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3.2. HERRAMIENTAS DE REGISTROS

3.2.4. HERRAMIENTAS ACÚSTICAS

3.2.4.1. Sonda Acústica (MSS)

2.5.1 Economic, Cultural and Social Importance of Fisheries to Kiribati

Kiribati ranked the third largest behind PNG and FSM in terms of tuna catch in the WCPO (Western and Central Pacific Ocean). According to official data, Gillett and Lightfoot (2001) the percentage contribution of fishing to GDP in 1999 is 0.6% in Papua New Guinea (PNG) and 12.0% in Kiribati. Twenty percent of the total tuna catch from the WCPO is taken from the Kiribati’s waters. Kiribati received a range of 40 to 60 percent of the total government revenue from

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license fees. This large proportion of the government’s revenue from access fees shows the vital importance of tuna resource to the economy of Kiribati.

The Kiribati government is concerned not only for the economy but also for the sustainability of the tuna stock for consumption and for livelihoods. Seafood and in particular fish is the main source of protein of the majority of the Kiribati population. Fish consumption estimates for Kiribati indicates that it has the highest rate of fish consumption in the world at 185.0 kg/ capita in the late 1990s Gillet & Lightfoot (2001). Fisheries Division (1978) estimates that 335,936 cans of fish are purchased in South Tarawa annually. The annual fresh fish consumption for the 14,824 residents of South Tarawa was estimated to be 113.0 per kg per capita.

2.5.2 Fisheries Employment in Kiribati.

NEPO (National Economic Planning Office) (1999) reported that the 1995 record shows that of the 7,848 people who had cash work, 349 people (4.4%) had fisheries related jobs. This includes seaweed grower, coastal fishermen, deep-sea fishermen and others. Of the 11,940 households in Kiribati, 64% practiced fishing in the ocean flat, 64% in the lagoon flat, 49% in the ocean, and 59% in the lagoon. The main source of cash income for 29% of the 11,920 households in Kiribati was fishing. Preston (2000) estimates fisheries employment in Kiribati in 1996 at 1,131 people employed in commercial harvesting and 20,000 people employed in subsistence fishing. ADB (1998), states that almost all rural households and about 65% of urban households are engaged in fishing for subsistence purposes. About 1,100 household were engaged in seaweed production, however seaweed production declined and the seaweed company closed in 2006. Mees (1987) reported that 40 to 50 % of the weekly South Tarawa (where 50% of the total population resided) fish landings of 128 tons are made by full time commercial fishermen. Fisheries Division, in 1998 indicates 12% of the households in Kiribati

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do not fish. Of those that do fish, 17% fish commercially full time, 22% fish commercially part time, and 61% fish only for subsistence.

2.5.3 License fees in Kiribati.

The licensing agreements between Kiribati and the Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFNs) formally began in 1978, following the declaration of a 200 mile economic fishery zone (EFZ) around the Gilbert Islands group in March 1978. Since the end of the government’s revenue from the phosphate in Banaba, revenue from access fees was the main criterion in Kiribati’s policy of encouraging the major DWFNs to fish within its extensive EEZ (Teiwaki, 1987).

In 1996 Kiribati government revenue from access fees was only 9.9% and in 1999 it was 34% of the total government revenue. In 2004, fishing license fees exceeded 50% of the total government revenue. On average licensing fees amounted to over 40% of the total government revenue in most years. The aim of the government is to get as much revenue as possible from negotiating with DWFNs. Unfortunately by international standards, the Kiribati government received less than average from the DWFNs.

Previous studies like Roniti (1987), Petersen (2002) and Barclay (2006) have identified the cause of the above concern, and they concluded that there was an issue of bargaining power between the Kiribati government and DWFNs. PICs lose their bargaining power to negotiate for higher access fees even though they feel underpaid. It was then recommended that PIC governments be encouraged to increase their participation in the tuna industries, or develop their own tuna fisheries industry and onshore processing plant, enter the international market and export their tuna products with a view to obtaining more benefits from tuna rather than just obtaining the licensing fees from DWFNs.

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In terms of fee payment system, Kiribati and most Pacific Island Countries have been using a lump sum system payment for many years. The amount paid by DWFNs is based on the bilateral negotiations between Fishing nations and concerned Countries who own the EEZ, and the bargaining power of small island nations. However this has been replaced last December with the new system ‘Vessel Day Scheme’ (VDS). This new system was adopted by the FFA and Pacific Island Countries are being encouraged to use the new VDS, although a few countries resist continue to resist the new scheme (PC: Clark (2008), Tumoa (2008), Awira, (2008)).

The ‘VDS’ was implemented in December 2007. The idea is to determine licence fees based on actual fishing effort and catch. It emphasises the idea of the more catch you get the more money you pay. The VDS is designed to provide more control for resource owners. The calculation is based on the amount of catch over the last six (6) years, using the FFA data. The allocation processes requires FFA member countries to meet and calculate the VDS applicable to respective countries based on historical data. They allocate the number of fishing days for all member countries. For instance, if Kiribati is allocated 2000 - 3000 fishing days, those days are then available for sale to fishing nations. Rate per day is determined by respective countries. On a regional scale, some countries have limited the number of days depending on their historical catch data.