soluciones contraproducentes

Sanctions can be used to encourage compliance with state regulations and induce workers and managers to follow the state plan. No cogent and unified regulation imposing such sanctions has been found. This is perhaps not surprising, since China does not possess a clear legal system nor a codified set of laws.

Four major reasons for this exist. First, the Chinese traditionally are little concerned with legal systems, which were something to be

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be settled in court were frequently decided by those involved or recourse was made to extra-legal institutions for solution. This attitude

persisted into the Communist period, and top level factorv management regarded the law as existing solely for the punishment of counter- revolutionaries: managers regarded their workers as their own people to be dealt with by themselves [ J.M.J.P., 1955/1/17] . Many quasi-

judicial organs, such as People's Courts and Comrades' Trial Committees, were established and used to try cases and impose sentences early in the 1950s; such organisations were given broad powers to impose sanctions [ Schurmann F., 1966:188] . The Party gradually and effectively replaced the legal system.

A second reason was the inability to set up a good legal system in China ii^ the 1950s, because of the short period of existence of the new regime and the lack of good personnel in sufficient numbers.

A third reason was much more important. This was the attitude towards law involved in the Maoist ideology. Inherent in this is the view that revolution is essential and change will be continuous. Stability and law are not important; the former is not desired, the

latter is almost irrelevant. The stress on the masses in this ideology, along with the belief that the masses collectively have the ability to be right, also obstructed the establishment of formal laws and legal systems.

A fourth reason is that many items possess, or nearly possess, the force of law. All people's government orders, decisions, and commands were regarded as law by the courts [C.P.G., 1951] , and in the absence of these, government policy itself V7as taken as law. Editorials in the People's Daily are 'near law', while articles in it, as well as most published recommendations, carry an influence greater than similar publications in the west. This situation provides flexibility to the state, so that a formal set of laws are not required and might indeed be considered superfluous.

The sanctions available

Sanctions are considered here as forming two groups: general sanctions and specific sanctions. General sanctions exist and form part of the general environment within which workers and managers operate. All such sanctions consist essentially of a preference for not offending the Party and state. In more detail, there is a fear that one might become a target of struggle meetings during a movement, when incidents of

infringements of rules may be used to ones detriment. A personal file IS kept by the state on all residents, and many people apparently believe that it is a voluminous record of all important events.

Informant number eleven reported that in fact it was very thin indeed, but the prevalent view was deliberately not discouraged as it made control easier. There was also the possibility of discovery and report of infringements by the trade union. Communist Youth Leage, Party, or activists, which could result in punishment.

The specific sanctions available to deter breaking of regulations and encourage the pursuit of plan norms were of two kinds, legal and administrative. The legal sanctions were applied by the courts, which considered all laws. The corruption laws in particular could apply to industrial malpractises such as theft, bribery, embezzlement, and

'satisfying oneself at the expense of the public', the latter capable of wide interpretation [ H.H.Y.P., 1952c]. Punishments under this law varied from admonishment through a range of fines and terms of imprison- ment to death.

There were many possible administrative punishments for malpractises, including dismissal, admonishment, criticism, demotion in job or in

wage grade, expulsion from the Party, the noting of one or more 'demerits' or 'large demerits' in the record,^ and writing and rewriting confessions. There was also the power to send a serious case to a court for trial, and directors had the power to stop a bonus payment under certain

circumstances.^

The use of available sanctions

Deliberate use of sanctions in order to ensure fulfillment of plans was apparently rather rare, despite the fact that the plan was considered to be law. Sanctions do not seem to have acted as the counterpart of financial incentives to encourage production and plan compliance; a high output earned a bonus, but low quality did not lead to punishment [ Hsu Chang-ch'ing, 1957]. One administrative sanction that was sometimes used was to reduce a workers wage as a fine if his targets were not met. This was encouraged in one article, in cases such as significant

fluctuations in quality of output, in order to improve standards [ Ju Lien, 1956a]. The practice was criticised in the textile industry as being

1

Three large demerits resulted in the dismissal of tax workers fM. of F., 1950] , and the expulsion of members from the Party in the textile industry [ Informant number 8] .

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punitive [ Liu Yung -tsung, 1955], and in industry in general as being harsh as well as illegal [ K.J.J.P., 1956/5/18] . It was ordered that this sanction should not be used.

The courts in particular played a most minor role in the application of sanctions in the textile industry. Few showcase trials, accompanied by publicity, were held in industry in general after the conclusion of the Wufan movement. If the courts were expected to play a role, then such trials might be expected to be well publicised. The occasional reported trial was usually for corruption or embezzlement. Factory managers preferred not to send workers to the courts even when they should have done so. Managers often dealt with it themselves by

criticism and education, sometimes would use administrative punishments proper, but only exceptionally would they let it go to court [ J.M.J.P., 1955/1/17].

If sanctions in general were to be used as an important device to ensure desired results, then it might be expected that they would be discussed fully. There were no discussions of sanctions as a form of control in either of the two textile journals up to 1959, nor were there any movements with the use of sanctions as an aim. Severe punishment of managers was in any case not desirable, since China was very short of experienced men with administrative ability. The wide use of punishments could have resulted in a diminution of the existing stock and served to deter potential recruits. Additionally it would contradict the view that human beings can be changed and re-educated, and might negate the policy of achieving people who were both red and expert.

Many of the reports of flagrant breaking of rules do not recommend, or even mention, punishment of offenders. The case of the Honan Textile Bureau illegally diverting part of its holdings of enterprise funds to its own use is an example [Chang Chung-i, 1956]. Where punishment was recorded it often does not seem severe. A case of the managers of a mill who buried huge quantities of cotton and yarn in the grounds, apparently as an illegal device for concealing the amount of waste, resulted in two dismissals, two demotions and two reductions in grade, [M. of T., 1955c]. A tax scandal in Southern Kiangsu involved bribery of tax officials in order to avoid payments of tax. In two years the number of corrupt tax cadres increased from four to eighty-five,equal to thirty- seven per cent of all the tax cadres in the town. Yet most of the

punishments mentioned were the recording of demerits of various size and number [ H.H.Y.P., 1952a].

Punishments were reportedly given tardily in the textile industry and were often so remote from the event that the effectiveness of

sanctions as a deterrent was greatly reduced. In addition the punish- ments were not at all severe [T.S.S.B., 1955b] .

Sanctions were not popular with some sections of the Party, which would hinder their use. When a manager punished workers by giving demerits or reducing the workers grade and wage grade, some felt that it was commandism and punitivism on the part of the manager. This work style was considered poor in general and it ignored the role of the masses [ J.M.J.P., 1956/7/1] . This reflects reasonably clearly the basically different approaches to organisation and management of the Maoist ideology, with stress on human organisation and the masses, and the 'Russian' method of using experts and establishing sets of rules.

Despite the lack of reliance on sanctions as a device for ensuring compliance with regulations and plans, the existence of sanctions may well have had some effect in this area. It is impossible to know how many malpractises did not occur because of the existence of sanctions nor how many times regulations were observed and plans fulfilled because of the fear of possible punishment.