While proponents of the creole model see differences within CARICOM as capable of coalescing into building blocks for a common identity, proponents of the plural and plantation models see such divisions as antithetical to a common identity. Premdas (1996) for example assumes that people are more likely to have strong ties to their racial/ethnic background than a macro/trans-Caribbean identity. In a similar vein, other Caribbean observers contend that the Caribbean identity as historically conceived is an ideal, not a reality (Müllerleile, 1996; Premdas, 1996). Eric Williams (1973), the first Prime Minister of Trinidad & Tobago, and proponent of a federal style government for the Commonwealth Caribbean, notes that despite similar
populations and historical development, Caribbean countries:
Have basically one thing in common: they have been nurtured in a climate of isolation one from the other and the jealousies resulting therefrom. Britain did little or nothing to encourage inter-island co-operation… [And hence we have developed a] historical tradition to fragmentation rather than to integration (Williams, 1973:51). Müllerleile (1996) extends this argument, noting that the shared history, geography, social and climate have developed a Caribbean personality and ‘Caribbean’ ways of living and behaving,
60
which is inhibitive to development and integration. This view has inspired a whole gamut of debate on the impact of insularity on negating Caribbean unity. For example, the early Caribbean integration theorist William Demas (1975) contends that the geographic insularity between the islands have produced a competitive, individualistic mentality in the people of the region. These divisions have served to prevent the formation of a Caribbean identity (Lewis, 1968; Parker & Scott, 2006; Smith, 1968). Instead of forging a unified identity, what has emerged is a
multiplicity of identities within the Caribbean (Müllerleile, 1996; Premdas, 1996; Garcia, 2008). Another argument supporting the absence of a common Caribbean identity is that
Caribbean expressions are not indigenous but are products of external influences, particularly colonial imprints. In other words, they are imposed from the outside. Lewis (1968:350) arguing from the Plural society model of the Caribbean, notes that “regional identity… was frequently not so much an indigenous phenomenon on native grounds as it was the effort of the outsider groups… to impose an abstract ideal upon an intractable insularity”. Similarly, Müllerleile, (1996: 137) opines that “people, culture and language were all imported”. This sentiment is shared by the prominent Caribbean novelist, Naipaul, who stipulates that the Caribbean consists of “manufactured societies, labour camps, creations of the empire; and for a long time they were dependent on the empire for law, language, institutions, culture, even officials. Nothing was generated locally” (in Mullerleile, 1996:136). The supposed lack of authenticity in Caribbean society is perceived as creating reticence among CARICOM nationals regarding a common identity. Müllerleile (1996:136) summarizes the argument, noting that what Caribbean people possess is “an ‘identity of inferiority’ to colonial influences, out of which grows ‘complicity at the expense of co-operation’. Accordingly, the Nobel Prize laureate, Sir Arthur Lewis, (1983) affirms that a specific West Indian personality and a particular West Indian social system are not
61
possible or desirable due to colonial outgrowths, which include deep structural discordances such as racial division and inequalities.
The above arguments and the three models of Caribbean societies point to the structural conditions that constrain the development of a CARICOM identity. However, these structural make-up of CARICOM societies also affect social relations and individuals’ identity choices. Borrowing from Beckford’s Plantation Society Model and Lewis’ Plural Society model, many regional writers also blame racial and ethnic divisions for disunity not only within and between Caribbean countries, but also within and between people (Mullerleile, 1996; Premdas, 1996; Smith, 1984). According to Stone, “the idea of an individual West Indian identity is predicated on the assumption that, in the Caribbean, people of different races have together formed a West Indian society in which the question of race does not play a role, but where, instead, social norms are set by income, class and education” (in Mullerleile, 1996:164). Smith (1984) describes stratification as a source of tension in the Caribbean based on unequal distribution of power among ethnic groups and social class. The stratification and differences are embodied in the tensions and xenophobia that is said to be experienced by some CARICOM migrants (Kendall, 2008; Ferguson, 2003). They can also lead to a situation in which people mix, but do not combine (Lewis, 1983). In Trinidad, Guyana and Belize, racial tensions are known to be prevalent, and it is pluralism rather than assimilation that are the status quo in those countries (Smith, 1984; Lewis, 1983:10).
Premdas (1996) agrees that it is membership in ethnic communities, not territorial, cultural or historical affiliation, which determines how Caribbean people derive their sense of belonging. He notes that in spite of shared history, colonial powers have left different imprints, and identities on each island, which precedes an “enormous range and variation in present day
62
Caribbean societies” (Premdas, 1996:2). This, alongside the multi-racial, multi-lingual, stratified, and multi-cultural composition, makes the concept of a Caribbean identity nebulous (Premdas, 1996).
Borrowing on Anderson’s (2006) concept of the imagined community, Premdas (1996) suggests that a sense of regional identity can exist without much social relationship among Caribbean nationals. He contends that “it is easy to assert a Caribbean identity if that person does not have to meet his/her compatriots and have no hope of this ever happening” (Premdas,
1996:6). Furthermore, he argues that an imaginary region empowers persons with something much bigger than a relatively small island (Premdas, 1996) and so it might be desirable to have this larger sense of being that a regional identity permits. At the same time, he notes “Caribbean” is an abstraction suffused with an assortment of ethnic tensions that demonstrate the dangers of making indiscriminate ethnic identity claims (Premdas, 1996:8).
In addition to lacking a tangible base, Robert Cuthbert (1986) argues that a ‘Caribbean identity’ is something that is not accepted by many people of the region. He stipulates that for many residents, it is much more important to be designated a national of their native country than to be a Caribbean person or a West Indian. In fact, Cuthbert (1986) also holds that in spite of links between family members in the various islands, and large intra-regional migration, this has not led to a regional identity.
The above suggests that even if it exists, the CARICOM identity is non-salient. They also indicate that it is weakened by social relations where people privilege personal characteristics such as race and class over a regional identity. Thus, the formation of a CARICOM identity requires the negotiation of race and class as well as other structural differences that define the countries in CARICOM. Applying the concentric models of identities to the discussion above,
63
national and ethnic identities appear much closer to the individual than Caribbean identity. As Boxill (1997) points out, notwithstanding intra-regional relations developed through migration and integration, the Caribbean historical legacy has divided the region to the point where its members possess stronger identification with countries outside of the region than with those inside. The key argument by these scholars is that despite similar social structures and forms of social organization, the Anglophone Caribbean is far from unified into a common identity let alone non-Anglo Caribbean nations (such as Suriname and Haiti). They therefore cast doubt on the possibilities of integration and of creating a regional identity. In fact, they imply that intra- regional travels would not lead to the strengthening of a regional identity because social relations would be hindered by personal differences, which would loosen the sense of a unified region.