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Coming to power with a weak personnel base in nearly all sectors of China’s national security system, Hu Jintao apparently has moved with expected caution on most―but by no means all― signifi cant security policy issues. In foreign and military affairs in particular, Hu has focused on securing for himself as many of the key authoritative positions as possible, trying to supplant Jiang as the authoritative public voice of Chinese foreign policy on key issues such as Taiwan and Korea, while subtly reasserting the role of the

Politburo (vs. the CMC) as a venue for discussing military affairs. On substantive issues, however, Hu remains solidly on-message and in the mainstream, and has given observers little evidence from which to infer his personal vision of national security policy (his personal activism on Korea is the main exception here).

Hu came to offi ce with far more experience in internal security, based on his days in Guizhou and Tibet, and his record suggested both that he was willing to use repression, but also that he might consider bolder, more sophisticated strategies for internal security than Jiang. In the end, however, in his July 1 speech he missed his major opportunity of the year for annunciating a personal vision of internal security policy―perhaps because of opposition among Jiang supporters within the leadership. Instead, his handling of specifi c cases―Hefei, Hong Kong―suggests a leader who is still reactive and a bit ambivalent when faced with mass protest.

The SARS case, however, raises interesting questions about Hu, and suggests a little about his crisis decisionmaking style. It is unclear how deeply committed Hu really is to greater transparency in government, in particular a truly free fl ow of policy-related information. Some of his public statements in this regard are clearly designed to create a powerfully reformist image.47 _{Hu has indeed}

pushed to have Chinese authorities release more information, but still at the government’s discretion. On Hu and Wen’s watch, Chinese police arrested large numbers of citizens for “spreading rumors” about SARS via cell-phones and there is no sign that Hu and Wen have criticized these arrests, ordered these persons released, or directed that the Implementing Regulations of the State Secrets Law that make such actions a crime be revised or repealed. So for now it appears that Hu and Wen’s preference is not necessarily for a much freer fl ow of information. It is possible they prefer a regime of greater information and transparency, but one in which the government is able to get out ahead of information fl ows rather than being manipulated by them and placed in a passive position.

This case merits closer scrutiny as we consider how Hu might respond to future crises. The case also makes clear that, despite his well-deserved reputation for caution, Hu is able to respond to crises with some boldness and marshal his forces to overturn past policy consensus. In the SARS case, Hu’s relative boldness was rewarded

handsomely―Hu seems to have won increased popular support, and soon after the policy shift, China began to see greater success in its handling of the disease. Perhaps more importantly, by the sheer popularity of their demarche, Hu and Wen were able to compel the more recalcitrant members of the Politburo―most of whom did not owe their promotions to them―to embrace their position. The impressive payoffs from this early test may encourage him to respond in similar fashion in future crises.48

But Hu’s efforts to portray himself as a leader who is more in favor of public discussion, reform, openness, transparency, and accountability is also potentially very risky. In particular, it risks sending many disgruntled citizens in Chinese society a possibly mistaken message―that Hu Jintao is signifi cantly more liberal than Jiang Zemin―an assertion for which we have very little hard evidence as yet. Such a public perception risks creating false perceptions of a reformer/conservative split in the leadership and unrealistic public hopes that might encourage greater dissent or unrest. Moreover, Hu’s apparent willingness to respond to protests with concessions certainly risks creating incentives for more protests. These could place Hu Jintao in a dangerous situation (the overly effusive, populist, and reformist wording used by some offi cial media outlets in describing Hu is, in this respect, risky and perhaps even unwise). If Hu is attempting to paint an image of himself as more populist and pro-reform than he is in order to broaden his popular base of support (perhaps as compensation for his weak personnel base in the top leadership), he needs to proceed with greater caution, lest he seem to promise more than he really intends to deliver.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. Andrew J. Nathan and Bruce Gilley, China’s New Rulers: The Secret Files, New York, New York Review Books, 2002. See especially chapter 2, pp. 36-73.

2. Joseph Fewsmith, “The Sixteenth National Party Congress: The Succession that Didn’t Happen,” The China Quarterly, No. 173, pp. 1-16.

3. For an article that stresses the large number of Fu allies in the new leadership, see Oliver Chou, “PLA’s Old Guard Makes Sure the New Faces Fit,” South China Morning Post, internet version, December 2, 2002.

4. According to various press sources, by mid-year Hu was reportedly the secretary of the Central Leading Groups for Foreign Affairs, National Security, and Taiwan Affairs. Like other Party leaders before him, he has not chosen to chair the Leading Groups on Political-Legal Affairs (Luo Gan does). I have no sources on the current chair of the Leading Group for the Protection of State Secrets.

5. See, for example, “Beijing Bids Farewell to Beidaihe,” Japan Times, July 29, 2003.

6. A May 23, 2003, Xinhuanet report claims that Hu Jintao has ended the practise of giving leaders big airport sendoffs when they go overseas, beginning with his fi rst foreign trip to Russia, Kazakhstan, and Mongolia, to make the leadership appear more professional and less distant and regal.

7. The text of the speech was published by Xinhua, July 1, 2003, BBC translation, accessed on Lexis-Nexis.

8. On this trend, see Evan Medeiros and Taylor Fravel, “China’s New Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs, November 2003.

9. “Mr. Hu, 59, is the enforcer who was the top offi cial in Tibet when China imposed martial law in 1989 to quell unrest. He is the nationalist who supported anti-American protesters after a United States bomb destroyed the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia in 1999.” Joseph Kahn, “Mystery Man At the Helm: Hu Jintao,” New York Times, November 15, 2002, p. A-1.

10. Based on a Lexis-Nexis world news search by the author.

11. See, for example, Xinhua’s April 21, 2003, report on Hu’s meetings with Senator Frist.

Hu Jintao said: The nature of the Taiwan issue is an issue of sovereignty which involves the question of China’s reunifi cation or separation. The Chinese government’s position on the Taiwan issue has been consistent and clear. We appreciate the U.S. side’s reaffi rmation on several occasions of adherence to the one-China policy, of abiding by the three Sino-US joint communiqués, and of opposing “Taiwan independence.” It is hoped that the U.S. side will keep its commitments, not send wrong signals to the “Taiwan independence” forces, and play a constructive role in China’s peaceful reunifi cation. It is also hoped that friends in the U.S. Congress and senators will exert a positive impact to this end. 12. Xinhua Domestic Service, March 11, 2003, translation BBC/SWB.

13. See the statement by Taiwan Affairs Offi ce spokesman Zhang Mingqing, AFP, November 27, 2002. Also, at a January 2003 Hong Kong symposium

commemorating the eighth anniversary of Jiang’s “eight point proposal,” Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (H.K. S.A.R.) Taiwan Offi ce Director General Xing Kuishan reaffi rmed the continuity and stability of the policy.

14. Xinhua Domestic Service, March 11, 2003, translation BBC/SWB.

15. Ibid. Hu announced “four viewpoints on work toward Taiwan in the new situation,” though it was unclear what was “new” about the situation, especially given that he has endorsed the success of policies in the past. The four viewpoints were (1) always uphold the one China principle; (2) vigorously promote cross- strait economic and cultural exchanges; (3) thoroughly implement a policy of placing our hopes on the people of Taiwan; and (4) uniting compatriots on both sides of the straits in joint effort for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

16. Jiang actually said little about Taiwan at the Congress.

Fresh progress has been made in the great cause of national reunifi cation. The Chinese Government has resumed the exercise of sovereignty over Macao. The principle of “one country, two systems” has been implemented, and the basic laws of Hong Kong and Macao special administrative regions have been carried out to the letter. Hong Kong and Macao enjoy social and economic stability. Personnel, economic and cultural exchanges across the Taiwan Straits have kept increasing. The fi ght against “Taiwan independence” and other attempts to split the country has been going on in depth.

He went on to say:

Here, on behalf of the CPC Central Committee, I wish to express our heartfelt thanks to the people of all our ethnic groups, the democratic parties, people’s organizations and patriots from all walks of life, to our compatriots in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the Macao Special Administrative Region and Taiwan as well as overseas Chinese, and to our foreign friends who care about and support China’s modernization drive.

“Full text of Jiang Zemin’s report at 16th Party congress,” Xinhua, November 17, 2002, accessed on Lexis-Nexis.

17. Xinhua Domestic Service, March 11, 2003, translation BBC/SWB. 18. South China Morning Post web site, June 19, 2003.South China Morning PostSouth China Morning Post

20. Interview with Interfax, May 22, 2003. 21. Ibid.

22. In their February meeting, Hu tried to reassure Secretary Powell that China was working through private channels to deal with the North Korean government and urged the United States to hold direct dialogues with the North as soon as possible. Washington Post, February 25, 2003, p. A-19; New York Times, February 25, 2003.

23. Interview with Interfax May 22, 2003. 24. Ibid.

25. Zong Hairen: “Hu Jintao Writes to Kim Chong-il To Open Door to Six- Party Talks,” Hsin Pao, Hong Kong, BBC translation accessed on Lexis-Nexis.

26. Wu Chenguang, “China Pushes forward Military Transformation,” Nanfang Zhoumo, internet version, June 12, 2003, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) translation.

27. Ibid.

28. South China Morning Post, online edition, May 26, 2003; also Nanfang Zhoumo, June 12, 2003.

29. South China Morning Post, online edition, May 26, 2003.

30. I have analyzed this debate in a forthcoming chapter in a book on law and society in China, edited by Kevin O’Brien, Stanley Lubman, and Neil J. Diamant (Stanford University Press).

31. Hu’s comments at the time are nicely summarized in Richard Daniel Ewing, “Hu Jintao, the Making of a Chinese General Secretary,” The China Quarterly, No. 173, March 2003, pp. 22-25.

32. Susan Lawrence, “Primed for Power” Far Eastern Economic Review, February 22, 2001.

33. Xinhua, March 6, 1997. 34. Ibid.

35. Note, for example, the unusual publicity given by the PRC-owned HK daily, Ta Kung Pao, to an August forum in Jilin on intra-Party democracy featuring several Party academics.

36. For a sample of these rumored reforms, see John Pomfret, “Chinese Leader Solidifi es Power,” The Washington Post, June 28, 2003, p. A18; Luo Bing, “Hu Jintao Promises ‘Reforms in Four Fields’,” Zhengming, June 1, 2003, pp. 11-13.

37. John Pomfret, “Chinese Leader Solidifi es Power,” The Washington Post, June 28, 2003, p. A18.

38. This lack of even a strong statement on the need for reform is striking. Willy Lam, writing on the eve of the speech, reported that Hu had dropped his reform proposals, but would at least say that “there is no way out for the Party save political reform.” “China’s Conservative Backlash,” CNN.com, June 24, 2003.

39. On p. 6, however, Hu discusses at some length the need to build a Party that serves the interests of the people, and rules the country for the people―forfor that this is an essence of the Three Representations. But the speech says nothing about the desirability of involving the people more in their own government―an omission that may undermine the justifi cation for any such institutional reforms for the time being.

40. BBC.co.uk, January 9, 2003. This report notes the PRC-owned Wen Wei Po as one source.

41. Xinhua Domestic Service, July 19, 2003, FBIS translation.

42. Yao Ye, “Child’s Death Turns Up Heat on China’s Police,” Asiatimes online, June 28, 2003.

43. John Pomfret, “Outbreak Gave China’s Hu an Opening,” Washington Post, May 13, 2003, p. A-1.

44. Ibid.

45. Jonathan Ansfi eld of Reuters reports that in late May when Hu Jintao was overseas, Jiang lunched with Zhang in Beijing, and Zhang’s former deputy, Vice Minister Gao Qiang, made a public statement defending Zhang, which he was forced to retract under intense media criticism. “Hu, Jiang Intrigue Clouds China’s Reform Outlook,” Reuters, June 29, 2003.

46. Rupert Wingfi eld-Hayes, “Hu Jintao and the Handling of the SARS Epidemic,” BBC.co.uk.

47. Note, for example, the widely quoted statement, attributed to Hu and Li Changchun, that the press must be “closer to life, closer to reality, and closer to the people,” and must honour the people’s “right to know” (zhiqingquan). Willy Wo- Lap Lam, “China’s Conservative Backlash,” CNN.com, June 24, 2003.

48. The case, of course, still leaves open the question of just what types of issues and problems make Hu seize the initiative and what types of policy actions he might consider in a crisis.

CHAPTER 4