look carefully at the definition of [E], we will see that, whenBeyngMETis understood as a synonym ofbeing self identical, this structural prop- erty holds as well. So, consider [E], which is defined in the following way:

[E]:∀x∃y(y≠x∧x→y).

Now, this structural property says that everything depends on something else. It is important to underline that, according to [E], all entities depend on something which is not themselves (and this is guaranteed by the first conjunct of the formula, that is

y≠x). Exactly for this reason, in both foundationalism and para-foundationalism, the

negation of [E]holds. According to foundationalism, BeingMET is simply ungrounded and this means that it is not the case that everything depends on something else. Indeed,

BeingMET does not. According to para-foundationalism, the negation of [E]holds be- causeBeyngMETis both ungrounded and self-grounded. This means that it is still not the case that everything depends on something else. In other words, BeyngMET does not depend on anything else (in virtue of itsbeing ungrounded) and it depends on itself (in

virtue of itsbeing self-grounded). In both cases, the negation of [E]holds because there is something that does not depend on anything else, namelyBeyngMET. However, the

situation changes if BeyngMET (or what determines entities as entities) is interpreted as being self-identical. In this case, BeyngMET itself is self-identical (because it is an entity) and not-self-identical (because it is not an entity). Now, on the one hand, since

BeyngMETis self-identical, the negation of [E]holds; even thoughBeyngMETdepends on itself, it is not true that everything depends on something else. On the other hand, sinceBeyngMETis not self-identical as well,[E]holds. From the factBeyngMETis not

self-identical, it follows that BeyngMET grounds something other than itself. In other words, ifBeyngMET is self-identical (as in the case of Heidegger’s foundationalism and the previous version of para-foundationalism), extendability does not hold because the

first conjunct of the formula for [E] (namely y ≠ x) is not satisfied. On the contrary,

if BeyngMET is both self-identical and not self-identical (as discussed in the present Section), the first conjunct of the formula for [E] is both satisfied and not. Therefore, both [E]and[¬E] hold.

Let’s sum up. On the one hand, when the foundational element (BeyngMET)

is just characterized as what determines entities as entities, we have a form of para- foundationalism in which [AR] and its negation, and [AS] and its negation, hold. Moreover, [E] holds but not [¬E]. On the other hand, when the foundational element

(BeyngMET) is understood asbeing self-identical, we have a particularly extreme form

of para-foundationalism. Such a new form is stronger than the previous one for two main reasons. First of all, it has more inconsistent structural features: beside the features of the previous version of para-foundationalism, it has also the structural property[E]and its negation. Secondly, it is more radical than the previous form of para-foundationalism because it is inconsistent on that specific structural property, namely[E], the negation of which was meant to characterize all forms of foundationalism.3 _{This second form of para-} foundationalism shows that all forms of foundationalism do not have [E], even though, in some extreme forms, both[E]and its negation hold. Finally, from both forms of para- foundationalism also follows a new consideration about Heidegger’s account of (PSR). In the case of BeingMET , Heidegger has correctly claimed that (PSR) cannot unrestrict- edly hold. As we have seen, if we interpret the principle ‘nothing is without a reason’ as ‘nothing is without a ground’, there is, at least an element, namely BeingMET, for

which (PSR) does not hold: indeed, BeingMET is ungrounded. BeingMET is without any reason. However, according to both forms of para-foundationalism, this is not the case anymore. As we have seen, sinceBeyngMETis inconsistent, it is both ungrounded and self-grounded. On the one hand, because BeyngMET is ungrounded, it is without any reason. Therefore, (PSR) fails. On the other hand, becauseBeyngMETis grounded (or, more precisely, self-grounded), it has a reason (namely itself). Since all entities

3

This is true because if we have the structural property[E], it follows that it is impossible to have

foundational elements. Since foundationalism is characterized as the view according to which there are

are grounded inBeyngMETandBeyngMETis both ungrounded and self-grounded, all entities have a reason in BeyngMET, and BeyngMET has its reason in itself. Even though something (namely BeyngMET) both has a reason and not, it is still true that

everything has a reason. Therefore, (PSR) holds.