SISTEMAS DE TIEMPO REAL

Korten (1987) describes three distinctive ‘generations’ of development action strategies emerging since 1950. The first is relief and welfare; then local self- reliance (as in the rise of CSOs); and thirdly, sustainable systems development. These generations are not mutually exclusive, nor open to precise definition. As Korten acknowledges, the first and second modes of development remain both needed and appropriate, yet both are better off if they have embraced sustainability in their strategic approach (1987:149). Korten also recognises that different organisations may undertake different aspects of these generations. Elliott interprets the 3rd _{generation of development as one grounded in}

empowerment and “training for transformation”, a process for developing critical consciousness (1987:58-59). Korten (1990) acknowledges this process in defining a 4th _{generation of development as ‘people’s movements’, also described by de}

Senillosa as contributing to structural economic and political changes to favour marginalised and impoverished peoples (1998:46). De Senillosa goes on to suggest a 5th _{generation of NGDOs, in which these organisations become}

‘transmission belts’ for the perceptions, concerns and struggles of the South, while also assuming their role as funders of ‘added value’ via development education, awareness-raising and lobbying – all with the objective of democratising and transforming the structures of their own societies, and as equal partners with Southern NGDOs, global society itself (1998:49).

Korten’s third generation strategy of sustainable development marks a turning point for NGDOs. If ‘people-centred’ development was to succeed in poverty reduction, its practice had to join with, or at least work alongside, national and international programmes, beyond the limitations of small-scale programmes in local communities. Hence in the late 1980s the call went out for ‘scaling-up’ of organisational strengths, improving technical and strategic competence and collaboration with other agencies and organisations. Edwards & Hume (1992a) argued for scaling-up as a means to improve NGDO impact, and Chambers (2005) continues to refer to a scaling-up of his participatory methodologies to reflect his model of development as ‘responsible well-being’.

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This shift in NGDO thinking coincides with the global rise of neo-liberal economics and its influence on development programmes. If state functions were to be devolved to other sectors under conditional funding from IFIs, then NGDOs were in a good position to fill the resulting vacuum: NGDOs had experience on the ground; they could offer organisational structure and expertise to undertake an expanded mission (Edwards & Hume, 1992; Fowler, 1997). Thus began a relationship between NGDOs and ODA in the delivery of development and responsibility for the provision of basic services such as health care and education. The resulting explosion of new organisations, both Northern and Southern, is therefore not surprising. NGDO development practice might have been “more effective, cheaper, and better targeted at low-income groups than official aid” (Van der Heijden 1987:107), but in outcome they were, in Dolan’s view, “midwives to integration into capitalist economic and political systems” (1992:210). Temple (1997) calls NGDOs ‘the Trojan Horse of development’, suggesting there were ulterior motives not wholly driven by humanist concerns.

There is some confusion in the data reported on the growth in NGDO numbers and the proportion of ODA funding they receive. Figure 4.1 is a graphic illustration of the rise of NGDOs, supplemented in Table 4.2 with information from other sources, and with data on ODA funding transfers and budget dependency. Hayden’s graphs (Figure 4.1), showing the steep rise in NGO numbers from 1990, would be dramatic in any line of business and they underline the acerbic views of Dolan and Temple cited above. In Table 4.2 there are variations in dates and figures which make it difficult to assess details beyond an overall massive increase in numbers of organisations, the funding transfers from ODA and NGDO budget dependency.

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Figure 4.1: The Rise of NGOs

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Table 4.2: Data Relating to Numbers of NGOs and Funding Sources

Numbers of NGDOs

• 1970-89, international NGOs increased from 2300 to 24,000 (but may not be all development organisations). (Arrossi, et al, 1994)

• 1989, OECD figures: 4000 NGDOs, working with 10-20,000 Southern NGOs (Edwards & Hume, 1992)

• In the South, the availability of official funding led to an 82% increase of NGOs in Nepal, 1990- 1993; Tunisian NGOs grew 64%, 1989-91 (Edwards & Hume, 1996a)

ODA Funding Transfers to NGDOs

• 1970-85: increase from $1b to $4b (Van der Heijden, 1987)

• Proportion of OECD aid funding allocated to NGDOs increased from 0.7% in 1975 to 3.6% in 1985; in 1994 to total was $2.3b. (Van der Heijden, 1987; Edwards & Hume, 1996a)

• OECD reports 1600 organisations receiving ODA in 1980; by 1993 this figure has risen to more than 3000 (MFAT VASS report, 1998)

• 1993: one-third of WB projects involved NGOs; 1994, inc to over 50%; more than 15% total aid channelled through NGOs (Zaidi, 1999)

• 1995: a total of $3.5b, a 3-fold increase from1983 (Fowler, 1998)

• 1970: $1b; 1997: $7.2b (Lindenberg & Bryant, 2001)

% NGDO budget dependency on

ODA

• In the early 1970s more than 90% of NGDO funding came from members and supporters (Van der Heijden, 1987);

• Varies from less than 50% to well over 90% (Smillie, 1996)

• 1984: 7-15%; increase over 10 years to 18-52% (Edwards & Hume, 1996a)

• Oxfam New Zealand 2006 Annual Report records 35.5% of total budget came from government grants.53

Source: Author (all figures in US$)

Despite inconsistencies in the data it is clear that NGDOs have become significant players in global development programmes. The consequences and practice implications for this economic and global expansion have also impacted on NGDO functions and operations as the next section outlines.

53 _{As reported by Catherall (2007), 30% appears to be the benchmark for New Zealand}

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