178a-181d: THE MAN FIGHTING IN ARMOR:
178a-180a: Fathers, sons, and education:
Lysimachus and Melesias, two undistinguished sons of famous generals and statesmen, seek Nicias’ and Laches’ opinions regarding the
educational value of training to fight in armor. 180a-181d: The appeal to Socrates:
Laches and Nicias advise the men to ask Socrates.
Laches on Socrates’ valor during the Athenian retreat from Delium.30
Lysimachus to Socrates: is it useful (e0pith/deion) for the young to learn to fight in armor?
Socrates defers to his older and more experienced colleagues, Nicias and Laches.
181e-189d: PRELIMINARY OPINIONS: 181d-182d: Nicias:
It is beneficial (w0fe/limon) to learn to fight in armor. It trains one for combat.
It is the first step on the way to the art of the general and the many noble and worthy (kala\ kai\ pollou= a1cia) practices associated with it. Finally, a young man trained to fight in armor will acquire an appearance that will frighten the enemy.
182d-184c: Laches:
If the practice were beneficial, the Spartans would have adopted it. Stesilaus, the very man who performed the exhibition, has performed ridiculously in battle.
Finally, a coward who learns the craft will become rash and more readily expose his inadequacies, while a brave man who learns it will be the object of close and critical scrutiny.
184d-187c: Socrates on knowledge, teachers, and care of the soul:
184d-185b: Must base the decision upon knowledge rather than majority opinion. Only he who has studied the matter in question under a good teacher will have the appropriate knowledge.
185b-186b: They are investigating the practice of fighting in armor in order to evaluate its effects upon the souls of young men (th=j yuxh=j e3neka th=j tw=n neani/skwn).
Therefore, they must determine whether any of them is skilled in the care of the soul (texniko\j peri\ yuxh=j qerapei/an) and has had good teachers in that subject.
Lysimachus and Melesias should seek advice from the man who can prove that he has studied under teachers who are good themselves and who have improved the souls of their pupils, or who can display men whose souls he has improved himself.
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186b-187c: Socrates has had no such teachers, nor has he been able to discover the necessary skills on his own.
Perhaps Nicias or Laches has had such teachers or has taught others himself.
187c-189d: Nicias and Laches on Socrates’ words and deeds:
187c-d: Will Nicias and Laches consent to be questioned by Socrates?
187d-188c: Nicias knows and approves of Socrates’ style of inquiry, which scrutinizes a man in all the details of his life.
188c-189b: Laches is unfamiliar with Socrates’ manner of discussion, but if his words match his deeds (lo/goi; e1rga), he will be happy to talk with him.
189d-194c: SOCRATES AND LACHES:
189d-190c: What is virtue?
The best way to proceed is to discover the nature of that which improves the souls of the young.
Souls are improved by virtue (a0reth/).
Therefore, the question they must ask is: what is virtue? 190c-e: What is courage?
They agree to consider a part of virtue, particularly that part to which fighting in armor is most directly related, namely courage (a0ndrei/a). What, then, is courage?
190e: Laches’ first definition:
Courage is remaining at one’s post and fending off the enemy without fleeing.
190e-192b: Socrates’ objection:
Laches’ definition is incomplete; he has provided not a definition of courage but an example of one type of courageous action.
191e-192b: Socrates on the difference between an example and a definition. 192c: Laches’ second definition:
Courage is endurance of the soul (karteri/a…th=j yuxh=j).
192c-d: Socrates’ objection:
This definition is as broad as the previous one was narrow. Courage is noble.
Endurance is noble only if it is accompanied by wisdom (meta\
fronh/sewj); if accompanied by foolishness, it is harmful and productive of the bad (blabera\ kai\ kakou=rgoj).
Therefore, if courage is noble, but endurance is sometimes noble and sometimes not, the two cannot be identical.
192d: Laches’ second definition revised:
Courage is wise endurance (h9 fro/nimoj…karteri/a).
192e-193d: Socrates’ objection:
Examples of wise endurance do not qualify as courage. Examples of foolish endurance that do seem courageous.
In all situations the actions of the man who lacks knowledge are more courageous than those of the man who is skilled in the activity. Foolish endurance is shameful (ai0sxra/) and harmful.
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Therefore, foolish endurance, which is shameful, is courage, which is noble.
193d-194b: Aporia:
Socrates and Laches partake of courage, yet their present discourse shows no evidence of the fact.
They agree to endure (karterh/swmen) in the search for courage. Laches is not accustomed to such discourses, but the love of victory has possessed him.
194c-199e: SOCRATES AND NICIAS: 194c-d: Nicias’ definition of courage:
Courage is a type of wisdom (sofi/a ti/j h9 a0ndrei/a).
194d-195a: Nicias’ definition clarified:
Courage is knowledge of that which is fearful and that which inspires confidence (th\n tw=n deinw=n kai\ qarrale/wn e0pisth/mhn).
195a-c: Laches’ objection:
Doctors, farmers, and the other craftsmen know what is to be feared in their particular area of expertise, but we do not call such men courageous on that account.
195c-d: Nicias’ reply:
Experts know only the objects of their expertise; they do not know whether these things are good or bad.
195e-196c: Laches and Nicias quarrel:
Laches: Nicias must intend to call prophets courageous.
Nicias: seers know only what will be, not whether what will be is good or bad.
196e-197a: Socrates’ objections to Nicias’ definition:
If courage is knowledge of that which is fearful and that which inspires confidence, then courage is extremely rare.
Moreover, according to this definition one must either deny that any animal is courageous or admit that animals possess a type of knowledge that very few humans can claim.31
197b-c: Nicias’ reply:
Animals are not courageous.
Any man or beast who from ignorance (u9po\ a0noi/aj) does not fear that which is fearful is not courageous but fearless and stupid (a1fobon kai\ mw=ron).
What the many call courage is rashness (qrase/a). 197c-e: Laches and Nicias quarrel:
Laches: Nicias intends to rob men of the honor due them for their courage. Nicias: I grant any man who is courageous the distinction of being wise. Laches accuses Nicias of sophistry.
197e-199e: Socrates’ final objection to Nicias’ definition: 197e-198a: They have been examining courage as a part of virtue.
But virtue has other parts, such as temperance and justice.
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198b-c: The fearful is that which produces fear, which in turn results from the anticipation of future evils (ta\ kaka/).
That which inspires confidence does not produce fear; it refers to future things that are not evil (ta\ mh\ kaka/) or to future goods (a0gaqa/). 198c-199a: The past, the present, and the future are all the domain of a single
knowledge.32
199a-e: Therefore, courage is not knowledge only of the fearful and that which inspires confidence, for these refer exclusively to the future.
Courage must be knowledge of past, present, and future goods and evils. Therefore, courage is knowledge of good and evil generally.
But the man who possesses general knowledge of good and evil possesses the whole of virtue.
Therefore, Nicias’ definition may be accurate regarding virtue as a whole; but it does not adequately distinguish courage.
200a-c Laches and Nicias quarrel:
Laches mocks Nicias’ failure.
Nicias accuses Laches of being more concerned with remarking the inadequacies of others than of acknowledging and improving his own weaknesses.
200c-201c: THEY ALL NEED A TEACHER:
Laches and Nicias advise Lysimachus and Melesias to entrust their sons’ education to Socrates.
Socrates insists that he cannot educate the boys, for, as the conversation has shown, he is as ignorant as Nicias and Laches.
Socrates suggests they find a teacher for themselves as well as for the boys.
32 In this section Socrates alludes to Nicias’ role in the Athenians’ catastrophe on Sicily during the Peloponnesian War. See Plutarch’s Nicias, 23 ff.
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LACHES