Essentially, while the origin and meaning of democracy are still the subjects of debate among scholars, yet, its various (democracy) forms and models are contributory factors to the several challenges underpinning the understanding of democracy as a system of administering modern states. Pinkney (2003) has listed a fivefold classification of democracy which includes: radical democracy, guided democracy, liberal democracy, socialist democracy and consociation democracy. He defines Radical Democracy as a situation in which society is seen as an aggregation of undifferentiated individuals, and the democratic ideal is for the individuals to exercise their rights and protect their interests as active participants in the political arena (Pinkney, 2003: 10). Examples, he noted, can be found in Ghana, under Kwame Nkrumah, and in Guinea, under Ahmed Sekou Toure. Guided Democracy, on the other hand, is a society that is seen as an organic whole with common interests and leaders who claim to know what constitutes the interests of the general public (the will). Citizens only enjoy equality, whether politically or economically, to the extent
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that their rulers deem this desirable. Kenya, Tanzania, Brazil, Indonesia, China, India, and Pakistan provide a variety of this system. He also noted that colonial rule might be regarded as guided democracy. In Liberal democracy, the society is seen as an aggregation of diverse citizens acting as both individuals and members of groups.
The state exists as a referee to ensure the representation and protection of diverse interests. Inequalities are perpetuated under this system as inherited wealth is allowed (Pinkney 2003: 12). This is mostly found in the Western and the advanced countries of the world. In fact, Kuper (2004: 1) puts it in a correct perspective when, he notes that liberalism and modern democracy are now the most widely accepted forms of official justification for political rule. In Socialist Democracy, society is seen as an organic whole with common interests and the state exists to allow for an even distribution of wealth and resources. Kuper (2004: 13) argued that examples are found in Nicaragua and Tanzania. In Consociation democracy, society is seen as being a culturally diverse country. Kenya and Nigeria are often cited as examples of this kind of democratic system, simply because of the heterogeneous population of these states.
The state exists not to promote any utopian ideal, such as socialism, the will of the majority, or the general will, but to act as a referee in the process of intergroup conflict. Citizens’ participation in politics will mainly be on a regional basis. Immobilisation is a major problem of this system, with political change moving at the slowest pace. This system, he notes, encourages the emergence of a ‘few privileged’ people, thus promoting a political system that reinforces cultural divisions. Minorities may have some measure of influence, and this is a basic pre-requisite of this type of democracy with well-established institutions and procedures, a spirit of compromise, and an overarching sense of national loyalty. Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland have this type in Europe. This study believes that it is the lack of these requirements in Kenya and Nigeria that has left them with a loose marriage of convenience, rather than with a durable form of democracy.
It is the contention of this study that experience with Liberal Democracy in the last two decades in nearly all of the African states has revealed the emergence of a formal/electoral system with nothing to show for the agitation for real democracy. As Pinkney correctly observes:
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The justification for democracy has never been, simply, that it offers a better means of material advancement, but unless it can give voters something in return for their votes, no amount of philosophical argument about liberty, human rights or political choice will ensure its survival. That is the challenge facing both Third World governments and Western governments that proclaim a belief in democracy.
To address this challenge, Held (2006: 304-305) advocated the concept of the cosmopolitan model of democracy that would establish an overarching network of democratic public fora covering cities, nation-states, regions, and the wider trans-national order. Such an arrangement, this researcher believes, will further undermine and worsen the ‘cosmetic’ democratic governments in Africa. Africa must be allowed to work out a model of government that suits its peculiar needs. As Pinkney (2003:2) puts it aptly:
The West enjoyed the right preconditions, such as material prosperity, urbanization, cultures that encouraged tolerance and participation, and political institutions that had developed accepted ways of resolving conflicts. Third World countries lacked most of these preconditions and were, therefore, much less likely to be able to establish or maintain democratic political structures.
Moreover, an ideal of the cosmopolitan model of democracy is not likely to produce even results if one takes into consideration the fact that the unit of analysis in the West is based on individuals, while the unit of analysis in the Africa context, is still based on community. Nyamnoh (2005: 17) argued that the conventional notions of liberal democracy that focus on individual and citizens are not appropriate in an African context. More importantly, most Third World countries have not enjoyed the economic development and the civic cultural virtues that promotes democracy in advanced countries of the World (Pinkney 2003). This researcher’s perspective tallies with the argument of Pinkney, that the sequences of development that are conducive to democracy in the West have not generally occurred in the Third World, and the developmental crises have, frequently, crowded in on one another over a short period of time (Ibid: 37). Indeed, Schmitter and Karl (2009: 13-14) offer what democracy is not:
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1. Democracies are not, necessarily, more efficient economically than other forms of government.
2. Second, democracies are not, necessarily, more efficient administratively. The decision-making process is sometimes slower and the cost of getting things done may be higher than in the regime they replace.
3. Third, democracies are not likely to appear more orderly, consensual, stable or governable than the autocracies they replace.
4. Finally, democracies do not, necessarily, lead to the opening of more economic opportunities.
They concluded that the notions of economic liberty that are currently put forward in neo-liberal economic models are not synonymous with political freedom, and may even impede it. Accordingly, they stress that what democracies can do more than other systems is to have the “capacity to modify rules and institutions consensually in response to changing circumstances” (Schmitter and Karl, 2009: 14-15).
Scholars are also sharply divided on the impact of democracy on economic development. Pastor (1999),) noted that based on the results of a survey carried out in 100 countries in the 1990s democracy performs better, economically, than dictatorship. He insisted that “democratic regimes grew seven-tenths of one percent faster than their non-democratic counterparts”. More established democracies in the developing world outperformed both new democracies and authoritarian governments.
Pastor (1999: 137) asserted that on the margin, and in the long term, democracies do better economically. However, Sen (2009: 310) also faulted the claim that non-democratic systems are better at bringing about economic development. She noted that the high economic growth of Singapore or China cannot be taken as “definite proof” that authoritarianism does better in promoting economic growth, nor is the economic growth recorded in Botswana under a democratic
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regime an indication that democracy works better economically. Sen (2009: 310-311) concluded with a word of caution:
There is, in fact, no convincing general evidence that authoritarian governance and the suppression of political and civil rights are really beneficial to economic development. Indeed, the general statistical picture does not permit any such induction… If all comparative studies are viewed together, the hypothesis that there is no clear relation between economic growth and democracy in either direction remains extremely plausible.
Sen (2009: 319) argued that what democracy offers includes its intrinsic importance in the human, instrumental role of generating political incentives and a constructive function in the formation of values. It therefore means that there is the need for more multi-country surveying before an accurate evaluation can be reached on the impact of democracy on economic development. The unrelated link between democracy and economic development can be further explained, since most European countries were under democratic rule when they were hit by the “suffocating economic recession” of the 1930s and that of 2008.
In-spite of the fact that there was no convincing evidence to support the impact of democracy on economic growth, the International Financial Institutions, represented by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have tied the granting of aid to developing countries to the installation of democracy. “Since 1991, the EU had insisted on ‘a democracy clause’, in each trade agreement with a Third World government”, (Pastor, 1999: 136). Moreover, debates are ongoing on the economics of democracy and corruption. There are two schools of thought on this issue. Some suggests that democracies will not deter corruption but will actually promote it (Shleifer & Vishny 1998:4) while others believe that democracies with an independent/free press will deter corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, Ades & Di Tella, 1997: 497-499; Treisman, 2000:1; Norris, 2006: 11). Chowdhury, (2004: 27), in particular, noted that “democracy and press freedom can play an instrumental role in making a country less corrupt. Sen (1999: 38-40) supports this school of thought, but with a word of caution. She notes that democracy may be a solution to the economic and political challenges of a state.
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In view of the problems associated with democracy in Africa, such as corruption, ineffective leadership, political instability, as well as the growing decline in the economic prospects of most nations, it may well suit Africans to consider governing themselves through a “Trusteeship form of Government”, which will be devoid of the excessive wastage of public funds that are usually spent for the conduct of the Western type of elections. Moreover, the money saved through this means can then be channelled for developmental purposes, which are begging for attention on the continent (Kuper, 2008).