FRANCISCO I. MADERO, POSTERIOR NINGUNO NINGUNO
CALLE 15 SN NÚMERO INTERIOR 0 , COLONIA DEPORTIVA, CÓDIGO POSTAL
There could be several alternative explanations for the observed relationship that hosting refugees from a rival country leads to an increase in respect for human rights and a decrease if refugees hail from a non-rival state. The first is contiguity.
The majority of refugees flee to neighboring countries (Schmeidl 1997; Melander and ¨Oberg 2006). For instance, more than half of the Afghan refugee population resides in Pakistan, Kenya hosts the majority of Somali refugees, and Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon together host approximately 85% of the registered Syrian refugee population. While some try to obtain asylum in countries farther away, the bulk of refugees stay nearby because they lack resources to move further, they want to maintain close contact with their home state, and they desire to return as soon as possible (Schmeidl 1997;Crisp and Jacobsen 1998).11
With respect to interstate rivalries, most rivals also happen to be are neighbor-ing countries. Because of their close proximity, neighborneighbor-ing dyads are prone to iterative interactions that may develop into a hostile relationship. Since refugees tend to flee next door, externalities of the civil war can follow them into the host
11The timing and number of returnees will be explored in the next two chapters of this disser-tation.
country through cross-border raids by non-state groups or hostile origin countries (Salehyan 2008a).
Thus, it is unclear how contiguity influences the observed relationship be-tween interstate rivalry, hosting refugees, and changes in respect for human rights. Table 2.3 presents the results of OLS regressions with panel corrected standard errors that take into account whether states are neighbors from the Cor-relates of War Direct Contiguity dataset (CorCor-relates of War Project 2017; Stinnett et al. 2002). In Model 5, estimates show that whether refugees arrive from a neigh-boring country or further afield do not influence human rights abuses from the previous year. When accounting for how many refugees a state accepts, more refugees from a non-contiguous country leads to a decrease in respect for human rights whereas refugees from a neighboring state holds no association (Model 6).
Thus, being neighbors with a refugee-producing country does not hold any strong association with changes in respect for human rights. On the other hand, as countries host more refugees from a non-neighboring country, it becomes more likely that the host a state will decrease respect for human rights. A potential explanation for this correlation is refugees from further afield are considered more foreign to the host country whereas refugees from a neighbor are more likely to be a known population. For instance, the fervor of the European refugee crisis in 2015 could be because the Syrian civil war, located far away, was displacing vast numbers of civilians to countries where they do not have much contact or cultural similarity with the state. Turkey, neighbor to Syria, initially supported hosting Syrians with claims they were their “Muslim brothers” who needed their
Table 2.3: Refugees from Contiguous States & Strategic Rivals on Changes in Respect for HR
Binary Number of Refugees Binary Number of Refugees
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Refugees from Contig. -0.0075 -0.0001 -
-(0.0088) (0.0009)
Refugees from Non-contig. 0.0068 -0.0018* -
-(0.0073) (0.0007)
Refugees from Rival, Contig. - - 0.0112 0.0019*
(0.0095) (0.0009)
Refugees from Rival, Non-contig. - - -0.0247 -0.0023
(0.0153) (0.0021)
Refugees from Non-rival, Contig. - - -0.0097 -0.0010
(0.0083) (0.0010)
Refugees from Non-rival, Non-contig. - - 0.0072 -0.0015*
(0.0071) (0.0007)
Interstate Conflict -0.04086† -0.03756† -0.0472* -0.0499*
(0.0224) (0.0218) (0.0234) (0.0239)
Civil Conflict -0.0760*** -0.0770*** -0.0754*** -0.0783***
(0.0130) (0.0128) (0.0133) (0.0131)
GDPPC (logged) 0.0100** 0.0105** 0.0097** 0.0097**
(0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0034)
Population (logged) -0.0136*** -0.0109** -0.0131*** -0.0109**
(0.0033) (0.0036) (0.0033) (0.0036)
Neighboring Civil Conflict -0.0030 -0.0055 -0.0033 -0.0049
(0.0061) (0.0058) (0.0061) (0.0060)
TEK -0.0006 0.0013 -0.0006 0.0015
(0.0097) (0.0095) (0.0096) (0.0095)
Executive Constraints 0.0120*** 0.0119*** 0.0125*** 0.0124***
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022)
Respect for HRt 1 -0.0462*** -0.0444*** -0.0452*** -0.0438***
(0.0082) (0.0085) (0.0083) (0.0086)
Constant 0.1415** 0.1046* 0.1326** 0.1084*
(0.0495) (0.0498) (0.0488) (0.0492)
N 3201 3201 3201 3201
†p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
help. Future research could tease out these relationships in more detail.
Turning to the next two models, I code whether refugees came from a ri-val and/or a contiguous state. Model 7 operationalizes these distinctions cat-egorically whereas Model 8 examines the logged number of refugees that fall under these categories. The results reveal interesting patterns. First, the associ-ation between refugees from a rival state and an increase in respect for human rights seems to be driven by contiguous countries. With respect to non-rival states, accepting any refugees from a contiguous country shows no discernible pattern with changes in respect for human rights. However, when considering
Figure 2.2: Predicted Change in Respect for HR Given Strategic Rivalry and
Predicted Change in Respect for HR
0 3 6 9 12 15
Predicted Change in Respect for HR
0 3 6 9 12 15
Predicted Change in Respect for HR
0 3 6 9 12 15
Predicted Change in Respect for HR
0 3 6 9 12 15
Refugees, logged Non-rival, Non-contiguous
the number of refugees in MOdel 8, we see that it is refugees from rival non-contiguous states that are associated with a decline in respect for human rights, similar to Model 6.
The predicted change in respect for human rights given the number of refugees from rival and contiguous states is displayed in Figure 2.2. As the number of refugees from a contiguous rival rise, the more likely we are to observe the host state increasing respect for human rights in the subsequent year. The rest of the categories show a decrease in respect for human rights in the host state when more refugees arrive. These findings suggest the contiguous nature of a strategic rivalry translates to fewer human rights violations. Absent this context, the arrival
of refugees, especially in larger numbers and from non-contiguous countries, is associated with a decrease in respect for human rights.
I also run a series of robustness checks that examine different specifications of the dependent variable. The first is using the absolute human rights scores, rather than changes in respect. Tables A.2 and A.3 of Appendix A display results of models where the dependent variable is respect for human rights in year t and includes a lagged dependent variable in the list of covariates. The coefficient estimates are similar to the main results.
Next, I expand the window of time for changes in respect for human rights.
Only examining changes from one year to the next could be too narrow of a win-dow to produce meaningful alterations in human rights practices. I re-estimate the regressions using dependent variables accounting for changes in respect for human rights in a 3- and 5-year windows. The regression results can be found in Appendix A, with Tables A.4 and A.5 for the changes in 3 years and Tables A.6 and A.7 for changes over 5 years. The results corroborate the findings of the main results. Even when expanding the time frame, refugees from rival states are associated with an increase in respect for human rights whereas refugees from non-rival states lead host states to be more likely to abuse human rights. Refugees from neighboring countries do not have an influence on respect for human rights unless they arrive in large numbers from non-neighboring states. Finally, it is the context of refugees from neighboring rival states that lead host countries to re-spect human rights more, whereas refugees from non-contiguous rival states and refugees from non-rival states lead to a decline in respect.
The final robustness check concerns the rivalry indicator. In the main results, I specifically use Thompson and Dreyer’s strategic rivalry because it captures the perception of threat, not just the number of militarized interactions between states. I also re-run the models using Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) specifica-tion of interstate rivalry. Their conceptualizaspecifica-tion of rivalry consists of four di-mensions: spatial consistency, duration, militarized competitiveness, and linked conflict. Since the data ends in 2001, the sample is restricted to this year and may not be directly comparable to the main findings. The results of these models are found in Tables A.9 and A.10 of Appendix A.
The results of the models using the Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) concep-tualization of rivalry are not consistent with the main results presented in this chapter. While in some models the distinction leads to similar patterns as the main results, it is not consistent. Even when accounting for contiguity, there is no meaningful statistical relationship between hosting refugees and respect for human rights. This suggests the definition of rivalry matters for the association between taking in refugees from a rival and changes in respect for human rights.
Most likely, since Thompson and Dreyer (2011) rely on the perception and be-lief that the other state is an enemy, and this bebe-lief is shared mutually between both countries, rivalries are more emotionally triggering and well-known in their conceptualization. Importantly, these rivalries are more likely to be be known publicly, such that citizens support state actions This distinction is important be-cause the Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) conceptualization relies on frequent military action in a period of time whereas states do not have to fight militarily to
be considered rivals inThompson and Dreyer(2011). Further, since each country needs to perceive the other as a threat in Thompson and Dreyer’s specification of rivalry, there can be instances where one country thinks the other is an enemy whereas the other does not even if they are often engaged in militarized disputes.
Relating to the association with changes in respect for human rights given the arrival of refugees, the goodwill of accepting refugees from a rival will only be substantiated if both countries perceive the other as an enemy. Otherwise, there is no incentive to capitalize on embarrassing the origin state by imporving respect for human rights.
2.8 Conclusion
Most quantitative studies investigating the relationship between refugees and se-curity tend to find that refugees are associated with a higher propensity for civil conflict onset (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006), one-sided violence against civilians (Fisk 2018), and repression in the host state (Danneman and Ritter 2014; Wright and Moorthy 2018). While other studies show that accepting refugees is beneficial for the host in terms of political and economic gains (Jacobsen 2002; Cortes 2004;
Sadiq 2005;Adamson 2006), they tend to address specific cases that are not always generalizable to other situations. The findings of this study advance our knowl-edge regarding how human rights practices in host states are impacted by the arrival of refugees. Namely, accepting refugees from a strategic rival provides an incentive to boast about humanitarian practices toward these populations, which
can also garner good-will from the international community and are documented in human rights reports.
I find that the arrival of refugees from a rival state leads to boasting of good behavior by host governments because they are accommodating refugees. In this context, the government has an incentive to highlight their humanitarian action because there is a foreign policy objective to undermine their adversary and project their hospitality to the international community. By accepting refugees from their strategic rival, host states are able to tarnish the reputation of their adversary by highlight that their enemy is unable to protect its own citizens. This may also lead to the host state being more active in procuring funds from aid or-ganizations and a productive working relationship with the UNHCR in order to implement assistance programs. While this was not directly tested in this chapter, future work can investigate whether and how some countries are more successful at obtaining monetary and institutional support or whether the host state pro-vides more of its own resources for hosting refugees . This would be especially interesting over time when refugee situations become protracted and funds be-come limited.
On the other hand, refugees from a non-rival state are met with a decrease in respect for human rights. This is likely linked to the traditional theories of immigration that expect a response of xenophobia and discrimination because refugees pose a “threat” as an inherent out-group. While refugees are often con-sidered more “deserving” than regular migrants for sanctuary, their arrival can be associated with negative security externalities. This subjects host countries to
implement policies designed to prevent individuals from seeking asylum within their borders or to incentivize repatriation. Across the globe, this is witnessed through closures of border crossings in Europe, the attempt to close down the Dadaab camp in Kenya, de-funding assistance to refugees in Lebanon, and im-plementing quotas on how many individuals are awarded refugee status in the United Kingdom and United States. These actions contribute to a negative im-pact on a country’s respect for human rights since governments are deliberately enforcing measures to keep individuals out of their country.
This negative relationship between refugees and respect for human rights is most pronounced when refugees arrive from a non-contiguous country. A simple explanation is that refugees or immigrants from further away are more likely to be
“incompatible” with the national culture in the host state. Domestic populations of the host state are more likely to view refugees as intruders when refugees are seen as being more culturally and socially “distant” (Adida, Laitin, and Valfort 2016). For instance, refugees from the Middle East and Africa hoping to make it to Europe are often treated with disdain and met with “non-assistance” poli-cies by potential host states (Heller and Pezzani 2016). Polipoli-cies toward refugees are crafted under a framework of security, which can lead to more violations of human rights by the government. This is reflected in the statistical relationship found in the results.
How host governments promote their own behavior toward accepting or deny-ing displaced populations is clearly bedeny-ing picked up by human rights monitors.
States certainly have strong motivations to vocalize good behavior toward the
exiled population of their rival, which is observed as cooperative and positive behavior. Since governments have the foreign policy goal of undermining their rival, the government will purposefully act and broadcast this behavior. Con-versely, states without such a foreign policy objective in mind must consider the costs associated with hosting refugees and will act in their self-interest, which tends to be characterized as xenophobic.
Another ramification is understanding the complexities of refugee burden sharing. The majority of refugees flee to neighboring countries, yet it seems states farther away tend to enforce tough policies barring immigrants from en-tering and are able to get away with it. In particular, countries farther away from conflict regions (i.e. Western states) tend to have strict and long bureaucratic vetting processes that may not grant asylum to the whole family. On the other hand, countries within a region experiencing violence are less capable of control-ling cross-border flows and are the states hosting most refugees. For instance, Kenya announced they would close the Dadaab camp but after a backlash and a Supreme Court ruling, Dadaab kept the doors open. On the other hand, poli-cies like the United State’s “travel ban” are adopted to keep the already limited number of refugees from entering.12
While there are exceptions, such as Canada and Germany who promote their open border policy and increase their asylum seeker quota, there is domestic
12In the next chapter of the dissertation, I show how, since the end of the Cold War, 356 million people are or have been refugees. The majority of these individuals remained in host states, with 27 million refugees repatriating to their country of origin and only 3 million refugees resettled to a third country. Note third-country resettlement is the main avenue for refugees to be granted asylum in developed Western nations, such as the United States.
backlash to these stances. Right-wing anti-immigrant parties are collecting more of the vote share in these countries in response to their federal government’s stance. While out of the scope of this chapter, future work can examine the variation in host government’s policies—and how this changes given inflows of refugees—and the reasons behind this variation.