Sistema de dos componentes GacA/GacS

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Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

Globally, many millions of people are displaced by infrastructure development each year.² Displacement occurs directly and indirectly through urbanisation, construction of roads, bridges, mines, and hydropower schemes.³ Recently, displacement is also occurring through other processes which restrict access to land, such as forest protection and conservation.⁴ Since the 1980s, multilateral development banks have required borrowing governments to comply with “safeguards” and prepare resettlement plans to assist people negatively affected by their projects. Yet, the effectiveness of these resettlement safeguards has been the source of conflict between civil society groups and project financiers for many decades.⁵ These conflicts have been particularly acute in countries where there are few local protections otherwise available for communities at risk of displacement.⁶

Multilateral development banks, such as the World Bank, are under increasing pressure to reduce the negative community impacts of resettlement, without placing undue burdens on the governments of borrowing countries.⁷ Since 2012, the World Bank has been undertaking a multi-country consultation process to both improve its involuntary resettlement policy and to develop a more straight-forward safeguards system in response to borrower demands.⁸ Policy-makers around the world are watching the outcomes of these negotiations with interest, especially as resettlement is being proposed as a potential climate change adaptation measure for populations in vulnerable locations.⁹ The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change has signalled that resettlement may be an adaptation option

2 Accurately accessing the numbers of people displaced by development and infrastructure projects is very difficult and the data available is not reliable, see Chapter 2; Also see: McDowell & Morrell (2010, p. 37); Oliver-Smith (2010, p. 12).

3 See generally: McDowell & Morell (2010); Scudder (2012); Oliver-Smith (2009).

4 McDowell & Morell (2010); Vandergeest, Bose & Idahosa (2007); Agrawal & Redford (2009); Cernea & Schmidt-Soltau (2006); De Sherbinin, Castro, Gemenne, Cernea, Adamo, Fearnside, Krieger, Lahmani, Oliver-Smith & Pankhurst (2011).

5 See: Oliver-Smith (2010).

6 This argument is developed throughout the thesis. See Chapters 2 and 4.

7 Von Bernstorff & Dann (2013, p. 7).

8 The consultation began in 2012 and was intended to be a two year consultation, but is still ongoing. For details of the review see: World Bank (2015e).

9 Ferris (2012); De Sherbinin, Castro, Gemenne, Cernea, Adamo, Fearnside, Krieger, Lahmani, Oliver-Smith & Pankhurst (2011);

32 for communities exposed to climate change, renewing demand for understanding “best practices” and the safeguards which might be most effective.¹⁰ While refugee resettlement involves different processes again, large influxes of refugees in recent years have also intensified concerns about how to re-establish livelihoods and cohesive communities in new settings.¹¹

Drawing on the ADB co-financed railway project in Cambodia as a case study, this thesis explores contemporary tensions shaping the implementation of resettlement safeguards in a country where domestic legal protections are not well established. It explores how communities and advocates used creative strategies to influence the outcomes of the resettlement scheme, resulting in improvements in the resettlement sites over the eight years of the project. It also considers the experience of people who were not provided with the option of relocation and investigates the changing social dynamics of these communities as the project evolved. The findings of the study are based on in-depth interviews with community members in five locations in Cambodia (Pursat, Poipet, Sihanoukville, Phnom Penh and Battambang), and with NGOs and financiers in multiple locations where decisions were being made in relation to the project and where safeguards policies were being generated (Phnom Penh, Australia and Washington D.C.).

This introduction first provides a brief background to understand resettlement safeguards in the context of development and infrastructure projects. It then introduces the railway case study, before explaining the questions guiding the research and the structure of the thesis.

1.2 Safeguards and development-induced displacement

Resettlement schemes for infrastructure projects have a long history of negatively impacting people who are relocated.¹² Early studies in Africa and Latin America in the 1960s describe how resettlement created multi-dimensional types of stress on households relating to anxiety about the resettlement process, abrupt shifts and loss of livelihood opportunities, physiological and health effects as well as socio-cultural stress relating to loss of place and loss of control.¹³ Often poorly timed and implemented external assistance exacerbated the

10 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2011).

11 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2015b, p. 10).

12 Colson (1971); Scudder (1962, 1993, 2005, 2012); Chambers (1970); Hansen & Oliver-Smith (1982); Oberai (1988);

Cernea (1986).

13 Colson (1971); Scudder (1962, 1993).

33 stress of relocation, disproportionately impacting vulnerable members, especially older people and children.¹⁴

In response to concerns about the treatment of resettled people and pressure from advocacy groups throughout the 1970s-80s, multilateral development banks such as the World Bank and ADB, introduced safeguard policies into their internal operations aimed at preventing or mitigating undue harm to people and the environment. Safeguards require certain processes to be followed where there is a risk that an investment will have detrimental impacts on affected populations.¹⁵ The World Bank was the first institution to introduce an Involuntary Resettlement Policy in 1980. The policy influenced other multilateral agencies to adopt similar models, including the ADB, Inter-American Development Bank, the African Development Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.¹⁶ The involuntary resettlement policies of the World Bank and the ADB mandate that involuntary resettlement should be avoided, or minimised, wherever possible exploring all viable alternative project designs.¹⁷ Where it is not possible to avoid resettlement, then displaced persons are to be assisted in their efforts to improve their livelihoods and standards of living, or at least to restore them to pre-displacement levels. Both policies require displacement to be minimised, compensation to be provided and livelihoods to be re-established so that affected households are not adversely affected by resettlement. Detailed resettlement plans must be prepared, including inventories of losses and livelihood baselines. Monitoring processes are also required. These standards are not limited to people being relocated. They also apply to people who have lost access to land on which their livelihoods rely, such as loss of access to forests, farmlands, water bodies or other income-generating resources.¹⁸

To provide a forum to enforce these safeguards, the World Bank established the Inspection Panel in 1993, which enables project-affected people to make complaints directly to the Bank to seek compliance with the safeguards.¹⁹ The ADB followed suit in 1995 and

14 Scudder (1993).

15 Cernea & Mathur (2011).

16 Cernea & Mathur (2011). For an analysis of the influence of the World Bank, see: Park (2014).

17 World Bank (2001); Asian Development Bank (2009b). Note that the World Bank policies are under review, and both banks are piloting various alternative models, such as the “Country Systems” approach, as explored in Chapter 2 and 8.

18 World Bank (2001); Asian Development Bank (2009b). Specific safeguards were also introduced to protect against a range of other impacts, especially protections for the environment and indigenous people.

19 Bissell & Nanwani (2009).

34 established an Inspection Function which became its Accountability Mechanism in 2003, consisting of the Office of the Special Project Facilitator (OSPF) and the Compliance Review Panel (CRP).²⁰ These mechanisms are often called “community-driven” or “citizen-driven” accountability mechanisms, because while they may have various shortcomings, in theory, they provide a forum to enable project-affected people to make complaints directly, or through a local representative.²¹ In exceptional circumstances an international organisation (i.e. an advocacy NGO) acting as an agent for the affected persons may make a complaint. In practice, however, project-affected people are often represented by local or international agents (NGOs), as was the case with the Cambodian railway. These grievance mechanisms are particularly crucial in places where people experience limited protections through their own country’s legal systems, as is the case in Cambodia.²²

Cambodia’s social protection system is among the least developed in the Asia Pacific, meaning that there are very limited formal supports or government safety nets available to people experiencing hardship. ²³ Legal protections for people at risk of displacement are also very weak.²⁴ These weak social and legal protections can be partially attributed to Cambodia’s recent history, as Cambodia is still recovering from the Khmer Rouge conflict of the 1970s-90s. It was only in the late 1990s that relative political stability was established.²⁵ A number of authors have identified the consequences of weak legal protections and inequitable government policies as resulting in widespread land conflicts, and highly uneven access to land, land title and protection of land rights.²⁶ Similar patterns of unevenness shape resettlement processes. In Cambodia, like many countries, the standards set by multilateral development banks for resettlement and the complaints mechanisms available to project-affected people are at odds with the social and legal protections otherwise available to Cambodian citizens. People displaced by infrastructure projects involving a multilateral development bank, such as the World Bank or ADB, are entitled to enforce the safeguards standards through the Banks’ complaints mechanisms.²⁷ Donor countries, such as Australia, provide funding to the World Bank and ADB on the

20 See the discussion in Park (2014). Also see Chapter 2.

21 For a general discussion, see Clark, Fox & Treakle (2003); Ebrahim & Herz (2007).

22 Williams (2013); Grimsditch & Henderson (2009, pp. 37-39).

23 Asian Development Bank (2013).

24 See generally: Williams (2013); Grimsditch, Kol & Sherchan (2012); Grimsditch & Henderson (2009). See the discussion in Chapter 4.

25 See Chapter 4.

26 For example, see: Dwyer (2015); Milne (2013); Biddulph (2010).

27 Bissell & Nanwani (2009); Suzuki & Nanwani (2005); World Bank (2015c); Park (2014). See Chapter 2.

35 condition that projects in foreign countries are managed in accordance with the safeguard systems. These protections differ for people who are relocated for a Cambodian Government project or for a private investment. These differences have led some authors to describe multilateral development bank projects as creating exceptions, or leading to “islands of governance”, which are potentially isolated from broader governmental systems and standards.²⁸ These notions of “islands of governance” or places of exception is a theme that emerges throughout this thesis, and is developed further in the final empirical chapter (Chapter 8).

The differences between the rights and treatment of ordinary citizens and those who fall within the bounds of certain projects has been subject of debate within the multilateral development banks, and in part, has led to an interest in supporting a “country systems”

approach where a borrowing country’s own institutions and processes are used to implement development projects.²⁹ Under these arrangements, borrowing countries are ostensibly provided with intensive support from multilateral development banks prior to and during projects to ensure they meet the benchmark standards required. These new safeguards models are currently being piloted in a number of countries, but have been criticised by civil society groups who argue that these new models reduce the protections available to project-affected people.³⁰ Debates about how to protect people experiencing displacement, what rights should be afforded to project-affected people, especially in settings where few other protections exist, provide the broad context for this research. Tensions between local, country-level resettlement practices and international multilateral development bank or donor country expectations are exemplified in recent resettlement conflicts in Cambodia, including in the Cambodian railway project.

1.3 The Cambodian railway project

Cambodia has a population of around 15 million people and is one of the poorest countries in Southeast Asia.³¹ It is geographically situated between Vietnam to the east and Thailand to the northwest and borders Laos to the northeast and the Gulf of Thailand to the south. As

28 CIDSE (2006, 20); Connell & Grimsditch (2014); Johns (2015)

29 See for example: World Bank (2015a); Asian Development Bank (2015d). Also see Chapter 8. During the research, I conducted a review of the World Bank pilot of the new financing modality, Program-for-Results in Vietnam for the Bank Information Center, which relies on country systems, see: Jessie Connell & Grimsditch (2014).

30 See for example: Bank Information Center (2005).

31 Cambodia is listed as a “Least Developed Country” by the United Nations based on several socio-economic indicators, see: < http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc_info.shtml> accessed 29 November 2015.

36 is the case in many countries in Southeast Asia, forced community relocations have increased in Cambodia over the past 15 years to make way for public infrastructure projects, private development and urban beautification.³² In the aftermath of the Khmer Rouge conflict which devastated Cambodia in the 1970s-90s, the Cambodian Government has promoted economic growth. The past decade has seen an increasing number of land conflicts exacerbated by weak land tenure security arrangements across the country. Large numbers of people have been displaced in the absence of clear legal protections.³³ Resettlement processes have been characterised by conflict between communities, financiers of infrastructure projects, NGOs and the Cambodian Government.³⁴ Advocacy NGOs have emerged as influential actors in resettlement disputes, coordinating vocal, high-profile campaigns. NGOs have compiled data on resettled populations, publicised relocation events locally and internationally and utilised the accountability and complaints mechanisms of the World Bank and the ADB.³⁵

The ADB Rehabilitation of the Railway in Cambodia Project (or simply, the “Cambodian railway project”), began in 2006, and involved Cambodia’s largest community resettlement for an infrastructure project to date. Co-financed by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Australian Government, it affected approximately 20,000 people, of whom 4,610 were required to relocate.³⁶ The railway project aimed to improve economic opportunities for Cambodians by integrating Cambodia into the regional railway network of the Western Greater Mekong Sub-region. Under ADB’s supervision, the Cambodian Government was responsible for implementing the USD 141 million project in accordance with ADB safeguards and its involuntary resettlement policy.³⁷ The ADB also managed a USD 21.5 million grant for the project from the Australian Government.³⁸

32 NGO Forum on Cambodia (2014).

33 See: NGO Forum on Cambodia (2014); Sahmakum Teang Tnaut (2014); Sahmakum Teang Tnaut (2012); Also see generally: Amnesty International (2008); Hall, Hirsch & Li (2011).

34 See media reports such as: Lei Win (2011).

35 Many of these advocacy activities have been undertaken by Equitable Cambodia, (formerly Bridges Across Borders Cambodia), Inclusive Development International, Sahmakum Teang Tnaut (STT) and AidWatch.

36 (ADB 2014f); Estimates of the number of households affected have varied over the course of the project. ADB’s website materials and formal reporting of the numbers of affected households also differ. The ADB in Cambodia calculates the average household size as 4.7 people using demographic data, see: Asian Development Bank (2014b, p. 1). The average urban household (4.8 members) is slightly larger than the average rural household (4.6 members).

37 The 1995 ADB Policy on Involuntary Resettlement applies to most of the people affected by the project, see: Asian Development Bank (1995); Also see Chapter 5.

38 See Chapter 5.

37 The original plan was to rehabilitate the railway system that fell into disrepair in the 1970s and then connect Cambodia by rail from Kunming in China, through Vietnam, all the way to Singapore via Thailand and Malaysia.³⁹ However, notwithstanding the technical assistance, consultant, capacity building and supervision costs of the project, and the preparation of more than 50 detailed reports, including economic, financial modelling and technical assessments, feasibility studies, multiple revised resettlement plans, numerous social and environmental monitoring studies and income restoration programs, the partly implemented project was cancelled in 2014, with more than 300 km of tracks still awaiting repair.⁴⁰ Financiers are reluctant to extend further financing to the beleaguered and costly investment, although the Cambodian Government will still need to repay around USD 81.1 million, with interest, for the partly finished project.⁴¹

By the time the project was cancelled, resettlement had already taken place. Households were required to relocate if they had residences, structures and other assets within the railway corridor of impact, which is a narrow 7 metre corridor (3.5 metres on either side of the railway centreline). Most of the affected households were considered to be “illegal settlers” under Cambodian law, as the areas directly adjacent to the railway lines were state public property on which occupation is not legal. An important aspect of the ADB resettlement policy was that it compensated people considered to be squatting “illegally” for loss of assets and businesses, but not for loss of land. However, relocated households were provided with new plots of land in the resettlement sites and were promised that they would receive land title if they lived in the resettlement sites for five years or more, although it was not explained how this process would occur.⁴²

Only people living within 3.5 metres of the railway centreline were moved to new locations, despite the fact that a much larger number of people were living in the wider railway right of way, which is an area of 20-30 metres on either side of the centreline and also considered state public property.⁴³ Households in these areas had generally been living in these locations

39 Asian Development Bank (2006).

40 Asian Development Bank (2014g); Asian Development Bank (2014a).

41 Chapters 5 and 8 go some way to explaining why the project was cancelled, and how the Cambodian Government has been left with an outstanding loan of USD 81.1 million plus interest for the unfinished project. This aspect of the case study is important, but it is not elaborated here as the primary focus of the research relates to the resettlement aspects of the railway project.

42 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Cambodia & Asian Development Bank (2007).

43 The right of way is 20 metres on each side of the centreline in densely populated areas and 30 metres on each side outside the cities, see: Asian Development Bank (2006, p. 47).

38 for many years, sometime decades. The resettlement policy did not seek to identify and resettle whole communities, rather it only relocated households who were living precisely within the corridor of impact. The remaining “partially-affected” households who were living in the wider railway right of way were compensated only if their assets and structures were partially within the corridor of impact. These households were generally moved back from the area past the 3.5 metre point, as shown in Figure 1 below. Residents living in the right of way were not provided with land title in the areas beyond 3.5 metres, but it was agreed that they could remain living there for at least five years without being relocated or evicted.⁴⁴ In the initial plans, it was promised that if these people were relocated at a later date they would also receive the same compensation and livelihood re-establishment support as those who had relocated earlier,⁴⁵ however no formal arrangements were put in place to ensure this would occur after the ADB finalises its involvement in the project.

Figure 1: Railway line depicting corridor of impact

Source: Author’s illustration

People were affected by the railway all along the railway line, however the households most directly affected and required to move were located in clusters in five locations: Phnom Penh, Pursat, Sihanoukville, Battambang and Poipet. Resettlement sites were established in

44 Asian Development Bank (2014f).

45 Asian Development Bank (2006, p. 14).

39 each of the five places to accommodate the relocating households from each area. Figure 2 below shows a map of Cambodia indicating the locations of the resettlement sites.

Figure 2: Map of railway project identifying resettlement sites

Critical to understanding the resettlement impacts of this particular project is an appreciation of the different micro-geographies of each of the resettlement sites, especially the proximity of the sites to urban centres, sources of employment, and distances from former residences.

Figure 3 below shows the different distances people moved from their previous locations.

40 The Phnom Penh resettlement site is in a peri-urban location approximately 20 km from the city and far from where the affected households lived previously. The Battambang site is approximately 5-7 km away, the Sihanoukville site is 10 km away, the Poipet site is 4-5 km away. In the Pursat site, people were relocated only 400 metres from most former residences.

In Pursat, people affected were mostly living in the village of Bamnak, which is in the

In Pursat, people affected were mostly living in the village of Bamnak, which is in the