Strategies to identify genomic biomarkers

Self-organization theory considers nature as dynamic and is hence opposed to the classical Newtonian worldview that characterizes nature and soci-ety as strictly determined, immutable, conservative, reducible to mechanics, and stabile. Hegel, Marx, and Engels were highly critical of the Newto-nian worldview. They emphasized interconnection and processes instead of singularities and reduction. Hegel criticized atomistic philosophies (Hegel 1874, §§97, 98) by saying that they fix the One as One. The Absolute is formulated as Being-for-self, as One, and many ones. They wouldn’t see that the One and the Many are dialectically connected. Marx criticized the reductionism of individualism in his critique of Max Stirner (Marx and Engels 1846, 101–438¹) and put against this the notion of the indi-vidual as a social being that is estranged in capitalism and becomes a well-rounded individual in communism. Engels questioned the reductionism and

individualism of “metaphysical thinkers” (Engels 1878, 20sq.; 1886a, 482).

Due to the stress on dynamic development, self-organization theory can be considered as a reformulation of dialectical philosophy (Hodgson 2000, 65;

Hofkirchner 1993, 1998; Prigogine and Stengers 1984; Steigerwald 2000;

Woods and Grant 2002). “The idea of a history of nature as an integral part of materialism was asserted by Marx and, in greater detail, by Engels.

Contemporary developments in physics, the discovery of the constructive role played by irreversibility, have thus raised within the natural sciences a question that has long been asked by materialists. For them, understand-ing nature meant understandunderstand-ing it as beunderstand-ing capable of producunderstand-ing man and his societies” (Prigogine and Stengers 1984, 252). In Marxist thinking also, Ernst Bloch’s concept of matter anticipated the modern theories of self-organization. Nature is for Bloch a producing subject; he says it is form-ing itself, formform-ing out of itself (1963, 234). Bloch used the term emergence in stressing that all gestalt figures emerge from the dialectical process and from matter as developing, producing (ausgebären²) substance immanently as well as speculatively (Bloch 1975, 165).

The logic of self-organizing systems resembles the dialectical principles of the transition from quantity to quality, negation, and negation of the nega-tion (Fuchs 2003e):

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel has outlined that the purpose of dialec-tics is “to study things in their own being and movement and thus to demon-strate the finitude of the partial categories of understanding” (Hegel 1874, note to §81). Self-organization refers to the forms of movement of matter and hence is connected to dialectical thinking. What is called control param-eters, critical values, bifurcation points, phase transitions, nonlinearity, selec-tion, fluctuaselec-tion, and intensification in self-organization theory (principles 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9) corresponds to the dialectical principle of transition from quantity to quality. This is what Hegel has discussed as the Measure (Hegel 1874, §§107–111): The Measure is the qualitative quantum; the quantum is the existence of quantity. “The identity between quantity and quality, which is found in Measure, is at first only implicit, and not yet explicitly realised.

In other words, these two categories, which unite in Measure, each claim an independent authority. On the one hand, the quantitative features of exis-tence may be altered, without affecting its quality. On the other hand, this increase and diminution, immaterial though it be, has its limit, by exceeding which the quality suffers change. . . . But if the quantity present in measure exceeds a certain limit, the quality corresponding to it is also put in abey-ance. This however is not a negation of quality altogether, but only of this definite quality, the place of which is at once occupied by another. This pro-cess of measure, which appears alternately as a mere change in quantity, and then as a sudden revulsion of quantity into quality, may be envisaged under the figure of a nodal (knotted) line” (ibid., §§108–109).

Hegel gives an example for the transition from quantity to quality: “Thus the temperature of water is, in the first place, a point of no consequence in

respect of its liquidity: still with the increase of diminution of the tempera-ture of the liquid water, there comes a point where this state of cohesion suffers a qualitative change, and the water is converted into steam or ice”

(Hegel 1874, §108). In the language of self-organization theory, one can say that temperature is a control parameter. At zero degrees Celsius a critical threshold is reached; water changes its quality; ice emerges as a new quality.

As other examples, Hegel mentions the reaching of a point where a single additional grain makes a heap of wheat; or the point where the bald-tail is produced, if we continue plucking out single hairs.

What is called emergence of order, production of information, or symme-try breaking in self-organization theory (principles 10, 11, 14) corresponds to Hegel’s notions of sublation (Aufhebung) and negation of the nega-tion. Something is only what it is in its relationship to another, but by the negation of the negation this something incorporates the other into itself.

The dialectical movement involves two moments that negate each other, a somewhat and an other. As a result of the negation of the negation, “some-thing becomes an other; this other is itself somewhat; therefore it likewise becomes an other, and so on ad infinitum” (Hegel 1874, §93). Being-for-self or the negation of the negation means that somewhat becomes an other, but this again is a new somewhat that is opposed to an other and as a synthe-sis results again in an other, and therefore it follows that something in its passage into other only joins with itself: it is self-related (§95). In becom-ing there are two moments (Hegel 1812, §§176–179): combecom-ing-to-be and ceasing-to-be: by sublation, that is, negation of the negation, being passes over into nothing, it ceases to be, but something new shows up, is coming to be. What is sublated (aufgehoben) on the one hand ceases to be and is put to an end, but on the other hand it is preserved and maintained (ibid., §185).

In dialectics, a totality transforms itself; it is self-related. This corresponds to the notions of self-production and circular causality. The negation of the negation has positive results, that is, in a self-organizing system the negation of elements results in positive new qualities. Hegel speaks in this context of being determined (bestimmtes sein).

Friedrich Engels, in his Dialectics of Nature and his Anti-Dühring, devel-oped a dynamic worldview in which motion is the mode of existence of matter (Engels 1878, 55). Examples that Engels (1878, 1886a) mentions for the transition from quantity to quality are the homologous series of carbon compounds, a certain current strength that is required to cause the platinum wire of an electric incandescent lamp to glow, the temperature of incandescence and fusion of metals, the freezing and boiling points of liquids, the critical point at which a gas can be liquefied by pressure and cooling, the change of form of motion and energy, or Hegel’s example of the states of aggregation of water. As an example for dialectical development, Engels mentions the development process of a grain of barley: “Billions of such grains of barley are milled, boiled and brewed and then consumed. But if such a grain of barley meets with conditions which are normal for it, if it

falls on suitable soil, then under the influence of heat and moisture it under-goes a specific change, it germinates; the grain as such ceases to exist, it is negated, and in its place appears the plant which has arisen from it, the nega-tion of the grain. But what is the normal life-process of this plant? It grows, flowers, is fertilised and finally once more produces grains of barley, and as soon as these have ripened the stalk dies, is in its turn negated. As a result of this negation of the negation we have once again the original grain of barley, but not as a single unit, but ten-, twenty- or thirtyfold” (Engels 1878, 126). As similar examples, he mentions the development process of insects, geology as a series of negated negations, a series of successive chatterings of old and deposits of new rock formations, differential and integral calculus, the development of philosophy and society. Such development processes can also be described as self-organizing development: The control parameters that influence the development of the grain are time and natural conditions such as heat and moisture. During the development, new seeds show up. At a specific point of time, a critical point is reached and the grain ceases to exist. But at the same time, new grains emerge. Nodal lines or the transition from quantity to quality are today also studied in self-organization theory, especially in the theory of self-organized criticality (Bak 1996).

Dialectical processes and negation of the negation mean not just the emergence of other, new qualities; dialectic development also includes devel-opment process that results in higher qualities and other structural levels.

Dialectical development is not just change or transformation and self-reproduction; it is also the emergence of higher levels of organization (Hörz 1976, 311sqq.). Hence, dialectical thinking assumes an immanent hierar-chy in nature and evolutionary leaps. “The transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a decisive change” (Engels 1878, 61). Self-organization theory is also dialectical in the respect that it fre-quently considers self-organization as emergent evolution. This means that there are hierarchical organizational levels of self-organization that differ in complexity. New qualities of organization emerge on upper levels. In self-organization theory, for example, Ervin Laszlo (1987) argues that evolution does not take place continuously, but in sudden, discontinuous leaps. After a phase of stability, a system would enter a phase of instability; fluctua-tions intensify and spread out. In this chaotic state, the development of the system is not determined; it is only determined that one of several possible alternatives will be realized. Laszlo says that evolution takes place in such a way that new organizational levels emerge. He identifies successive steps of evolution. Not all scientists who speak about self-organization include the development of higher qualities into their concepts. Hence, dialectical mate-rialism can in this respect be considered as a broader evolutionary concept than self-organization.

The principle of relative chance, which is typical for self-organizing systems, has already been considered as dialectic of chance and neces-sity by Hegel, Marx, and Engels (Hegel 1874, §§144–149; Engels 1886a,

486–491). Engels has stressed that the dialectic of attraction and repulsion is an aspect of matter and its movement. Both elements are also described by self-organization theory: Chaos, noise, or instability are seen as disordered movement of the elements of a complex system. One can also say that the elements are repulsing each other. But this repulsion is one that turns into attraction, because the elements interact; there are processes of ordering and selection, that is, attraction takes place as the emergence of a coherent whole and new qualities.

Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (1992) applied self-orga-nization theory to biology in order to find a consistent definition of life.

They say that living systems are biologically self-organizing in the sense that they permanently produce themselves, their parts, and their unity. They term such self-producing systems autopoietic (autos = self, poiein = to make something). Engels pointed out the problem of defining life and intuitively anticipated autopoiesis theory. Of course, today we know a whole lot more about life than Engels did, especially since the discovery of the double helix.

But what’s important is that Engels anticipated the idea of autopoiesis. He says that life exists in the “constant self-renewal of the chemical constitu-ents” it has (Engels 1878, 75); it is a “self-implementing process” (ibid. 76).

Albumen would not only permanently decompose itself; it would also per-manently produce itself from its components (Engels 1876a, 558f).

I am aware that, due to Marxist orthodoxy, dialectical materialism is today considered by many as a mechanic worldview that assumes that capi-talism by natural laws collapses and that communism is an automatic result.

Orthodox Marxism interpreted societal development as a natural process and neglected the role of agency. For me, speaking of self-organization means that novelty can emerge from the interactions of agents that are not determined but conditioned, that is, enabled and constrained, by existing structures. Self-organization in society is used as a category that stresses agency and the creativity of human cooperation. Linking these ideas to Marxian dialectical categories shall not revive a determinist conception of history but show the topicality of reading Marx’s works as a theory of agency, cooperation, and self-determination. Traditional Marxism is not the same as Marxian ideas.

Antonio Negri argues that Hegelian dialectics is deterministic, a “sche-matism of reason and transcendentality” and a “reformist teleology” (Negri 2004, 84). The critique of dialectics by Negri holds true for vulgar dialecti-cal thinking such as the one of Stalin and Mao, in which the development of society has been conceived as based on deterministic natural laws so that human practice could be considered as unimportant and the Soviet and Chinese systems could ideologically be legitimated as free societies because, according to dialectical materialism, socialism would, as a natural law, have to follow after capitalism. That these regimes were indeed highly repres-sive was ideologically concealed by a deterministic interpretation of Hege-lian dialectics. Stalin (1938) misinterpreted Marx and argued that dialectics

apply similarly to nature and society and cause a linear, successive develop-ment in both realms. Stalin overlooks that social dialectics differ from natu-ral dialectics in the respect that human beings have a much greater degree of freedom of choice than nature does have; they can make a conscious differ-ence that makes a differdiffer-ence in society. Stalin’s interpretation of dialectics is structural, functionalistic, and deterministic. Based on the deterministic nat-uralization of society, he argues that “revolutions made by oppressed classes are a quite natural and inevitable phenomenon” and based on this mechanic determinism he says that “the U.S.S.R. has already done away with capital-ism and has set up a socialist system” where “there are no longer exploiters and exploited”. Stalin interprets the dialectical movement of society as a natural law in order to idealize the Soviet system that was indeed a sys-tem of terror, domination, exploitation, and repression. He argues that this system must be considered as a free society because it would be the system following capitalism, and according to historical laws and the natural devel-opment of society, a free society would follow capitalism. In Stalinism (and similarly in Maoism and some other isms), dialectics became an ideology.

“[In Soviet ideology] the consciousness and action of the proletariat then are largely determined by the ‘blind laws’ of the capitalist process instead of having broken through this determinism. . . . the capitalist development, the transition to socialism, and the subsequent development of Soviet society through its various phases is presented as the unfolding of a system of objec-tive forces that could not have unfolded otherwise. To be sure, strong and constant emphasis is placed on the guiding role of the Communist Party and its leaders . . . The subjective factor no longer appears as an integral element and stage of the objective dialectic” (Marcuse 1958, 147sqq.).

But it is a premature conclusion to oppose all dialectical thinking. The dialectic of society must be based on the dialectic of human subjectivity and societal objects in order to be truly dialectical and nondeterministic. Such a reading of dialectics can be found in the philosophical writings of Marx and was for the first time explicitly formulated against deterministic interpreta-tions by Herbert Marcuse. Marcuse argues that capitalism is based on struc-tural antagonisms that cause crises; the tendency of crises would be an aspect of objective dialectics: “Capitalist society is a union of contradictions. It gets freedom through exploitation, wealth through impoverishment, advances in production through restriction of consumption. The very structure of capitalism is a dialectical one: every form and institution of the economic process begets its determinate negation, and the crisis is the extreme form in which the contradictions are expressed” (Marcuse 1999, 311sq.). Marcuse wanted to avoid a deterministic understanding of dialectics; he wanted to accomplish a turn from structuralism towards human practice in Marxism.

For doing so, he first turned to Heidegger’s phenomenology, but Heidegger’s fascist ideology and the publication of Marx’s “Economic-Philosophic Man-uscripts” in 1930 made him aware that there is a line of thought immanent in Marxian and Hegel’s works that allows the accomplishment of a turn

towards practice in Marxism. Capitalism would be dialectically negative by its very own antagonistic structure, but the negation of the negativity could only be achieved by human practice: “The negativity and its negation are two different phases of the same historical process, straddled by man’s historical action. The ‘new’ state is the truth of the old, but that truth does not steadily and automatically grow out of the earlier state; it can be set free only by an autonomous act on the part of men, that will cancel the whole of the existing negative state” (Marcuse 1999, 315). “Not the slightest natural necessity or automatic inevitability guarantees the transition from capital-ism to socialcapital-ism. . . . The realization of freedom and reason requires the free rationality of those who achieve it. Marxian theory is, then, incompatible with fatalistic determinism” (Marcuse 1999, 318sq.).

Subjective practices are conditioned, that is, enabled and constrained, by objective antagonisms; vice versa, objective reality is a result of the subjective realization of certain objective potentials. For Marcuse, dialectics is dialectics of subject and object, freedom and necessity, a unity of subjective dialectics and objective dialectics. The rise and fall of the Soviet system has shown that there is no automatic historical development. Capitalism produces antago-nistic potentials for cooperation that anticipate a cooperative society. If a cooperative society will emerge is decided in social struggles and by realized or unrealized potentials for social self-organization of oppressed groups in contemporary network capitalism. It is not predetermined. Subjective dia-lectics is dialectically connected to the objective dialectical structure of con-temporary society. With the help of the concept of self-organization, I want to contribute to a subjective turn of dialectical thinking, that is, a dialectic of dialectics that overcomes the theoretical and practical gap between human subjects and social structures. A mechanic dialectic can be avoided by an emphasis on practice and subjectivity that argues that the objective dialectic sets conditions, that is, enables and constrains the subjective dialectic of human practice that can, based on conditioning structures, produce differ-ent historical alternatives of developmdiffer-ent. It is also important to stress that human dialectics differs from natural dialectics in the sense that humans are knowledgeable, creative, visionary, anticipatory, self-conscious, active social beings that, given certain societal conditions, can choose between different practices. In human practice we find much more (conditioned) degrees of freedom than in nature.