El suelo y sus irregularidades

In the middle of the nineteenth century, Minahasa was regarded as the most important Dutch possession east of Java, and perhaps even the most important in the outer islands.11® Yet by 1922, one Minahasan could describe it as a "forgotten corner" of the Indies.11^ Although the enormous territorial and economic expansion of the colony over the intervening decades allowed Minahasans to become an elite outside their homeland, in the long term it also implied a threat to their privileged status.

There was a time when, apart from Minahasa and a tiny area around Makasar, we did not concern ourselves with Celebes at all. The rest of the island was simply left to its own devices. 116. On Manado Malay, see Watuseke & Watuseke-Politton

(1981) .

117. The NZG initially promoted a form similar to that used by the VOC for diplomatic purposes, converting to Riau Malay toward the end of the 19th century (Graafland 1898 I: 541; Watuseke & Watuseke-Politton 1981: 324-325). Graafland (1898

I: 539) regarded the Manado dialect as a "bastardisation" of Malay.

118. Francis 1856-1859 III: 278; Padtbrugge 1866: 304. 119. Marchand 1922: 545.

Extraordinary effort was lavished upon Minahasa without concern for equity with other areas; schools were built and salaries fixed as if there was nothing else in the Indies besides that one region. (120)

Having unified the archipelago as a territorial state, the colonial government began to be concerned with levelling its uneven social surface. Practical considerations played a part here, as it was sometimes cheaper in the long run to train local personnel than to import Minahasans. But this high-handed egalitarianism was also inspired by a further development of the spirit of rational, impersonal administration which had helped to unify Minahasa itself. Except where European privileges were concerned, the absolutist colonial state of the twentieth century was opposed in principle to the kind of ethnic favouritism which had often served imperial purposes in the past. When Minahasan chiefs pressed at the turn of the century for inclusion of all Minahasans in the European category for civil law purposes, part of the government's reply was that "legal gelijkstelling with Europeans naturally could not be limited to particular parts of the Netherlands Indies".1^ The same principle informed Dutch attacks upon racist explanations for Minahasan achievements.

Many among the Ambonese and Minahasans themselves have a tendency to attribute their mental superiority to superior racial qualities. This interpretation is, I believe, in conflict with the historical facts. It also does nothing to further 120. From a colonial budget statement for 1912, quoted in

'De onderwijs-reorganisatie in de Minahassa' (1912: 60). 121. From a ministerial statement reproduced by Carpentier- Alting (1902-1903 I: iii). The original request is stated in

'Rapport over de 'adat kabiasaan' (1911 [1896]: 110-112), and by Waworuntu (1902: 49).

brotherly cooperation with the other native inhabitants of the Indies, nor indeed to promote the self-knowledge which Ambonese and Minahasans so badly need.(122)

The change in attitude was often more strongly manifest in rhetoric than in action, for Minahasa's educational lead was, as I have noted, retained. Nevertheless, some concrete implications were felt. By 1936, for instance, it was official policy to dispense with Minahasan technical, clerical and advisory personnel in the native states of Celebes as soon as suitably qualified local people became available. Moreover, relative educational advantages were no guarantee of security once white collar unemployment became a universal problem. By 1938, many Minahasan expatriates were aware that the emergence of a

klerkenproletariaat elsewhere in the archipelago might

ultimately throw them back upon their own resources.

How many unemployed intellectuals wander the 'island of Java now? Already a thousand times as many as in Celebes, yet more appear every year. Where will they find work? Although we as children of Celebes are also inhabitants of Netherlands India, I feel that we are all just passengers in Java, exiles who must eventually return to our own tanah air. (124)

The realisation that Minahasa's days of unquestioned privilege were numbered had an influence upon its political attitude to the colonial government, as discussed in the following chapter.

122. Kerkkamp 1918: 4 3 .

123. Broeder 1936: 1008. The Protestant mission in central Celebes had begun substituting local teachers for Minahasans as early as 1916 (Brouwer 1951: 124) .

The most striking illustration of how the experience of becoming a subaltern elite affected Minahasan identity, and

also how the threat to that elite status stimulated

Minahasan nationalism, is provided by a different category

of expatriates. A substantial minority of emigrants from

Minahasa left not as clerks or teachers, but as soldiers. The tradition of military service began in 1829, when some 800 Minahasans were enlisted to help crush the rebel prince

Diponegoro in the last stages of the Java War. ^ 5 After

1850, Minahasa supplied the majority of the native Christian

contingent of the Netherlands Indies Army known as the

"Ambonese" Together with a smaller number of Sangir

islanders, the Minahasan part of this group was officially

referred to as "Manadonese". Attracted by an enlistment

premium and the promise of a state pension, recruits were

often drawn from the poorer parts of M i n a h a s a .^27 A

survival of traditional respect for the warrior may also

have played a role here.

Recruitment accelerated with the escalation of the Aceh war, and at the beginning of the twentieth century Minahasans also fought in the campaigns to establish Dutch authority in Jambi, South Celebes, Flores and New Guinea.-^28

125. Waworuntu 1918: 652; Van Gent 1923: 10-11. 126. Bosscher 1880: 229.

127. MR 779X/1920; Schouten [1986]: 2. The shame of corvee labour, from which soldiers were exempted for life, is also regularly mentioned as a factor ('De exodus van Minahassers' 1918: 665; Marcus 1919: 417).

Table 4.6: Ethnic composition of the Netherlands Indies Army, 1880-1936.(129) 1880 1900 1920 1936 Manadonese 725 1, 951 5, 930 5, 130 Ambonese proper 461 2,030 3,721 4, 052 Other natives 14,952 19,015 20,884 16,146 Europeans 17,Oil 15,109 7,880 7,751 Total strength 33,149 38,105 38,415 33,079 In addition to the soldiers, other Minahasans - about 2,000 of them in 1916 - served with the gewapende politie or armed police.130

Institutionalised racial discrimination reached its apogee in the army, and the intermediate status of the Manadonese between European and Muslim native was regulated with military precision. Everything from food to promotion was affected. On the one hand, the Minahasans were hailed as a martial elite - one Dutch officer called them "one of the finest military races in the world".131 Consequently they tended to view the ordinary native soldier, usually Javanese, with contempt. A report published in 1925 recommended segregation of the Manadonese troops from other ethnicities on the grounds that "a certain arrogance among them can lead to fights". 132 on tjie other hand, their own fondest aspiration, to be treated "seperti orang Belanda" - 129. Koloniaal Verslag 1881 Bijlage B: 4-7; 1901 Bijlage B: 4; 1921 Bijlage C: 5; Indisch Verslag 1937: 391.

130. Ratulangie & Laoh 1917: 472. 131. V 15/5/1918/64.

like Dutchmen - was frustrated. 133 At the same time, rivalry with the Moluccans prevented the "Ambonese" category from becoming a real focus of identity.134 The net result was an involution of loyalty and an ambiguous and explosive

esprit de corps within the Minahasan units.

Those who threaten to stain the military reputation of the Manadonese by slovenliness and suchlike are corrected by their compatriots, and not always gently. According to reports, people are less closed in Minahasa itself. But our Minahasan troops always give me the impression that they could form a danger, that they will preserve and extend their privileges at all costs, and that all their toasts to Her Majesty the Queen, the House of Orange and the tricolour are drunk upon the express condition that they remain Her Majesty's privileged Christian subjects - a position to which, in military respects, they have every claim.(135)

As predicted, the abolition of Minahasan military privileges in 1920 caused outrage among those affected, and came as a rude reminder of the real political situation. "I hope this meeting will understand my meaning if I say that we Minahasans are almost like part of bangsa Indo, the Indo- European group", said Ratulangie to a gathering of Minahasan soldiers in 1922. "But if we have anything to do with the government, we are immediately just natives". 136 By that time the soldiery had passed through a phase of intense politicisation which will be described in the following chapter.

133. Marcus 1919: 417.

134. Opposition to categorisation as "Ambonese" was an important political issue among Minahasan soldiers in 1919

(Marcus 1919: 417).

135. From a 1917 report by a former division commander, in V 15/5/1918/64.

I have shown that despite the "Manadonese" common ground between Minahasan and European, an element of reaction against European privilege and prejudice contributed to the sense of Minahasan community almost from its inception. But the pride which Minahasans soon derived from their own relative privilege over others was just as powerful an integrating factor. Having something in common to lose proved as effective a stimulus to unity as having something in common to gain. Of course, such sentiments sat uneasily with the ideal of Christian brotherhood upon which the original unity of Minahasa had been built. The crux would come when alternative ideals of unity were proposed by outsiders.