El sistema de Formación Profesional Dual en Alemania (FP Dual)

The term “persuasive appeal” (e.g. Koenig et al. 2009) and “persuasive attack” (e.g.

Tormala, Clarkson, & Petty, 2006) are often used interchangeably in persuasion literature. Presumably, the only distinction between these two terms is a matter of perspective; i.e. a persuasion agent (e.g. advertiser or salesperson) makes a persuasive appeal while an unwilling recipient repels an unsolicited, persuasive attack.

Individuals may employ seven main strategies to resist persuasive attacks; attitude

“bolstering”, counterarguing, negative affect, selective exposure, social validation, source derogation and asserting a belief that nothing will change their minds (Zuwerink Jacks & Cameron, 2003). This research will investigate the two most important resistance strategies; counterarguing and bolstering.

Counterarguing refers to the generation of opposing arguments in response to a persuasive appeal (Xu & Wyer, 2012). In contrast; bolstering refers to the generation of supporting arguments in response to a persuasive appeal (Knowles &

Linn, 2004). Counterarguing and bolstering are the most widely used strategies for resisting persuasion attempts (Zuwerink Jacks & Cameron, 2003). Bolstering and counterarguing are also the most potent defensive strategies available to consumers (Zuwerink Jacks & Cameron, 2003). However, counterarguing and bolstering strategies tax cognitive resources and require high levels of motivation and engagement to enact (Briñol et al., 2004). Compared to other resistance strategies (e.g. source derogation, negative affect, and selective exposure) bolstering and counterarguing are reflexive, argument-based approaches that require conscious, effortful resistance. Interestingly though, recent research suggests that counterarguing

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and bolstering behaviours may be activated outside of conscious awareness (Xu &

Wyer, 2012).

Xu and Wyer (2012) demonstrated that inducing individuals to counterargue (bolster) increases the likelihood of them employing these cognitive procedures when evaluating adverts in an ostensibly unrelated study. The researchers demonstrated that bolstering and counterarguing mindsets may be procedurally primed or incidentally induced. To the author’s knowledge, no study has yet replicated these newly discovered mindsets.

This research seeks to test both the robustness and generalisability of bolstering and counterarguing mindsets. Across 6 studies the researcher will attempt to replicate the carryover effects reported by Xu and Wyer (2012) in their study (see H1 - H3). The research also aims to extend the work of Xu and Wyer (2012) by testing the hypothesis that motivational orientation moderates the effects of these mindsets (see H4). Motivational orientation is considered to be a building block of human behaviour (Carver, 2006). Accordingly, it seems plausible that motivational orientation may moderate the non-conscious approach and avoidance behaviours activated by these mindsets. A number of secondary hypotheses will also be tested.

For example, Persuasion Knowledge (PK) will also be tested as a potential mindset moderator (see H5). The research will investigate the implications of these mindsets for consumer welfare. Specifically, it will explore the possibility that bolstering and counterarguing mindsets affect individuals’ defensive responses to persuasive appeals (see H5). The research will also explore the possibility that reactivating past bolstering and counterarguing thoughts may activate these mindsets (see H6). The hypotheses for all studies are outlined in the next section.

88 4.1. Hypotheses

4.1.1. Hypotheses for Perceptual Variables

Hypothesis 1a: Participants in the bolstering (counterarguing) condition will generate more (less) favourable overall evaluations of persuasive appeals (composite measure of persuasiveness and appeal) than participants in the control condition and participants in the counterarguing (bolstering) condition.

Hypothesis 1b: Participants in the bolstering (counterarguing) condition will generate more (less) favourable product/proposition evaluations (i.e.

product/proposition attractiveness) than participants in the control condition and participants in the counterarguing (bolstering) condition.

4.1.2. Hypotheses for Behavioural Variables

Hypotheses 2a-d: Participants in the bolstering (counterarguing) condition will be more (less) willing to pay for a product/proposition (H2a), be more (less) willing to volunteer for future research (H2b), be more (less) willing to volunteer their time (i.e. minutes) for future research (H2c), and be more (less) willing to sign a petition (H2d) than participants in the control condition and participants in the counterarguing (bolstering) condition.

89 4.1.3. Hypotheses for Cognitive Variables

Hypotheses 3a-b: Participants in the bolstering (counterarguing) condition will generate more (less) positive thoughts (H3a) and generate less (more) negative thoughts (H3b) in response to the persuasive appeal than participants in the control condition and participants in the counterarguing (bolstering) condition.

Hypotheses 3c-d: Participants in the bolstering (counterarguing) condition will generate less (more) PK thoughts (H3c) and exhibit greater (lesser) attitude certainty (H3d) than participants in the control condition and participants in the counterarguing (bolstering) condition.

Xu and Wyer (2012) did not test for moderators of bolstering and counterarguing mindsets. Thus, the boundary conditions of these mindsets await testing. Individual difference traits that moderate advertising effectiveness have long interested academics and persuasion practitioners alike. Indeed, a large body of research has been undertaken to investigate how individual difference traits affect perceptions of persuasive communications (for a review see Brinol & Petty, 2004). Motivational orientation is a building block of human behaviour and is thus a particularly important individual difference trait (Carver, 2006). Chapter 3 demonstrates that approach and avoidance tendencies can predict how individuals feel (e.g. Cesario et al., 2004), think (e.g. Mann et al., 2004) and behave (e.g. Hevey & Dolan, 2014) when interacting with persuasive communications. Given that motivational orientation can dictate whether

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an individual approaches or avoids a stimulus, this construct is particularly well suited to investigating consumer resistance.

Consumer mindset can compromise consumers’ defences and induce them to spend more (Dhar et al., 2007; Xu & Wyer, 2007, 2008). Indeed, simply switching between mindsets may weaken consumer resistance by inducing resource depletion (Hamilton et al. 2011). Resource depletion has been linked to a wide range of societal ills including overeating, overspending, crime, violence, drug abuse and smoking (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Vohs & Faber, 2007). Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, consumers still happily entertain the “illusion of invulnerability” (Sagarin, Cialdini, Rice, & Serna, 2002). These researchers note the dearth of studies specifically focused on consumer resistance and call on scholars to work towards alleviating this knowledge deficit. Investigating consumer resistance would be of “considerable theoretical worth” and be of “substantial practical value” to society (Sagarin et al. 2002; p. 526). Answering this call, the current research seeks to make an important theoretical contribution to the scarce literature on consumer resistance by identifying individuals exhibiting a heightened sensitivity to bolstering and counterarguing mindsets.

4.2. Behavioural Mindsets and Motivational Orientation

As outlined in Chapter 3, there is strong evidence to suggest that motivational orientation (e.g. Gerend & Shepherd, 2007; Mann et al. 2004; Sherman et al. 2006) and regulatory orientation (e.g. Aaker & Lee, 2001; Higgins, 1997; Hong & Lee, 2008; Lisjakn et al; 2012; Pham & Avnet, 2004) influence information processing strategies. Specifically, approach/promotion-focused individuals are more likely to

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use eager strategies during information processing (Cesario et al., 2008). Conversely, avoidance/prevention-focused individuals are more likely to use vigilant strategies during information processing (Freitas & Higgins, 2002). Accordingly, it is hypothesised that individuals exhibiting high approach (avoidance) motivation will find bolstering (counterarguing) thoughts more accessible. If true, this heightened accessibility to these respective cognitive procedures should make these individuals differentially susceptible to these mindsets. Fit (non-fit) effects are found to accentuate (attenuate) an individual’s natural response to persuasive messages (Florack et al. 2009; Freitas & Higgins 2002; Jain et al. 2006; Lee et al. 2000; Lee &

Aaker, 2004). Thus, it is postulated that individuals exhibiting high approach (avoidance) motivation will be more sensitive to bolstering (counterarguing) mindsets and, consequently, will exhibit stronger carryover effects as a result. Accordingly, the following hypothesised fit effects between mindset and motivational orientation are derived:

4.2.1. Hypotheses for Motivational Orientation

Hypotheses 4a-b: The carryover effects of a bolstering (counterarguing) mindset on participants’ evaluations of persuasive appeals (composite of persuasiveness and appeal) (H4a) and participants’ evaluations of products/propositions attractiveness (H4b), will be particularly pronounced among participants exhibiting high approach (avoidance) motivation.

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Hypotheses 4c-f: The carryover effects of a bolstering (counterarguing) mindset on behavioural variables; willingness to pay (H4c), willingness to volunteer for future studies (H4d); number of minutes volunteered for future studies (H4e) and willingness to sign a petition (H4f) will be particularly pronounced among participants exhibiting high approach (avoidance) motivation.

4.3. Behavioural Mindsets and Persuasion Knowledge

Deceptive and manipulative practices are widespread in the marketplace (for a review see Boush, Friestad, & Wright, 2009). Persuasion Knowledge allows individuals to “cope” with persuasion attempts (Friestad & Wright, 1994). This knowledge is activated in order to assess the bona fides of a persuasive appeal and to determine the appropriate response. As such, PK represents an indispensable resource that offers a protective shield to consumers who must resist numerous persuasive attacks each day (Xie, Boush, & Liu, 2013).

Avoidance motivation bestows upon the individual a defensive posture which predisposes them to enacting vigilant strategies. Vigilant strategies serve to protect consumers and are thus especially important when accessing potentially deceptive or manipulative communications (Friestad & Wright, 2013). An individual’s ability to detect and deflect deceptive persuasive attacks is likely to be reliant upon “vigilant strategies” that are strongly associated with avoidance tendencies. Accordingly, it seems that the goals associated with avoidance motivation are congruent with the activation of persuasion knowledge. Indeed, it seems logical to assume that avoidance motivation might facilitate the activation of persuasion knowledge. The activation of

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PK would complement any vigilant strategies being applied and lend itself to the self-defensive goals being pursued. According to Knowles and Linn, (2004; p.7) “the four faces of resistance are: reactance, distrust, scrutiny and inertia. Distrust and message scrutiny are likely to be especially important defensive responses when evaluating manipulative persuasion appeals.

In contrast, the hedonic goals associated with approach motivation appear incongruent with the activation of PK. The eager strategies that characterise approach tendencies are concerned with reward attainment and goal maximisation rather than pain avoidance or loss prevention. Above, Hypothesis 6 posits that bolstering (counterarguing) mindsets are moderated by approach (avoidance) motivation. Using the hypothesis as a theoretical platform, the author extrapolates the hypotheses with regard to fit effects between PK and mindset: These hypotheses are outlined in the section below.

4.3.1. Hypotheses for Persuasion Knowledge

Hypothesis 5a: Participants in the bolstering (counterarguing) condition will rate a persuasive appeal as less (more) manipulative than participants in the control condition and participants in the counterarguing (bolstering) condition.

Hypothesis 5b: The carryover effects of bolstering (counterarguing) mindset will be particularly pronounced among participants exhibiting low (high) Persuasion Knowledge.

94 4.4. Behavioural Mindsets and Episodic Recall

As previously discussed, Fransen and Fennis (2014) demonstrated that an episodic recall task can activate resistance. Specifically, the authors primed

“persuasive intent”. The priming procedure involved an episodic recall task in which participants were asked to recall a past situation where someone tried to influence them. This persuasion intent prime activated resistance to future adverts by implicitly forewarning participants of an imminent persuasion attempt. Indeed, priming persuasive intent induced comparable levels of resistance to explicit forewarnings of upcoming persuasive attempts. However, the authors did not prime participants with a specific resistance strategy. Consequently, there is no way to know what type of resistance strategies were activated as a result of this episodic priming task. The current research seeks to address this problem by testing if activating memories of specific resistance strategies (counterarguing or bolstering) can prime the future deployment of these cognitive procedures when evaluating adverts. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is postulated:

4.4.1. Hypothesis for Episodic Priming

Hypothesis 6: An episodic recall task will induce a bolstering