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2. MARCO DE REFERENCIA

2.1 MARCO TEÓRICO CONCEPTUAL

2.1.3 Sistema de vigilancia

3-141. An intelligence discipline is a well-defined area of intelligence collection, processing, exploitation, and reporting using a specific category of technical or human resources (JP 1-02). HUMINT is one of these disciplines. The following discussion addresses COIN-specific considerations for other selected intelli- gence disciplines and information types. Because of their importance to COIN, counterintelligence is cov- ered separately in section IV and all-source analysis in section V.

S

IGNALS

I

NTELLIGENCE

3-142. In conventional environments, signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection is a good source for de- termining enemy locations, intentions, capabilities, and morale. The same applies in COIN operations. SIGINT is often helpful for confirming or denying HUMINT reporting and may be the primary source of intelligence in areas under insurgent control. Pushing SIGINT collection platforms down to tactical units can therefore improve intelligence collection.

O

PEN

-S

OURCE

I

NTELLIGENCE

3-143. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) is valuable for understanding the operational environment. It is often more useful than any other discipline for understanding public attitudes and public support for insur- gents and counterinsurgents. OSINT is also an important means of determining the effectiveness of IO. Monitoring a wide variety of media in multiple languages benefits the COIN effort. If possible, monitoring should occur at every echelon with collection requirements. Each echelon should monitor the media that contain information relevant to operations at that echelon. For instance, reporting by major news networks often matters a lot at the combatant command level; in contrast, local newspapers or radio stations may be more important to tactical units.

I

MAGERY

I

NTELLIGENCE

3-144. In COIN operations, imagery intelligence (IMINT) platforms may be used for surveillance of likely insurgent safe houses and other facilities. Further, aerial IMINT platforms are also effective at de- tecting unusual personnel and supply movements. This information can help commanders determine where best to interdict insurgent lines of communications.

3-145. Static imagery, such as aerial photos of facilities, is useful for detecting long-term changes in structures or activities.

3-146. Real-time video, often from aerial surveillance platforms, is critical to assessing whether particular locations are likely sites of insurgent activity. This capability may also be used to track insurgents during

operations. If flown high enough that insurgents cannot hear the platform, real-time video provides surveil- lance in areas where it is difficult or impossible to use observation posts.

T

ECHNICAL

I

NTELLIGENCE

3-147. Insurgents often adapt their tactics, techniques, and procedures rapidly. Technical intelligence on insurgent equipment can help understand insurgent capabilities. These may include how insurgents are us- ing improvised explosive devices, homemade mortars, and other pieces of customized military equipment.

M

EASUREMENT AND

S

IGNATURES

I

NTELLIGENCE

3-148. Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) sensors can provide remote monitoring of ave- nues of approach or border regions for smugglers or insurgents. They can also be used to locate insurgent safe havens and cache sites and determining insurgent activities and capabilities. MASINT can also con- tribute to targeting.

G

EOSPATIAL

I

NTELLIGENCE

3-149. Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial in- formation to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth. GEOINT consists of imagery, IMINT, and geospatial information. GEOINT may have some benefit for identifying smuggling routes and safe havens. Imagery can be very beneficial to operations in urban areas as well. It can help identify structures of interest and aid urban terrain navigation. (Paragraphs B-5 through B-9 contain more GEOINT-related information.)

I

NTELLIGENCE

-R

ELATED

A

CTIVITIES

3-150. There are several activities and information sources important to COIN that are not intelligence disciplines but are related to them. Chief among these are target exploitation (TAREX), document exploita- tion (DOCEX), property ownership records, and financial records.

Target Exploitation and Document Exploitation

3-151. Documents and pocket litter, as well as information found in computers and cell phones, can pro- vide critical information that analysts need to evaluate insurgent organizations, capabilities, and intentions. TAREX and DOCEX are also of great benefit to HUMINT collectors in substantiating what detainees know and whether they are telling the truth.

3-152. TAREX in a COIN environment is like evidence collection in a law enforcement environment. Procedures that ensure captured equipment and documents are tracked accurately and attached to the cor- rect insurgents is necessary. Evidence needs to be enough to justify using operational resources to appre- hend the individuals in question; however, it does not necessarily need be enough to convict in a court of law. Pushing HUMINT or law enforcement personnel to the battalion level and below can improve TAREX and DOCEX by tactical units. Procedures for ensuring that tactical units get the results of higher level TAREX and DOCEX are also important. Units must be able to receive intelligence collected from the documents, equipment, and personnel they capture in enough time to exploit it.

Property Ownership Records

3-153. Property ownership records include census records, deeds, and other means of determining owner- ship of land and buildings. They help counterinsurgents to determine who should or should not be living in a specific area and help them secure the populace. In some cases, it may be necessary for Soldiers and Ma- rines to go door to door and collect census data themselves.

Financial Records

3-154. Information gathered on sources of insurgent funding can be very helpful to the COIN effort. Col- lection of financial records often requires help from agencies like the Department of the Treasury and fi- nancial institutions. It may also require analyzing criminal activities or traditional means of currency trans- fer.

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