Al sujeto del conflicto, le implican consecuencias en el rendimiento académico

A very general criticism of the moral status framework claims that status classification of groups or types of beings according to certain criteria is a mistaken approach, as such, because status assignment, as a construct, has no leg to stand on, and is a fundamentally wrong approach to distribution of moral consideration.

Wilhelm Vossenkuhl, sceptical of any general value ascription to entities in nature (which I understand to be analogous in many respects to what I here describe as "status assignment") notes that in this context "No hierarchy is without problems." [transl. CH]369

His critique is not only aimed at holistic approaches which ascribe value according to function in the world's ecosystem or similar criteria, but also to pathocentric approaches. Any value ascription (or status assignment) is necessarily an anthropocentric one, Vossenkuhl states: it is always done by humans, out of a human mindset, and cannot take into account interests of nonhuman entities, since the latter are not accessible to us. Furthermore, while criteria like sentience are hard to ascertain, criteria like "utility within an ecosystem" are possibly even harder to establish, and, ultimately, have no moral relevance, Vossenkuhl argues. Consequently, value ascription systems and hierarchies are on a fundamentally wrong track, and should be given up altogether.

In fact, many types of status hierarchy take into account criteria which I personally would not regard as morally relevant (be it "utility in ecosystem", "membership in a race", or "rationality"). These are valid points of concern, yet, rather than presenting this as a general critique, I would suggest a type of status assignment that makes use of criteria that are more to my taste and reflect my respective value assumptions. Still, I acknowledge that status assignment processes are always highly problematic no matter what criteria are employed. Each such process depends on countless potentially problematic empirical assumptions (e.g. about the physical structure and needs of other beings), inductive steps or hypotheses (e.g. about preferences or interests of fellow beings, be they human or nonhuman), and all status assignments are tainted by our human and our personal perspective, which, in certain respects, we cannot leave behind.

369 _{Vossenkuhl (1993), "Ökologische Ethik - Über den moralischen Charakter der Natur", Information}

Yet, I believe that the model of status assignment describes quite well how moral consideration of types of entities does in fact happen in the real world. Robin Attfield's notorious statement that a human life is worth as much as one million trees is tacitly dismissed by Vossenkuhl, probably as indecent, morally reprehensible or at least demonstrably ridiculous.370 _{In fact, many such calculations are carried out implicitly in}

today's societies and by ourselves, maybe not with the same numerical result, but with the same variables being weighted against each other. Our governments do not spend all taxes on emergency healthcare or foreign aid (to save human lives), but use a sizeable proportion on the protection of animals (or even trees). Most governments or voters would hesitate to publicly make the calculation that "One life is worth n trees", yet these calculations are implicit in spending and other decisions. Regarding the value of human lives, government policy implicitly counts the lives and interests of natives far above the welfare and even lives of foreigners. Laws ensure that such hierarchical status assignments do have real world consequences, and they do not elicit much protest in public – as long as the status assignment is not made explicit.371 _{This is also true for individuals: every time you spend}

one Euro on free-range eggs rather than battery-hatched ones (out of animal welfare rather than culinary reasons), you make an implicit decision that ranks the interests of chickens above your own interest in buying something else with this amount of money. You weight chicken-welfare against human welfare, and have implicit assumptions about status hierarchies in this context (e.g. there is probably a quite low monetary limit above which you would not go in order to further chickens' interests).

Granted, there rarely is explicit status assignment in these processes – but this does not mean that there is none. We can detect a de facto, real-world status hierarchy in the consideration given to certain groups of people (or types of beings or entities) by society, and by individuals – even if the very same societies and individuals would find making such status hierarchies explicit mistaken and wrong. Status assignment to groups or types of beings may ultimately not be the perfect approach to moral consideration, but moral status assignment, resulting in (relatively) clear hierarchies and discriminatory practices, is what we as individuals, our governments and societies actually engage in on a large scale. It is also a cornerstone of speciesist approaches, the subject matter of the next section.

370 _{For Attfield’s hierarchical and strictly consequentialistic view of value distribution in nature, see Attfield}

(1987), A Theory of Value and Obligation.

371 _{An exception to this tendency is found in the U.S., where new regulation routinely undergoes cost benefit}