Situación de las Reformas 1 El enfoque conceptual de las reformas

1637, the purpose of which was to designate the quality of the products labelled, rather than forest management, as is the intent today.2 Modern forest certification was developed in the early 1990s as a specific form of private environmental governance to address growing public concerns about global deforestation in the previous decade.3 In 1985, Friends of the Earth (FoE) in England and Wales proposed what is claimed as the first modern timber certification and labelling scheme as part of a campaign to save tropical rainforests. Consumers in Britain and Europe were encouraged to avoid purchasing tropical timber produced on a non-sustainable basis, and the organisation launched its own ‘Good Wood’ scheme. From 1988 onwards, stickers and tags began to be attached to wood products as a “seal of approval.”4 In 1989, FoE prepared a proposal for the ITTO to look at the feasibility of developing a timber certification and labelling programme.5 The ITTO Council received the proposal in May 1989 but rejected the recommendations for a forest certification and labelling system.6

This encouraged NGOs to begin organising around certification more seriously themselves.7 At the turn of the decade, the Rainforest Alliance, a US-based non- profit organisation formed the SmartWood Program, created for the purpose of “forestry management certification.”8 The programme’s first certification was carried out in November 1990 in Indonesia, covering the teak wood forests of Java, managed by Perum Perhutani, the state forestry agency.9 At a meeting in San Francisco in 1991 a group of timber traders and social and environmental NGOs determined to develop an independently audited global system for “good

forest management”, managed by a global umbrella organisation, which, it was decided should be called the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), and a working group was created to start the process.10 WWF was to directly attribute the impetus to move forward on certification as a consequence of ITTO’s lack of action, and described the proposed FSC scheme as “leaving the ITTO behind.”11 In March 1992 interested parties met again in Washington, D.C. An interim board was elected, with representation from both developed and developing countries.12 Six working groups were created with a range of tasks including the drafting of principles of forest management, fundraising and communications.13

Discussions during this period regarding the scope and intent of the emerging institution were wide-ranging. Proposals regarding governance arrangements created some controversy. Initial thoughts within the working group favoured the creation of FSC as a foundation, with no members and only a board of trustees. This proposal was resisted by the World Rainforest Movement, which lobbied the working group, and urged other NGOs not to adopt this model.14 These groups persuaded the working group to adopt a participatory structure including open membership and accountability mechanisms and procedures for settling disputes. It is claimed that such arrangements provided the emerging FSC “with a legitimacy that it would have lacked if established as a foundation.”15

The term ‘sustainably managed’ was rejected on account of the definitional controversies surrounding this term.16 At the Washington meeting a draft of what were to become FSC’s Principles and Criteria for Well-managed Forests was discussed.17 These were categorised around the following matters: legal and administrative, social and economic, and ecological and environmental.18 It was agreed that FSC should address all forest types. Deliberations regarding the

extension of FSC’s forestry mandate beyond the tropics were not easy, however, and northern NGOs were accused of initially wanting certification to relate solely to the tropics.19

In addition to these founding meetings, consultation processes in ten countries took place between 1990 and 1993 to determine the level of support for a global certification programme for both natural forests and plantations. Following these events a founding assembly was held in Toronto in September 1993 consisting of 130 participants from 26 countries.20 Developing nations were present and included a strong representation from the Pacific Region, which played a significant role in deliberations. Indigenous peoples present also stated their case for the return of their lands. Forest industry representatives included the Canadian Pulp and Paper Association (CPPA) and Californian lumber and milling company, Collins Pine. A number of government representatives and public authorities attended as observers, while research foundations such as the World Resources Institute were also present. Participants were identified as either representing social, economic or environmental interests, and were placed in ‘chambers’ accordingly. The economic chamber contained forest sector representatives as well as consultants and certification bodies.21

Debate as to whether economic interests should be allowed a vote in the proposed future General Assembly was also intense, with Greenpeace and WWF expressing reservations, whilst FoE argued most strongly that they should not.22 A proposal was floated that economic interests be allowed no more than 25% of the voting power in the General Assembly, with the remaining 75% being held by the social and environmental chambers together. In terms of the proposed Board of Directors, two seats were to be reserved for economic interests. Thirteen social

and environmental groups, including Greenpeace, FoE and indigenous groups then withdrew their support, arguing that economic interests had been given too much power, and remained for the rest of the event as observers.23 Discussions regarding the types of forest to be certified, including planted forests, also proved a subject of intense debate, and the proposed principles of forest management were not finalised.24 The chamber system, in which social and environmental interests held 75% of votes in one chamber, and forest owners and retailers held the remaining minority share of 25% in another, was formalised in 1994.25 The initial principles and criteria for “natural forest management”, of which there were nine, referred to plantations only in so far as their establishment was expressly forbidden on sites of primary and well-established secondary forests, or of environmental, cultural or social significance.26

The ratified Statutes identified the first purpose of FSC to be the promotion of the environmentally appropriate, economically viable and adequate management of forests, as well as “a forestry production that preserves the environment.”27 The By-Laws use the more evangelical term “mission” rather than purpose, redefining the organisation’s role as the promotion of “environmentally appropriate, socially beneficial, and economically viable management of the world’s forests.”28 This mission was to be fulfilled through three activity areas: the promotion of its Principles and Criteria of Forest Stewardship by means of voluntary accreditation of a programme for certifying forest management; conducting educational activities to increase aware of the value of forest certification as a means of improving forest management; and the provision of guidance and assistance to policy-makers, legislators and forest managers on forest management issues.29 In 1994 it established its headquarters in Oaxaca, Mexico, consisting of a staff of

three and an executive director, gaining recognition under Mexican law as a civil association in 1996.30 Following a vote of FSC’s founding members in August 1994, the Principles and Criteria (P&C) were agreed upon. The Statutes, later superseded by the By-Laws on a number of procedural and structural matters, were also approved.31

The response to the development and founding of FSC was mixed. The reaction in some parts of the social, economic and environmental sectors, which would be expected to favour FSC was not entirely supportive. Some social interests felt the founding assembly only superficially addressed their concerns about lack of consultation and discriminatory treatment of tropical countries.32 The idea of certification itself was met, as has been previously related, by strong opposition within the ITTO. FSC’s management emphasis on performance was similarly opposed by senior figures in the global timber industry. These industry forces began a well-planned offensive to undermine performance-based standards, such as those proposed by FSC.33 It was not only large-scale interests within the forest industry who were concerned about the arrival of FSC. European small forest owners met its decision to base itself in Mexico with suspicion.34

In the same year, and perhaps partly in response to these developments, FSC softened its stance on the certification of plantations, and a revised set of P&C, further amended in 2000, were to permit the certification of plantations, with certain provisos.35 Certification of plantations had been discussed as early in FSC’s history as 1991. After the initial approval of the P&C without reference to plantations, the Board of Directors had agreed to extend the Principles to include plantations in 1993. Consultations were held between 1994 and 1995, and after a ballot of the membership in December 1995, in which 89% voted in favour of a

plantations-specific addendum, a new Principle Ten was approved at the eighth Board of Directors meeting in 1996.36

This action may have appeased some forestry interests, but it was to cause growing concerns about FSC’s credibility amongst some of those environmental NGOs that had withdrawn from the founding assembly in 1993.37 FSC also began to attract some criticism. At the beginning of 1996 its membership was drawn from only 25 countries and Asia and Africa were not well represented. This increased to 37 by 1997, but numbers in the economic chamber were still criticised as being too low to ensure proper interest representation. Under- representation of social interests, particularly from Africa and Asia was also identified as being a problem during this period, perhaps an even more severe one than economic participation.38 On a separate, but related issue, small forest owners continued to accuse FSC of being discriminatory, in view of the fact that large-scale, tropical forestry certification was both easier to achieve, and more cost-effective, than small-scale operations.39

Nevertheless, between 1993 and 1997 FSC and its supporters were credited with making a significant contribution to international forest certification and the progress of certification might not have been as far-reaching without it. It provided an important forum for policy debate, making certification a reality rather than a concept, as well as stimulating the growth of competing initiatives.40 In 1993 an independent working group consisting of academics and NGOs developed an Indonesian ecolabelling standard (Lembaga Ekolabel Indonesia - LEI). Although criticised by some NGOs as being unduly close to government, the programme has been presented as being stricter in some ways than FSC, with whom it entered into cooperation in 1997.41 The first accreditation contracts were

signed with four certification bodies, and the first certified products bearing FSC logo were released in the UK in 1996.42 The first Working Group, also in the UK, was established in the same year to develop nationally relevant management standards. In the following year the first national standard was endorsed for Sweden.43

Despite these positive developments, serious concerns regarding FSC certification, and the manner in which it was implemented by its accredited certifiers also began to emerge from the mid ‘nineties. One of the earliest, and most controversial cases, was the certification by the Rainforest Alliance’s SmartWood Program of teakwood plantations in Costa Rica.44 In 1999 NGO frustration over the failings within the FSC system were to culminate in the production of a highly critical report published by the Rainforest Foundation.45

Internally, however, the organisation continued to move forward with a number of policy initiatives, which were brought together during 1999. In January, following an international workshop held in Mexico in 1998, FSC became the first organisation to define high conservation value forests, and to delineate those forest characteristics that merited special protection. This was promoted as representing considerable progress in resolving forestry conflicts.46 Policy clarifications were also issued regarding the prohibition on genetically modified organisms from certified forests, the use of chemical pesticides, poorly defined in the P&C, and matters concerning contract labour. Major revisions of the controversial percentage-based claims policy, whereby certified and uncertified sources could be mixed, were also undertaken.47 These were seen as part of a process aiming at providing a clear interpretation of the policies contained within the P&C and avoiding undue bureaucracy whilst making

certification accessible, attractive and credible. The intention was to avoid ‘moving the goalposts’, while coping with changing scientific, technical and public opinions.48

The 1999 General Assembly was marked by a number of governance-related motions, attempting to address some of the perceived shortcomings of the organisation.49 An experienced facilitator was used to guide the membership through the complex procedures now required for speaking to, amending, and agreeing on motions under a revised tripartite economic, social and environmental chamber system.50 A number of important motions were passed, notably -- given external criticisms -- on small landowner certification.51 This and the other motions directed at improving FSC’s performance and policy gaps began to be implemented over the following year.52 At the organisation’s second annual conference about half of the agenda was devoted to social issues, and discussions were held regarding workers’ rights, community forestry, indigenous peoples and small forest enterprises.53

Although these initiatives went some way to appease stakeholder concerns, FSC was placed under increasing levels of scrutiny by NGOs, both supportive and sceptical. In May 2001, European environmental and social NGO FERN, published its report Behind the Logo, a comprehensive analysis of FSC and its competitor schemes.54 Although generally favourable to FSC and critical of other schemes, the findings did not all go in FSC’s favour. The report stressed that FSC was not perfect in a number of aspects, including methods of consultation, communication, and dispute resolution.55 A number of NGO complaints were also raised both formally and informally with FSC during this period. These included an ongoing dispute in New Zealand concerning plantation forestry company

Fletcher Challenge Forests and its certifier Scientific Certification Systems.56 This concern had arisen largely on account of the unpopular practice of undertaking evaluations using “interim” standards.57 The environmental and social NGO, World Rainforest Movement, also released a number of reports far less flattering than Behind the Logo aimed at pressuring FSC to change its stance on a number of issues, particularly plantation certification.58

In November 2001 the Rainforest Foundation published the report, Trading in Credibility, which systematically outlined a number of structural and procedural weaknesses in FSC system, as well as some of the shortcomings of its certification and standard setting activities in a number of countries. Although generally negative, the report nevertheless acknowledged that whatever its failings, FSC was based on sound principles, which could not be said for its competitor, industry schemes, and it was more demanding than them in its assessment procedures.59