One of the issues receiving a great deal of attention in the trust literature is the nature and conceptualization of trust. A number of trust scholars (e.g. Dietz and Den Hartog, 2006; Costa 2003; Dirks and Ferrin, 2002) point to the variety of different operational definitions and conceptualizations of trust. According to Costa (2003) there is a lack of agreement in defining trust. Dietz and Den Hartog (2006) note that the precise nature of trust remains contested.
Nevertheless, Costa (2003) states that even though these definitions reflect differences of opinion, there are a number of issues that are common across them. For example: a
32 number of authors (e.g. Colquitt et al., 2007; Rousseau et al., 1998) point out that the intention to accept vulnerability and positive expectations are two components that are present in many conceptualizations of trust and are critical in defining trust.
Trust is defined as “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectations that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party” (Mayer et al., 1995, p.712). Similarly trust is defined as “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another.” (Rousseau et al., 1998, p.395).
Ferrin, Bligh and Kohles (2008) note that the Mayer et al. (1995) definition of trust is conceptually almost identical to the Rousseau et al. (1998) definition. This is clear since both definition highlight the element of willingness or intention to accept or be vulnerable to the other party. Moreover, they both highlight another element which is that this willingness or intention to be vulnerable is based on positive expectations regarding the behaviour of the other party.
These two similar definitions of trust (i.e. Mayer et al., 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998) are adopted in this thesis for several reasons: first, according to Saunders, Dietz and Thornhill (2014) there is now general agreement on the definition of trust which is outlined in similar terms in the definitions provided by Mayer et al. (1995) and Rousseau et al. (1998). Second, according to Dietz et al.(2010) the Rousseau et al.
(1998) definition of trust highlights the two fundamental components of trust that are common in earlier definitions of trust: the willingness to be vulnerable in a situation of risk and confident positive expectations. Finally, the definition is applicable to the relationship contexts examined in this thesis since according to Mayer et al. (1995) their definition of trust is applicable to a relationship where the other party is identifiable and is perceived to act or react with volition toward the trustor.
As indicated in the introduction of this chapter, the qualitative study explores the antecedents of trust and also those of distrust in a co-worker. Thus, distrust is also defined. A number of trust scholars (e.g. Schoorman, Mayer and Davis, 2007; Saunders et al., 2014) note that the definition of distrust and its relation to trust is an area of contention that has sparked discussions and debates within the trust literature. This debate (e.g. Lewicki, McAllister and Bies, 1998; Schoorman et al., 2007; Saunders et
33 al., 2014) has focused on determining whether trust and distrust are two separate constructs or are two opposite ends of a single continuum.
For example Lewicki et al. (1998) argued that trust and distrust are two separate but linked constructs where each construct has its own separate antecedents thus proposing that the two constructs are not opposite ends of a single continuum (i.e. low trust is not the same as high distrust and high trust is not the same as low distrust) and that it is possible for trust and distrust to co-exist within the same relationship. To support their view, Lewicki et al. (1998) argue that given the contemporary view of relationships as multifaceted and multiplex, there is a need to view relationships as complex multidimensional constructs rather than viewing them as unidimensional. As for McKnight and Chervany (2001), they reviewed the literature on definitions of trust and distrust and developed two separate conceptual models for each construct. They note that the distrust constructs are defined as separate and opposite from trust constructs.
Schoorman et al. (2007) adopted the opposite view to that of Lewicki et al. (1998), thus proposing that the two constructs are opposite ends of the same continuum. To support their view, Schoorman et al. (2007) argued that the definition of distrust in Webster dictionary indicate that trust and distrust are opposites and that distrust is a lack of trust.
Schoorman et al. (2007, p.350) also argue that their “definition of trust-willingness to take risk (i.e., be vulnerable) in a relationship- means that at the lowest level of trust, one would take no risks at all.”. Furthermore, Schoorman et al. (2007, p.350) argue that in their trust model, they note that the trust antecedent ‘ability’ is domain specific and thus, only this allows for trust and distrust to co-exist in the same relationship (without the need to view trust and distrust as separate and different constructs) since “the difference in the level of trust within the same relationship is a function of the different abilities across different domains.”. Moreover, Saunders et al. (2014) note that Schoorman et al. (2007) view on the relation between the two constructs suggests that in general, feeling both distrust and trust toward an individual is unlikely and unsustainable.
In relation to conceptual models for trust and distrust developed by McKnight and Chervany’s (2001), Schoorman et al. (2007) note that the two models are identical suggesting that perhaps there is no need for both models. Saunders et al. (2014, p.643) support this criticism by noting that in McKnight and Chervany’s work “the two
34 concepts are portrayed, puzzlingly, as functional equivalents and opposites”.
Furthermore, Schoorman et al. (2007, p.350) add that since McKnight and Chervany’s (2001) concluded that trust and distrust are opposite to each other, “there is little added value to treating them as separate constructs.”
lastly, Saunders et al. (2014) used structured card sort and in-depth interviews to collect data from a sample of 56 participants to provide the first empirical test on whether trust and distrust are symmetrical (opposites and cannot co-exist) or whether they occur simultaneously as separate constructs. Their findings suggested that trust and distrust rarely occur simultaneously with regard to a single trustee thus providing considerable support to Schoorman et al.’s view of the two constructs since the findings imply that trust precludes the occurrence of distrust and vise-versa. These findings were from 44 participants who felt either trusting or distrustful. However their findings also provided support to Lewicki et al.’s (1998) view since 11 participants felt neither trusting nor distrustful and only one case felt both trust and distrust simultaneously which the authors note that they were both felt rather weakly by the participant and appeared to have distinct contextual stimuli.
For the purposes of the qualitative study, the view on trust and distrust provided by Schoorman et al. (2007) is adopted (i.e. trust and distrust are two opposite ends of the same continuum) for several reasons; first, the considerable empirical support provided by Saunders et al. (2014) to Schoorman et al.’s (2007) argument. Second, Schoorman et al.’s (2007) provides a convincing argument that trust is domain specific which can explain why trust and distrust (e.g. low trust) can co-exist in the same relationship without having to separate the two concepts. According to McKnight and Chervany (2001, p.45) “high trust and distrust would not simultaneously exist if interpersonal trust constructs were defined as situation-specific, because it is difficult to imagine both highly trusting and highly distrusting a person regarding the same situation.”.