Sistema electro-neumático del intercambiador

In any case there was little Kâllay could do to hurry thing along, since the Serbian government in the summer of 1869 was completely taken up with the elections to the Constituent SkupStina, and the deliberations on the new C o n s t i t u t i o n . ^ 2 9 Until mid- .

September Kâllay had no opportunity to discuss the Bosnian question with anyone on the Serbian side.^^o About the only person he did discuss it with was the Italian consul, Joannini, with whom Kâllay raised the idea of the Balkan peoples bound together in "un'immensa Svizzera o r i e n t a l e . " gut the Italian also pointed out the oddity of the

entreprise:

osservai al mio interlocutore [Kâllay] che accadea per la prima volta di assistere ad un'azione diplomatica esclusivamente diretta dagli interessi ungheresi, senza vedere posti in bilancia gl'interessi, diversi forse in taluna parte, del rimanente della Monarchia.

that "il Conte Beust divide le idee del Conte Andrassy", must have rung hollow even in his own ears.

Kâllay, however, remained anxious to get the Bosnian plan moving again, conscious that Andrâssy himself was beginning to get impatient with the S e r b s . 1 ^ 3 Early in

September 1869, Andrâssy was even more insistent. By now he was convinced that the Monarchy was in imminent danger of being attacked as soon as Russia completed its current railway building programme, and the security aspect o f the Bosnian question was increasingly uppermost in his mind. To secure both the Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire against attack from the rear, from the South Slavs, was essential.

Because of this we must win the Serbs over completely. They can only be won completely over by the cession of Bosnia. Its cession is the cornerstone of our South Slav policy, without it we are building on sand.^^^

The issue simply must be raised again; "regardless of what they think o f it in Vienna and Constantinople, he [Andrâssy] will try however to win the upper hand in both

p l a c e s . " 1 3 6 But in return the Regents had to act on their own behalf; and there was an

open threat in the next remark:

They must be warned that, in the event that Austria wins, and they have been on Russia’s side, an extremely melancholy fate i would await th em . 137

In response to Kâllay’s query about the possibility of a defensive-offensive alliance with Serbia, which after all was still a vassal state of the Sultan, "Andrâssy replied that he would achieve t h is .’’i38 He would even agree to Blaznavac’ election as Prince, if this facilitated the overall goal.

On 14 September Kâllay finally managed to have a serious discussion of the matter with Blaznavac, and stressed that "in my opinion the time was nearing when something would have to be done in this r e g a r d . "^3 9 The answer he got, however, reflected the

hesitancy which had dogged the issue on the Serbian side from the beginning. if they were sure of Andrâssy’s moral support, they would be willing to turn to Bosnia at once and take it over, preserving of course the Sultan’s sovereignty.

There was "a certain guardedness’’ in Blaznavac’ general demeanour, moreover, that disturbed Kâllay.

A lengthier discussion, on the 17th, gave Kâllay the opportunity to employ the strong-arm tactics hinted at by Andrâssy. He told Blaznavac that "Russia is going to attack us sooner or later, because she can only break through into the Balkans by going through us."i^2 Nevertheless,

there could hardly be any doubt as to our victory. I pointed out that Serbia could expect no good to come out of it if it were not on our side during this war, and we

won....1^3

What sort of policy, then, did Blaznavac intend to pursue?

Blaznavac claimed that, "if Hungary and Austria find themselves at war, Serbia will at once declare war on Turkey and annex Bosnia, the Hercegovina and Old Serbia and form a single s t a t e . " Kâllay, however, stamped on this idea as hard as he could: Austria-Hungary was not looking for Serbia's practical assistance in a war, he said, "only that it remain quiet and not disturb the Turks." In return for this passivity, of course, the reward would be Bosnia-Hercegovina.

The problem then arose, as always, of how this reward was to be effected. Kâllay's proposed plan of action was a mix of practical, if bold, diplomacy, and what amounted to political incendiarism.

Two means offered themselves: one was for the Serbian government to send direct to the Porte and the guarantor powers in connection with this question a memorandum, which Austria would support, or, if this wasn't enough,

covertly to activate the movements in Bosnia and exploit them to demand from the Porte the handing over of Bosnia.

Blaznavac naturally was highly interested but, beyond suggesting that a petition to Belgrade by the Bosnians themselves was another option, he had no practical

alternatives for the moment. All Kâllay could extract from him was the promise that "he would have a good think about the matter.

When Blaznavac returned to the subject two weeks later, there was a marked change in tone and emphasis. The Regent now thought it necessary "to employ the most

pacific methods possible." Perhaps, he suggested, it would be best to start with some less controversial request. For instance, Serbia could ask for jurisdiction over the Orthodox population o f Bosnia to be transferred from the Patriarchate of

Constantinople to the Metropolitan of Belgrade. If that was successful, it might then be possible to broach the idea of a share in the political administration,

The switch in Blaznavac’ tactics mystified Kâllay. On 5 October, he asked Blaznavac point-blank: why the sudden retreat from the idea of an administrative cession? Did the Regents no longer think the sympathies of the Bosnians could be relied on? Blaznavac denied this, "but he didn’t see any possibility o f action this winter, it could perhaps be started as soon as spring a r r i v e d . H e assured Kâllay that, in any Austro-Russiap^f Serbia would remain on the sidelines if guaranteed the administration ^ o f Bosnia. Kâllay could only report back to Andrâssy, urging further m e a s u r e s .