The Supreme Soviet was dominated by, on the one hand, ‘state centrists’ who wanted an assertive great power foreign policy but supported domestic reform, and ‘national- patriots’ who wanted an aggressively nationalist and pan-Slavist foreign policy (and, among the left, a return to communism). Particularly prominent among the latter were Sergei Baburin and Nikolai Pavlov, leaders of the Russian All-People’s Union, which advocated the re-creation of the USSR on a unitary basis. They supported a pro-Serb
Rodionov (4 June 1992). Kaverznev (18 June 1992). Pribylovsky (22 April 1994), p. 33.
policy towards the conflicts. Many deputies in the Supreme Soviet or Congress of People’s Deputies also had links with the ‘red-brown’ groups discussed previously.
The most prominent proponents of a ‘neo-realist’ position in the Supreme Soviet were Ambartsumov and Rumiantsev. They were critical of official policy because it was too pro-Western and not independent and did not protect Russia’s ‘national interests’; at the same time they were careful to distinguish their position from that of the ‘red- brown’ coalition, those who openly supported Milosevic and Serb extreme nationalist leaders. This position was stated very clearly by Rumiantsev during the Supreme Soviet debate;
During his trip to the Balkans, Andrei Vladimirovich [Kozyrev] said one very remarkable phrase which inspired in me great confidence. He said that Russia ought more often to act solo in the Balkans. But, very unfortunately, this good phrase, which could become the basis of our new Balkans policy, didn’t lead to real actions because our voice was drowned in the general chorus of protest against Yugoslavia and practical protest against Serbia, which was indirectly, of course, a strike aimed at the new Russia. Against new Russia. Consequently, in my view, it is very important today not to give up the idea of patriotism to the ultra-right forces, but our Foreign Ministry policy ought to proceed from a conception of patriotic policy, if you like, because our foreign policy today ought to become a buttress of patriotism.’^'*
In his contribution to the Supreme Soviet debate, Ambartsumov called on Russia to adopt a ‘balanced’ policy. He argued that the UN Secretary-General’s report showed that all sides were guilty, which made it ‘incomprehensible’ that sanctions were then directed only against one side, Serbia. Sanctions were one-sided when Croat and Muslim forces were also participating in the war: ‘In general, the impression is that the world community, above all the West, has occupied in relation to an internal conflict a position that was not fully just,’ he argued. Sanctions were harsher than those adopted against Iraq, which had been guilty of a clear case o f aggression against another state, whereas the Bosnian conflict was an inter-ethnic conflict, a ‘very complex, tangled situation’. Russia, he suggested, should adopt an objective stance: ‘we ought to proceed from the defence of human rights, from a just, objective position to all s i d e s . B e i n g critical of the sanctions vote did not mean ‘pitting themselves against the international
Russian Federation Supreme Soviet (26 June 1992a), p. 103. Ibid., pp. 92-3.
community’; after all, China had abstained and it had ‘hardly been castigated for
this’/^^
Ambartsumov was influential in shaping the Supreme Soviet resolution on Yugoslavia, which was initiated in the Committee for Foreign Affairs. As well as point four already quoted, the resolution called on the government
1. to maintain a balanced, objective approach to all sides in the Yugoslav crisis in the light of the real role and responsibility of each participant in the armed conflict;
2. to guarantee the conduct of a foreign policy line, excluding the possibility of armed intervention from outside in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina by any country or group of countries, whatever the pretext. At the same time to augment international mediation efforts with the purpose of achieving a political settlement to the conflict. To enable the unobstructed supply of humanitarian aid to the republic;
3. to instruct the MFA to study the possibility of a resolution in the UNSC for a reduction in the sanctions in relation to the FRY established by UNSC resolution 757, or for the introduction of a moratorium on their application in response to the receipt of evidence of the readiness of the FRY to carry out the directions included in the points of the resolution.
To what extent was Ambartsumov’s position and that of the committee a ‘balanced, objective’ position? Ambartsumov did not ignore Russia’s supposedly traditional links with Serbia, although he argued that they should not be the sole basis for policy. For example, during the debate, he stated that
the position of the committee is defined not only, and not so much by, the fact that Russia traditionally had friendly relations with Serbia, although of course it is impossible to discard this, and the traditions of our foreign policy from the equation.
And one comment in particular has been quoted by many Western commentators: ‘It would hardly seem obligatory that Russia, which naturally has its own state interests, duplicate the US position in all respects - a position that is by no means always i nd i s p u t a b l e . Ru s s i a , then, had its ‘own state interests’ and should take into account
136
Ambartsumov (29 June 1992).
Russian Federation Supreme Soviet (26 June 1992b). Russian Federation Supreme Soviet (26 June 1992a), p. 92. Ibid..
its traditional pro-Serb policy. Russia should pursue its own interests, acting as a corrective to the West’s anti-Serb stance, although this need not jeopardise relations with the West; there should be no trade-off between support on sanctions and aid/trade from the West (which Ambartsumov supported), since these were separate issues.
Unfortunately, it was never fully specified what exactly Russia’s ‘own state interests’ in the Yugoslav conflicts were, except that they must be different from those of the West and the United States in particular. This means that Ambartsumov proposed a policy that was still not derived directly from Russia’s interests in relation to the conflicts, but only in relation to the West; and then in a superficial manner, based on the assumption that Russia, as a great power, must have interests distinct from other great powers. This was a simplistic, realist approach of maximising power on a zero-sum model.
Furthermore, if Russia was to pursue its own interests in relation to the conflicts, this could not by definition be an ‘objective and fair approach to a complicated ethnic conflict’, as Ambartsumov also claimed. If Russia took into account its supposed traditional pro-Serb policy and friendly relations with Serbia, this was extremely unlikely to lead to an ‘objective’ position. And, in fact, Ambartsumov’s actions and statements did suggest a pro-Serb bias.
In August 1992, he visited former Yugoslavia (at the invitation of the Serbian Academy o f Sciences and Arts, SANU) with Rumiantsev, where they met Panic, Cosic, and Karadzic, but no Croat or Bosnian Muslim leaders. The aim, Ambartsumov said, was to ‘facilitate efforts to overcome the one-sided position that the international community has taken in the Yugoslav conflict’; but, as Maksim lusin comments, they were unlikely to succeed by meeting representatives of only one side. Furthermore, they claimed that the situation in Yugoslavia was being distorted: ‘we intend to dispel some myths,’ Rumiantsev said, ‘particularly the myth of the concentration camps on the territory o f Yugoslavia’. Naturally, setting out with such an intention made its fulfilment more likely. Ambartsumov concluded that the refiigee camps he saw were like ‘poor quality sports camps’ serving free food ‘perfectly decent by contemporary Moscow standards’. Description o f the camps as concentration camps was
Ambartsumov (25 August 1992).
ITAR-TASS {5 August 1992); lusin (11 August 1992). Crow (6 November 1992), p. 14.
‘disinformation’/'^'^ And, according to Agence France-Presse, Ambartsumov told journalists in Belgrade that the Supreme Soviet would insist that Russia ally itself with Belgrade at the international conference on Yugoslavia due to open in London later in August/'^^ In particular, Ambartsumov was pushing for closer Russian support o f the federal government and president. He hoped, in particular, to arrange a meeting between Yeltsin and Panic, but this did not happen.
The contention that Ambartsumov and Rumiantsev wanted a more pro-Serb emphasis in official policy is borne out by subsequent declarations. For instance, in August, after Russia had supported UNSCRs 770 and 771 enabling the use of military force to ensure the supply of humanitarian aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina and to gain access to detention camps in the FRY, Rumiantsev said that Russia’s position on the situation in the Balkans was ‘not quite right’, and warned that the United States would conclude from Russia’s handling of affairs in the region that the Balkans had ceased to be counted in Russia’s sphere of influence.
Also illustrative is their position on Macedonia. Khasbulatov, Rumiantsev, and Ambartsumov all criticised the decision to recognise Macedonia. This was surprising, given the fact that here was perhaps the clearest example of an independent Russian initiative. In fact, Ambartsumov cited it as an example that ‘Russia today is beginning to play a much more noticeable role in the regulation of the Yugoslav conflict, a more independent role’.^'^^ Furthermore, the decision to recognise a republic with a majority Slav and Orthodox population, linked with Russia by close historical and cultural ties, might be expected to gamer support even from the ‘patriotic’ opposition. But state centrists objected to the decision because recognition complicated relations with Greece and came at an inopportune time. From their point of view, Greece was an important ally in the region and should not be offended. According to Ambartsumov, more attention should have been paid to Greece’s position since it plays an important role ‘in countering the Islamic révanchism that threatens the region from the Adriatic to the Black and Caspian Seas’. B u t , as lusin dryly remarks;
Ibid.. lusin points out that if they truly intended to be objective, they would have awaited the final conclusions of the international commissions that were checking the accuracy of reports of concentration camps; lusin (11 August 1992).
Ibid..
Crow (7 May 1993), p. 38. Crow (6 November 1992), p. 14.
Crow (13 November 1992), p. 37. We might suspect that Khasbulatov objected on the principle that any action by the Foreign Ministry must be opposed.
Ambartsumov (13 August 1992). lusin (5 August 1992).
Just what this threat is and from whom it emanates Ambartsumov did not specify. Nor did he explain, unfortunately, how recognising Orthodox Macedonia will lead to growing Islamic révanchism, especially in the region adjacent to the Caspian
Sea.''"
Conclusions
On the eve o f the anniversary o f the August 1991 putsch, Kozyrev published an article in Nezavisimaia gazeta in which he stated again the basic tenets of his foreign policy approach. Comparing the Belgrade leadership to those who had tried to come to power a year previously in Moscow, he argued that the reason why Serbia found itself an international outcast while Russia had an ‘unprecedentedly favourable international environment’, was not because of some ‘imaginary Slavophobia o f the West’, but because on 19 August 1991, Russians [rossiiane] rejected the forceful preservation of the Soviet Union, and avoided stirring inter-ethnic tensions and using the army to punish those striving for sovereignty and independence. ‘In Belgrade, unfortunately, just such a line has predominated until now,’ he wrote.
Kozyrev divided opponents of his policy into ‘national-Bolsheviks’ and ‘national- democrats’. There was no need to explain why ‘an alliance with the national-Bolsheviks in Belgrade so attracts our national-Bolsheviks’. The ‘national-democrats’, however, were motivated particularly by anti-Western feeling. Kozyrev argued that the logic of their position was really quite simple; ‘as “democrats”, they don’t stand hand-in-hand with the Bolsheviks’, but as ‘nationalists, a union with the cosmopolitan West is sickening’. The position of the ‘national-democrats’ was also muddled by the ‘notorious Slav factor’ in foreign policy:
There is no doubt that this frctor to a certain degree ought to be taken into account in the policies of a state with an enormous Slav population. But this relates by no means only to die Serb national-Bolsheviks, who, by the way, are acting against the national interests of the Serb Slavs themselves, but also to all the Slav peoples of the former Yugoslavia. Don’t forget that even the Muslims in Bosnia are also Slavs...
Basing policy on the ‘Slavonic’ or ‘Orthodox’ factor created dangers in relation to other powers and also within the Russian Federation itself:
Any attempt to divide Europe into Slavonic, Germanic or French communities threatens to return to die situation not even of the second, but the first world war, and if applied to the Yugoslav crisis, for the second time in history to make Serbia the detonator of global catastrophe. Secondly, such an ethnic-religious foreign policy would be anti-Russian, since it could promote the division of Russia itself, where alongside millions of Orthodox Slavs live millions of people of other nationalities and faiths, in particular Muslims.
In fact, Russia’s multi-national character, its many languages and religions, provided a ‘rich, broad palate’ for its foreign policy, which was especially important, given its Eurasian position, for developing good relations with all its neighbours.
This was to be the last such categorical statement by Kozyrev o f an unfettered liberal internationalist approach. Increasingly, diplomats came to emphasise Russian geo-political interests, and its rights rather than duties as a great power. This was reflected in a shift in policy towards the Yugoslav conflicts that began towards the end of 1992 and was both a result of, and a contributor to, the change in overall foreign policy. It was in part a political reaction to the concerted domestic political opposition to official policy, but it also showed that key foreign policy actors now believed that changes were necessary. In particular, there was the feeling that Western powers were taking Russian support for granted and were taking advantage o f Russia’s weakness to further their own interests in the Balkans. Many Russian policy makers believed that Russia should now define its own interests in relation to the conflicts and devise an independent policy to protect them.
In addition, the issue of NATO’s role in the post-Cold War international system began to affect Russia’s relations with the West. Across the Russian political spectrum it was believed that NATO must not be allowed to dominate the security structure of Europe by taking new members, former allies o f the Soviet Union. Nor should it intervene militarily outside its borders in regions in which Russia still had interests. This was to have a major impact on Russian policy towards the Yugoslav conflicts from 1992, as Russia defined its primary interest in relation to the conflicts as keeping NATO out of former Yugoslavia.