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As mentioned above, realism has been the dominant explanation of the reconciliation. It is often argued from this perspective that the democracy did not choose but was forced into reconciliation by certain external factors, especially the attitude of Sparta which was supposedly the guardian of Athenian oligarchs. It is said that, had it been possible, the demos would not have voluntarily given up its revenge on the oligarchs. For example, Stephen Todd concedes that the reconciliation was successful to a certain extent, but he also stress that ‘the reason for this was not democratic magnanimity, or the existence of an all-powerful ‘moderates’ faction, but the threat of Sparta.’13

Thomas C. Loening’s The Reconciliation Agreement of 403/ 402 B.C. in Athens (1987) is an important work on this issue. Though pointing out that the peaceful outcome of the Athenian civil war was extraordinary, Loening does not argue that the Athenian way of thinking and behaviour were anything different from the way they had been in wartime.

The reconciliation was mainly achieved by the political and military conditions at that moment. All the three parties involved in the negotiation, the democrats, the oligarchs, and the Spartans, made their decisions according to nothing other than their partisan interests.14 Besides, he concludes that ‘[t]he triumph of the reconciliation treaty must be credited in large part to the leaders of the restored democracy, especially Archinos and Thrasyboulos, who were far-sighted enough to recognize that the renaissance of Athens depended upon peace and harmony among all its citizens.’ 15

Another recent example is Cynthia Schwenk. Though appreciating the stability and other achievements of the fourth-century Athens, she still argues that Sparta has the credit for the political achievement of Athens, not only because Sparta decided not to destroy Athens and tolerated the restoration of the democracy, but also because it acted as a powerful constraint on ‘the strongest passions and hatreds created [among Athenians] during the rule of the Thirty’.16

Barry Strauss summarizes the external factors that are said to force the democrats to reconcile with the oligarchs. He argues that the remaining strength of the oligarchs and the Spartan army were the true foundation for the moderation of the democrats. Another important reason is the decreased population of the demos which was outnumbered by the richer citizens by at least 20 percent because of their greater casualties in the war.17 B. Strauss also seems to credit the ‘Theramenean’ or moderate oligarchs with the

reconciliation. He concludes: 14 Loening 1987: 13-16. 15 Loening 1987: 149. 16 _{Schwenk 1997: 11-12.} 17 _{B. Strauss 1986: 80-81.}

The ranks of the men of the City were not small, for Archinus had limited the number who could emigrate to Eleusis. They included a general and secretary of the Council for 403/ 402. Three leaders of Phyle and Piraeus were former Theramenists: Anytus, Archinus and Phormisius. Add to this the population problems of the thetes and the watchful eyes of Sparta, and it is no surprise that the restored democracy avoided radicalism.18

This line of interpretation reflects the strong influence of the traditional suspicion of Athenian democracy. It tends to dismiss the achievement of reconciliation, considering it merely an accidental event based on precarious checks and balances of power. The Athenian demos, supposedly still keen on revenge, was seen as a potential threat to the fragile peace agreement, and many policies and decisions by the democracy actually violated the spirit of reconciliation, if not its terms. As to the limited success of the reconciliation, it is often credited to factors other than the demos and its government.

This dominant view of the reconciliation is not without its problems. Firstly, as discussed later in this chapter, the reconciliation is highly successful in terms of the enforcement of reconciliatory regulations and the consequent Athenian internal peace. It is unfair to deny the success of reconciliation, as some scholars did, by applying strict criterions such as complete oblivion and unconditional forgiveness of the past crimes committed by the Athenian oligarchs. It is equally problematic to describe the exceptional long-term

domestic peace of Athens after the civil war as nothing but a precarious balance of power. Secondly, most factors used in realist explanations are far from being decisive as they appear to be. The role of ‘Theramenist’ or moderate politicians has been highly

controversial since ancient times. Neither their morality nor their political leadership at the end of the fifth century B.C. should be taken for granted.19 The influence of Sparta, though important at the beginning of the reconciliation, soon faded out a few years later. Besides, it is likely that Athens was allowed to have complete freedom in the domestic affairs as long as it followed Sparta in its foreign policies.20 The only remaining factor left in B. Strauss’ list is then the post-war structure of Athenian population, whose diversity arguably prevented the demos from taking revenge on the oligarchs. However, even this is questionable, since the political diversity of Athenian population is more like a result of the reconciliation rather than its condition, as discussed below.