Los sistemas de partidos en Estados Unidos: cambios y tendencias

Individual equipment used in the VTS decision support system, such as the radar, AIS and VHF radio have received significant academic attention. Positive identification of vessels is imperative in congested waters as accurate identification is a prerequisite to undertaking further communication with the target vessel and/or carrying out evasive manoeuvres, if required. AIS is a transponder system capable of transferring and receiving information that can positively identify ships (Mora et al. 1998; IMO 2001). Amendments to SOLAS chapter 5 have made it mandatory for vessels over 300 GRT engaged in international voyages and all passenger vessels to be equipped with the AIS by 2004 to ensure compliance in the first phase of the implementation (IMO 1974). AIS has been studied in the VTS as a tool to be integrated in the decision support system available to the VTS operators and it is useful in Search and Rescue operations (Graveson 2004). AIS technology is a vital competent of pilotage operations and sea pilots have raised concerns regarding the unavailability of the plug-in for the Portable Pilot Unit in some makes of AIS (Pratt 2004). Chang (2004) argues that AIS information should be used to reduce inter-ship VHF communication, however, studies have revealed that the opposite is true; AIS has contributed to an increase in voice communication over the radio between ships (Bailey 2005; Bailey et al. 2008).

19 Command, Control, Communications, Computer and Intelligence

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Bailey (2005) conducted research at the Dover Coastguard Channel Navigation Information Service (DCCNIS) and found an impact of AIS on VHF radio use. The research found that 90% of the VHF calls were undertaken for collision avoidance (see IMO 2003), which is antithetical to the IMO Collision Regulations (COLREGs) (IMO 1972) which advocates against the use of VHF for collision avoidance and is further discussed subsequently in this section. The research further found that even when the information was already available via the AIS, it was continuing to be obtained and confirmed over the VHF radio. Unnecessary and confusing communication as well as rule breaking was also found in the VHF interactions in the study. The study by Bailey (2005) is conducted from the point of view of shipboard seafarers while mine is from the shore based perspective of the VTS. Bailey (2005) also addresses the training needs of the seafarers with respect to the introduction of new technology on-board and recommends that training should not be limited to the operation and limitations of AIS equipment, but should encompass the broader activity of navigation and collision avoidance and the manner in which the information available from the AIS is put to use. The research argues that in addition to developing training pertaining to the AIS, enhanced regulatory monitoring should be carried out and procedures with respect to data entry and standardised communication via the AIS should be codified (also see (Bailey et al. 2008)).

Sanders (2003) analyses informal conversations over the marine radio at sea. The book chapter is titled, ‘Conversational socializing on marine VHF radio: Adapting laughter and other practices to the technology in use’ and in it, he examines how the technology of the two way marine radio which does not allow the speaker to both listen and talk / transmit at the same time, shapes the management of laughter and the handling of gaps in the conversation and other responses in casual conversation at sea. The author highlights the tolerance of gaps on the marine radio in informal conversations and highlights the repeat transmission of laughter after a gap, to imply the genuineness of the laughter in the first transmission. Sanders’ (ibid) specifically studies informal and casual conversations over the marine radio, while my study specifically focuses on the interaction on the main working channel of the port which is key to accomplishing institutional VTS work. Furthermore, he monitored interaction on the radio and upon catching an informal conversation on a channel, would record it for further analysis. This approach implied that not all of the conversations were recorded from the beginning. Sanders (ibid) did not study marine radio communication in the context of institutional work. My research on the other hand, specifically studied VTS’ work largely conducted over the VHF,

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and recorded all real time naturally occurring interaction on the port radio channel to facilitate my study and is discussed further in chapter 3 on research methods.

Naturally occurring interaction on the VHF radio is the primary source of data for my research and helps me identify and nuance the in situ fine-grained practices of harbour and fairway navigation (Sacks 1989; Garfinkel 2006). An overview of the literature on the VHF radio and a discussion about its use at sea, including the regulatory environment is important for contextualising the study. The use of the VHF radio in collision avoidance is contentious, however it is increasingly being used for this purpose (Bailey 2005; Bailey et al. 2008). Two key considerations regarding the use of VHF in collision avoidance are – positive identification of the target vessel and a common language of communication (Harding 2002; Stitt 2003, 2004). Both these considerations can be addressed if positive identification is achieved with the help of AIS input or ascertaining target position with respect to navigational points and/or aids to navigation and if the speakers speak the same language as in the case of local sea pilots.

In the United States of America (USA), most of the radio interaction in the waterways is between experienced pilots who are native speakers of English. The USA, considers bridge-to-bridge radio telecommunication as important for navigation in US waterways and has legislated for its use (USCG 1971; Harding 2002). In the collision of the Alva Cape with Texaco Massachusetts, the National Transportation Safety Board investigation stated –

That any doubt concerning the course of the intention of the other vessel could have been readily resolved by the use of bridge to bridge radiotelephone, if the vessels had been so equipped (NTSB 1967, p. 17).

The NTSB (1967) accident investigation report further went on to add that the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard (USCG) should –

continue his efforts to effectuate a requirement for bridge to bridge radio telephone aboard vessels in navigable waters of the United States (NTSB 1967, p. 18).

Similar findings can be found in other accidents in the USA. The NTSB identified the lack of bridge-to-bridge radio communication as an issue in the African star accident with Midwest cities. The NTSB noted –

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Voice bridge to bridge radiotelephonic communications capability on a uniform operational frequency would probably have prevented this tragedy. Radio affords instant information and the opportunity to assent or object to the passing proposed by the vessel initiating the communication (NTSB 1970, p. 7).

In the collision between White Adler and Helena, the investigation report noted –

That strict compliance with the Rules of the Road would have prevented the casualty.

The casualty might also have been prevented by the use of bridge to bridge radiotelephone communication by the vessels involved to facilitate an agreement on the method of passing (NTSB 1971, p. 22).

In 1971, the USA formulated the United States Vessel Bridge to Bridge Radiotelephone Act which states (USCG 1971) –

Each person who is required to maintain a listening watch under section 5 of the Act shall, when necessary, transmit and confirm, on the designated frequency, the intentions of his vessel and any other information necessary for the safe navigation of vessels.

The USA considers bridge to bridge communications, an important part of navigation in US waterways, however has urged caution with respect to its haphazard use (Cahill 1979). The United Kingdom (UK) on the other hand is not in favour of the use of VHF to undertake communications related to collision avoidance. Several accidents have taken place in which the colliding vessels had interacted on the VHF radio and agreed upon evasive actions before the point of contact, as in the case of Mineral Dampier and Hanjin Madras (QBD 2000).

In passing judgement on the accident of the Maloja II with John M, Justice Sheen stated –

I must, once again, draw attention to the dangers of communicating with unknown vessels by VHF…But it is very probable that the use of VHF radio for conversation between the ships was a contributory cause of this collision, if only because it distracted the officers on watch from paying careful attention to their radar… any attempt to use a VHF to agree the manner of passing is fraught with the danger of misunderstanding.

Marine superintendents would be better advised to prohibit such use of VHF radio and instruct their officers to comply with the collision regulations (QBD 1993, p. 8).

The UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) (2006) considers VHF communication undertaken for the purpose of collision avoidance to be an alarming and dangerous trend (see

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MAIB 2014). The MCA (2006) issued the Marine Guidance Note (MGN) 324²⁰ on the Operational Guidance on the Use of VHF Radio and Automatic Identification Systems At Sea.

MGN 324 states that –

Although the use of VHF radio may be justified on occasion as a collision avoidance aid, the provisions of the Collision Regulations should remain uppermost (MCA 2006, p. 1)

There have been a significant number of collisions where subsequent investigation has found that at some stage before impact, one or both parties were using VHF radio in an attempt to avoid collision. The use of VHF radio in the circumstances is not always helpful and may even prove to be dangerous (MCA 2006, p. 3).

Cahill (1979) argues that an important benefit of the VHF radio is to reduce uncertainty in encounters at sea. Stitt (2004) states that the AIS and the VHF should be considered as one of several tools available to the officer of the watch (OOW) to fulfil the obligations under the COLREGs. Stitt (2003) proposes that the use of the VHF should be considered under three separate headings – in harbours and confined waters requiring pilotage, in inland and coastal waters, and in the open sea. Stitt’s (2003) discussion of the VHF use in harbours is relevant to my research as my study is in a port VTS situated in a harbour requiring compulsory pilotage.

Stitt (2003) states that VHF exchanges in such confined waters would mostly be between experienced skilled professionals (pilots) who are used to working together, possess in-depth knowledge of the local waters, follow similar procedures and speak the same language and it is unlikely that their use of the VHF would be challenged by anyone.

Adherence to COLREGs is recommended to avoid accidents at sea (IMO 1972; MCA 2006).

Belcher (2002) provides a sociological interpretation of the COLREGs. Using the example of a multiple vessel collision avoidance encounter, he highlights the conflict, tension and lacunae within the regulations. He further argues that in order to improve safety at sea, risk of collision would need to be eliminated by a physical separation of traffic so that the risk ceases to exist and the rules with their contingent defeasible nature would no longer need to be applied. The practical implementation of Belcher’s (2002) suggestion for the physical separation of traffic is beyond the scope of this study; however the identification of lacunae in the rules is an interesting finding that points to the contingent nature of rule following useful for my study.

20 MGN 324 replaces MGN 22, 167 and 277.

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In this section I have discussed the literature around individual components of the VTS, namely the AIS and VHF. In the next section I review qualitative research on the VTS, which has been conducted and applied in different ways, and a limited number of studies have also looked at VTS operators.